Biomass supply chain coordination for remote communities: A game-theoretic modeling and analysis approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 102819
Author(s):  
Zahra Vazifeh ◽  
Fereshteh Mafakheri ◽  
Chunjiang An
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Analysis Approach ◽  
Remote Communities ◽  
Modeling And Analysis ◽  
Biomass Supply ◽  
Game Theoretic

A game-theoretic analysis of the government's role on the biomass supply chain construction

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 444-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingling Zhai ◽  
Xu Zhang ◽  
Fei Cheng ◽  
Xiang Zhou ◽  
Xing Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Biomass Supply ◽  
Game Theoretic

Coordination mechanisms for digital and sustainable textile supply chain

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patanjal Kumar ◽  
Dheeraj Sharma ◽  
Peeyush Pandey
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Virtual Organization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Game Theoretic

PurposeSupply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.FindingsOur game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.Research limitations/implicationsThis study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.Originality/valueThis study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.

Impact of pricing structure on supply chain coordination with cooperative advertising

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (6) ◽  
pp. 1613-1629
Author(s):  
Seyed Jafar Sadjadi ◽  
Amin Alirezaee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Potential Demand ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact

This paper develops a game-theoretic model in a two-echelon supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two retailers to study the effect of pricing structure and cooperative-advertising decisions on the supply chain coordination performance. In the proposed model, different pricing structures are analyzed and then, two types of pricing structure in supply chain coordination mechanisms are presented, in addition to considering four possible scenarios for pricing structure. For the first two scenarios, retailers determine the retail prices, while in the other two ones, the sales price is set by the manufacturer. Therefore, the retailers are obliged to comply with this rule. The manufacturer-Stackelberg and the cooperative games are formulated for each scenario by considering key assumptions associated with advertising expenditures to maintain the potential demand size. This paper also presents some analytical results and determines the equilibrium of the models for each scenario. Finally, a numerical analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of pricing structure on the optimal decision variables and the profit of the supply chain members.

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination under a Reward–Penalty and a Manufacturer’s Subsidy Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9329
Author(s):  
Sungki Kim ◽  
Nina Shin ◽  
Sangwook Park
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Supply Chain Collaboration ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Recyclable Resources

Government legislation significantly impacts closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) operations. This study examines the collection rate of and decisions on the product greening improvement level in a three-level CLSC with the government’s reward–penalty and a manufacturer’s subsidy policy. Four game-theoretic models are analyzed in order to evaluate the ways in which the policy and revenue-sharing contracts (RSCs) between the manufacturer and retailer affect the CLSC members’ optimal decisions and profits. We found that a reward–penalty and subsidy policy raise the collection rate, as well as the product greening improvement level. A manufacturer’s financial conflict of interest can be mitigated using RSCs. The RSCs between the manufacturer and the retailer also increase the profit of a recycling company that successfully coordinates the CLSC. An interesting result is that, when the RSCs are used under the subsidy policy, the collection rate is higher than it is in a centralized model. We also found that the subsidy level needs to be adjusted according to the price of the recycling resources, and that increasing the value of the recyclable resources and lowering the recycling costs in the early stages of the supply chain collaboration could lead to higher environmental sustainability. These results illustrate that using an RSC can effectively coordinate the CLSC, and can thus help policy implementation by governments.

An analysis of sustainability and channel coordination in a three-echelon supply chain

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruting Huang ◽  
Xin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Environmentally Conscious ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
Decision Behaviors

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the decision behaviors and channel coordination of a sustainable three-echelon supply chain with retailer-led game setting.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop game-theoretic models to examine the decision behaviors of channel members in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier, one distributor and one dominated retailer. The authors first formulate two models for centralized decision and decentralized decision. And then this paper proposes sub-supply chain coordination and a two-tariff contract to coordinate the full supply chain. Finally, some management insights are obtained with a case study.FindingsThe authors find that when faced with environmentally conscious consumers, the channel members can benefit from higher greening level; however, higher cost of green technologies would have negative impacts on manufacturer's effort. The analysis also shows that cooperation among players can improve the supply chain performance and help with environmental improvement.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings provide important managerial insights for the three-echelon supply chain to achieve sustainable goals where the retailer bears the environmental responsibility. However, this paper also has some limitations with assuming risk-neutral channel members and symmetric information.Originality/valueThe findings of the study contribute to coordination and collaboration in sustainability of supply chains. The results provide important managerial insights for the three-echelon supply chain to achieve sustainable goals.

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