scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Dolors Berga ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Private Good ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
House Allocation ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Common Structure ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
The Many ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberr ◽  
Dolors Berga-Colom ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Private Good ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Cross-Monotonic in Cost Sharing Mechanisms Using Ns2

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2.4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
R Ganesan ◽  
Justin Joseph ◽  
Jisha Isaac
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Game Plan ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Key Techniques ◽  
Strategy Proofness

A cost-sharing plan is an arrangement of guidelines characterizing how to distribute the cost among adjusted clients. A cost-sharing strategy is check monotonic in case it satisfies the property that everyone is in a flawless circumstance when the course of action of individuals who get the affiliation creates. CM is a property that passes on a customer's part ought to be more humble when balanced in a more imperative set. CM is an key techniques to achieve the group strategy proofness. By using the multicast plans that objective the enhanced directing, cross-monotonic cost sharing, and stabilize budget. Unsurprising degree cost recuperations is conceivable, and also apply a primal-twofold diagram to in the meantime create an organizing strategy and a cost-sharing course of action, and demonstrate that the subsequent instrument is collect framework proof and ensures off base cost recuperation against a flawless coordinating game plan.  

scholarly journals Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero-Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Condition ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Proof Rule ◽  
Stable Mechanism ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Abstract We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

scholarly journals Robust group strategy‐proofness

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1351-1389
Author(s):  
Steven Kivinen ◽  
Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Free Disposal ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Indivisible Objects ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post stage but not to the interim stage. Thus, we propose a new notion of GSP, coined robust group strategy‐proofness (RGSP), which ensures that no group benefits by deviating from truth telling at the interim stage. We show for the provision of a public good that the Minimum Demand rule (Serizawa (1999)) satisfies RGSP when the production possibilities set satisfies a particular topological property. In the problem of allocating indivisible objects, an acyclicity condition on the priorities is both necessary and sufficient for the Deferred Acceptance rule to satisfy RGSP, but is only necessary for the Top Trading Cycles rule. For the allocation of divisible private goods among agents with single‐peaked preferences (Sprumont (1991)), only free disposal, group replacement monotonic rules within the class of sequential allotment rules satisfy RGSP.

Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero‐Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof
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