Precise computation of a competitive equilibrium of the discrete land market model

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 721-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitsunobu Miyake
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Land Market

Stability and Generalized Competitive Equilibria in a Many-to-Many Gale-Shapley Market Model

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-254
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Świtalski
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
College Admissions ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Type A ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Competitive Equilibria

We define, for some variant of a many-to-many market model of Gale-Shapley type, a concept of generalized competitive equilibrium and show that, under suitable conditions, stable matchings in such a model can be represented as competitive equilibria allocations (and vice versa). Our results are far-reaching generalizations of the “discrete supply and demand lemma” of Azevedo, Leshno (2011) for the college admissions market.Using the results of Alkan, Gale (2003), we also prove a theorem on existence of generalized equilibria in our model.

scholarly journals The Implications of Skewed Risk Perception for a Dutch Coastal Land Market: Insights from an Agent-Based Computational Economics Model

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana Filatova ◽  
Dawn C. Parker ◽  
Anne van der Veen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Perception ◽  
Risk Perceptions ◽  
Land Development ◽  
Coastal Hazards ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Land Market ◽  
Coastal Zones ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Amenity Values ◽  
Coastal Land

Dutch coastal land markets are characterized by high amenity values but are threatened by potential coastal hazards, leading to high potential damage costs from flooding. Yet, Dutch residents generally perceive low or no flood risk. Using an agent-based land market model and Dutch survey data on risk perceptions and location preferences, this paper explores the patterns of land development and land rents produced by buyers with low, highly skewed risk perceptions. We find that, compared to representative agent and uniform risk perception models, the skewed risk perception distribution produces substantially more, high-valued development in risky coastal zones, potentially creating economically significant risks triggered by the current Dutch flood protection policy.

scholarly journals A Two-Sided Market Model of Optimal Price Structure for Instant Messenger

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Xu
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Symmetric Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Internet Applications ◽  
Price Structure ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
Free Service ◽  
The World ◽  
Instant Messenger

Instant messenger (IM) is one of the most popular Internet applications all over the world. This paper examines the pricing problem of IM based on two-sided market model. IM serves as a two-sided platform, which gets both Internet users and advertisers on board. This paper concludes that IM operator adopts a heavily skewed price structure that favors IM users both under monopolistic case and under horizontal differentiated duopolistic case. When advertising revenue is large enough relatively to marginal cost for serving IM users, IM users can enjoy free service provided by IM operators. The competitive equilibrium of duopolistic case is not necessarily symmetric when advertisers choose singlehoming. Even in the symmetric equilibrium platform would rather deter all advertisers.

Effects of Land Markets on Competition Between Innovators and Imitators in Land Use

2008 ◽  
pp. 81-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Gary Polhill ◽  
Dawn C. Parker ◽  
Nicholas M. Gotts
Keyword(s):  
Land Use ◽  
Big Bang ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Exchange Mechanism ◽  
Land Market ◽  
Market Exchange ◽  
Decision Strategies ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Competitive Success ◽  
Land Exchange

This chapter explores the effects of a more realistic agent-based land exchange mechanism on the relative competitive success of innovative and imitative strategies for selecting land uses, using the FEARLUS-ELMM model. A key question in our investigation is whether land use decision strategies can be studied in isolation from land market exchange decision strategies. Results derived via computational experiments show that land market modelling decisions do affect outcomes, improving to an extent the relative success of innovators. We also conclude that further additions are needed to our model, and finally, we question whether a “big bang” strategy may have been more effective than our step-by-step evolution to the land market model, which was chosen to facilitate comparison to results derived from the original FEARLUS.

Competing Teams

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 1134-1173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hector Chade ◽  
Jan Eeckhout
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Knowledge Spillovers ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Economic Applications ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Competitive Equilibria ◽  
Shed Light

Abstract In many economic applications of matching, the teams that form compete later in market structures with strategic interactions or with knowledge spillovers. Such post-match competition introduces externalities at the matching stage: a team’s payoff depends not only on their members’ attributes but also on those of other matched teams. This article develops a large market model of matching with externalities, in which first teams form, and then they compete. We analyse the sorting patterns that ensue under competitive equilibrium as well as their efficiency properties. Our main results show that insights substantially differ from those of the standard model without externalities: there can be multiple competitive equilibria with different sorting patterns; both optimal and competitive equilibrium matching can involve randomization; and competitive equilibrium can be inefficient with a matching that can drastically deviate from the optimal one. We also shed light on the economic relevance of our matching model with externalities. We analyse two economic applications that illustrate how our model can rationalize the trend in within- and between-firm inequality, and also the evolution of markups of sectors where firms have market power.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document