Competing Teams

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 1134-1173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hector Chade ◽  
Jan Eeckhout
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Knowledge Spillovers ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Economic Applications ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Competitive Equilibria ◽  
Shed Light

Abstract In many economic applications of matching, the teams that form compete later in market structures with strategic interactions or with knowledge spillovers. Such post-match competition introduces externalities at the matching stage: a team’s payoff depends not only on their members’ attributes but also on those of other matched teams. This article develops a large market model of matching with externalities, in which first teams form, and then they compete. We analyse the sorting patterns that ensue under competitive equilibrium as well as their efficiency properties. Our main results show that insights substantially differ from those of the standard model without externalities: there can be multiple competitive equilibria with different sorting patterns; both optimal and competitive equilibrium matching can involve randomization; and competitive equilibrium can be inefficient with a matching that can drastically deviate from the optimal one. We also shed light on the economic relevance of our matching model with externalities. We analyse two economic applications that illustrate how our model can rationalize the trend in within- and between-firm inequality, and also the evolution of markups of sectors where firms have market power.

Stability and Generalized Competitive Equilibria in a Many-to-Many Gale-Shapley Market Model

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-254
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Świtalski
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
College Admissions ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Type A ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Competitive Equilibria

We define, for some variant of a many-to-many market model of Gale-Shapley type, a concept of generalized competitive equilibrium and show that, under suitable conditions, stable matchings in such a model can be represented as competitive equilibria allocations (and vice versa). Our results are far-reaching generalizations of the “discrete supply and demand lemma” of Azevedo, Leshno (2011) for the college admissions market.Using the results of Alkan, Gale (2003), we also prove a theorem on existence of generalized equilibria in our model.

scholarly journals Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Candogan ◽  
Markos Epitropou ◽  
Rakesh V. Vohra
Keyword(s):  
Network Flow ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Flow Problem ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Bilateral Contracts ◽  
Submodular Flow ◽  
Competitive Equilibria ◽  
Trading Networks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Shed Light

This paper considers a network of agents who trade indivisible goods or services via bilateral contracts. Under a substitutability assumption on preferences, it is known that a competitive equilibrium exists. In “Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach,” Candogan, Epitropou, and Vohra show how to determine equilibrium outcomes as a generalized submodular flow problem. Existence of a competitive equilibrium and its equivalence to seemingly weaker notions of stability follow directly from the optimality conditions of the flow problem. The formulation enables the authors to perform comparative statics with respect to the number of buyers, sellers, and trades. In particular, they are able to shed light on the impact of new trading opportunities on the equilibrium trades, prices, and surpluses. In addition, they present algorithms for finding competitive equilibria in trading networks and testing stability.

Recalibrating the governance of remedial clauses in contract law

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-455
Author(s):  
Moshood Abdussalam
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Commercial Networks

Yawning gaps in bargaining powers between transacting parties have always been a source of concern in commercial relations and the legal governance of such relations. In modern times, the likely implications of gaps in bargaining powers are not only palpable as it concerns the affairs of transacting parties with weaker bargaining powers, but also on the welfare of society, at large. That is particularly so in this milieu of pervasive oligopolistic market structures, organised commercial networks, digitisation, and big data. The imperative to guard against the use of contractually agreed remedial clauses to consolidate market power and as tools for wealth extraction is the concern of this article. To this end, this article makes a case for a recalibration of the rule against penalties in contract law.

scholarly journals The Influence of Rational Dimension in the GPH-MILF Peace Process

2018 ◽  
pp. 145-152 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Community Involvement ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
The Government ◽  
Rational Factor ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Shed Light

Resolution of the so-called “Bangsamoro Question” rests at the heart of the peace process between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Southern Philippines, also known as the Bangsamoro homeland. Inspired by Allison and Zelikow’s conceptualization of Rational Actor Model (RAM), this paper analyzed how rational factor contributed to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014 and eventually enshrined into the Philippine Constitution through the approval of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) on July 27, 2018. This paper argued that the success of the GPH-MILF peace process does not only depend on the sincerity of the administrations of both then President Aquino III and current President Duterte, international support or commitment, pressure from civil societies and community involvement as what many commentators provided. As shown in this paper, the rational factor and its dimension significantly affected actors’ strategic interactions and the GPH-MILF peace process per se. The findings offered a new perspective for conflict-resolution and shed light on how rational dimension impacted both actors’ strategic interactions, which led to the conclusion of the GPH-MILF peace agreement. This clearly indicated that rational dimension greatly influenced GPH and MILF’s strategic interactions and thereby took flexible attitudes to resolve outstanding issues between them which consequently led to the signing of the CAB and ultimately the ratification of the BOL in 2018.

scholarly journals Market Concentration and Market Power / Koncentrisanost tržišta i tržišna moć

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 228
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bogojević
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effects ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Market Participants

Contemporary directions of the market liberalization should lead to a bigger number of market participants and to a bigger degree of competition among them. This again, leads to a more diversified offer and to bigger quality products along with higher level of services with cheaper rates. In order to control the mentioned processes, analysis of market concentration is needed, as well as studying and perfection of the methods that allow measurement of market concentration. The degree of market concentration which on a specific market one or more economic subjects have is defined as ‘’market power’’. Economic efficiency on a specific market largely depends on whether non competitive market structures which produce adverse effects on economic efficiency are existent on that market, which ultimately affects on the overall well – being. Conversance of the degree of concentration of a specific (relevant) market is important so that breaching of the market principles can be timely spotted and so that appropriate measures can be taken. Supervision over the market and the market processes, as well as appliance of specific measuring methods of market concentration have the goal of establishing and maintenance of free market competition in which all of the economic subjects participate under the same conditions.

scholarly journals STUDY OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC TRANSITIONS J/ψ → P l+l- AND PROBE DARK PHOTON

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (38) ◽  
pp. 1250223 ◽  
Author(s):  
JINLIN FU ◽  
HAI-BO LI ◽  
XIAOSHUAI QIN ◽  
MAO-ZHI YANG
Keyword(s):  
Form Factor ◽  
Internal Conversion ◽  
Massive Particle ◽  
Lepton Pairs ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Decay Modes ◽  
Electromagnetic Structure ◽  
Dark Photon ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Shed Light

We study the electromagnetic Dalitz decay modes of J/ψ → P l+l- (P = π0, η or η′). In these decays, the lepton pairs are formed by internal conversion of an intermediate virtual photon with invariant mass ml+l-. Study of the effective-mass spectrum of the l+l- will shed light on the dynamic transition form factor [Formula: see text], which characterizes the electromagnetic structure arising at the vertex of the transition J/ψ to pseudoscalars. We also discuss the direct productions of a GeV scale vector U boson in these processes J/ψ → PU (U → l+l-). It is responsible for mediating a new U(1)d interaction, as recently exploited in the context of weakly interacting massive particle dark matter. In this paper, we firstly use the usual pole approximation for the form factor to estimate the decay rate of J/ψ → P l+l- in the Standard Model. Then the reach of searching for the dark photon is estimated. We suggest that these Dalitz decays can be used to search for the light U boson in the BESIII experiment with a huge J/ψ data set.

scholarly journals Existence of General Competitive Equilibria: A Variational Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
G. Anello ◽  
F. Rania
Keyword(s):  
Variational Inequalities ◽  
Finite Number ◽  
Variational Methods ◽  
Variational Approach ◽  
Existence Result ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Locally Lipschitz ◽  
Competitive Equilibria

We study the existence of general competitive equilibria in economies with agents and goods in a finite number. We show that there exists a Walras competitive equilibrium in all ownership private economies such that, for all consumers, initial endowments do not contain free goods and utility functions are locally Lipschitz quasiconcave. The proof of the existence of competitive equilibria is based on variational methods by applying a theoretical existence result for Generalized Quasi Variational Inequalities.

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