Coordination mechanisms for digital and sustainable textile supply chain

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patanjal Kumar ◽  
Dheeraj Sharma ◽  
Peeyush Pandey
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Virtual Organization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Game Theoretic

PurposeSupply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.FindingsOur game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.Research limitations/implicationsThis study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.Originality/valueThis study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.

A game-theoretic model for roadway performance management

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hesham Osman ◽  
Mazdak Nikbakht
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Road Users ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Asset Managers

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a socio-technical approach to modeling the behavior of roadway users, asset managers, and politicians toward roadway performance and asset management. This approach models the complex interactions that occur between these agents in a complex system. Most modeling approaches in the domain of infrastructure asset management take a purely asset-centric approach and fail to address these socio-technical interactions. Design/methodology/approach – Interactions among political decision makers, asset management strategy developers, and road users are modeled using a game-theoretic approach. The interactions are modeled as a non-cooperative game in which politicians, asset managers, and road users are the main players. Each player is autonomous and aims to come up with the set of moves to maximize their respective level of satisfaction in response to other players’ moves. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to deal with multitude of players’ goals, and the Nash equilibria of the game are south out to develop appropriate strategies for different players. Findings – An illustrative example for a road network of a Canadian city is used to demonstrate the developed methodology. The developed methodology demonstrates how behaviors of various agents involved in the sphere of asset management impacts their collective decision-making behavior. Originality/value – The developed framework provides asset managers and political decision makers with a valuable tool to evaluate the impact of public policy decisions related to asset managers on road performance and the overall satisfaction of road users.

Impact of pricing structure on supply chain coordination with cooperative advertising

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (6) ◽  
pp. 1613-1629
Author(s):  
Seyed Jafar Sadjadi ◽  
Amin Alirezaee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Potential Demand ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact

This paper develops a game-theoretic model in a two-echelon supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two retailers to study the effect of pricing structure and cooperative-advertising decisions on the supply chain coordination performance. In the proposed model, different pricing structures are analyzed and then, two types of pricing structure in supply chain coordination mechanisms are presented, in addition to considering four possible scenarios for pricing structure. For the first two scenarios, retailers determine the retail prices, while in the other two ones, the sales price is set by the manufacturer. Therefore, the retailers are obliged to comply with this rule. The manufacturer-Stackelberg and the cooperative games are formulated for each scenario by considering key assumptions associated with advertising expenditures to maintain the potential demand size. This paper also presents some analytical results and determines the equilibrium of the models for each scenario. Finally, a numerical analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of pricing structure on the optimal decision variables and the profit of the supply chain members.

scholarly journals Developing Fair Investment Plans to Enhance Supply Chain Visibility Using Cooperative Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 3209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changhyun Kim ◽  
KwangSup Shin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Collaborative Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Feasible Solutions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Impact

As supply chains become more complex and globalized, the individual participants of the supply chains should invest in systems based on information communication technologies (ICT) such as the remote frequency identification device (RFID) with tags that secure the visibility of the entire supply chain. In addition, the level of visibility, such as the container, pallet, carton, and box, should be determined for each participant to optimize its own profit function. By using a collaborative game scheme, the present study illustrates the relationships among participants who invest to a certain level of visibility, and then how much value each participant gets. To find feasible solutions, a genetic algorithm-based mechanism is devised for modeling various fitness functions considering the total profit and benefit to cost (B/C) ratio. The proposed framework considers the relationship among participants, as well as the impact from the enhanced visibility, and it may be possible to make fair and rational decisions for all participants based on the quantitative metrics such as the B/C ratio. In this paper, we propose a novel method based on the game-theoretic approach where the enhanced visibility prevents a certain participant from taking most of the benefit. It seems possible to establish a long-term sustainable supply chain visibility by distributing profit fairly to all participants in the supply chain.

A game-theoretic approach to evaluating the competitiveness of container carriers in the Northeast Asian shipping market

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 854-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byung-In Park ◽  
Hokey Min
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Actual Case ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Northeast Asian ◽  
Pricing Schemes

Purpose In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics. Findings This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand. Originality/value This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.

Impact of bargaining power on supply chain profit allocation: a game-theoretic study

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-416
Author(s):  
Sanjay Prasad ◽  
Ravi Shankar ◽  
Sreejit Roy
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
The Other ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of bargaining powers of firms in supply chain coordination. It studies selected aspects of bargaining powers, namely, impatience, breakdown probability and outside options, and uses a bargaining-theoretic approach to analyze surplus allocation in a coordinated supply chain. Design/methodology/approach This paper proposes one-supplier one-buyer infinite horizon supply chain coordination game, where suppliers and buyers negotiate for the allocation of supply chain surplus arising out of supply chain coordination. Various aspects of the bargaining power of the negotiating parties are modeled and the paper studies impact of power levels on the results of the bargaining game. Findings A significance of impatience on the bargaining process and the surplus split has been established. This paper also demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive aspect of bargaining that the impatience (as perceived by the other party) can improve the bargaining position and therefore share of profits. Research limitations/implications This paper has limited its analysis to three key components of bargaining power. Future works can study other aspects of bargaining power, namely information asymmetry, learning curve, inside options, etc. Further, the paper has considered an infinite horizon model – this assumption can be relaxed in future research. Practical implications Equations to derive optimal split of the surplus have been derived and can be leveraged to design an autonomous bargaining agent to discover equilibrium profit splits in a cloud or e-commerce setting. Further, insights from this paper can be leveraged by managers to understand their relative bargaining power and drive to obtain the best profit split. Originality/value This paper establishes that impatience (in terms of counter-offer probability) has a significant impact on the bargaining position and on the split of the surplus that the firm can get for themselves. It establishes the advantage of higher levels of impatience, provided the other party recognizes the impatience and factors it in their decision-making process.

An analysis of sustainability and channel coordination in a three-echelon supply chain

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruting Huang ◽  
Xin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Environmentally Conscious ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
Decision Behaviors

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the decision behaviors and channel coordination of a sustainable three-echelon supply chain with retailer-led game setting.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop game-theoretic models to examine the decision behaviors of channel members in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier, one distributor and one dominated retailer. The authors first formulate two models for centralized decision and decentralized decision. And then this paper proposes sub-supply chain coordination and a two-tariff contract to coordinate the full supply chain. Finally, some management insights are obtained with a case study.FindingsThe authors find that when faced with environmentally conscious consumers, the channel members can benefit from higher greening level; however, higher cost of green technologies would have negative impacts on manufacturer's effort. The analysis also shows that cooperation among players can improve the supply chain performance and help with environmental improvement.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings provide important managerial insights for the three-echelon supply chain to achieve sustainable goals where the retailer bears the environmental responsibility. However, this paper also has some limitations with assuming risk-neutral channel members and symmetric information.Originality/valueThe findings of the study contribute to coordination and collaboration in sustainability of supply chains. The results provide important managerial insights for the three-echelon supply chain to achieve sustainable goals.

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