The effect of policy objectives, complexity, and self-interest on individuals' comparative fairness judgments of a flat tax

2004 ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donna Bobek ◽  
Richard C. Hatfield
2000 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. McGowan

There is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the existing tax system. Prior research has found that self-interest, perceived equity, persuasive messages, tax knowledge, and demographic factors affect taxpayer attitudes. This study contributes to that body of research by examining the effects of another factor that is associated with taxpayer attitudes: their political affiliation. Data obtained from a national telephone survey of homeowners' attitudes toward alternative tax systems are used. Results indicate that political affiliation plays a significant role in taxpayers' attitudes toward both alternative tax systems in general and the proposed flat tax in particular. Specifically, when faced with the choice of alternative tax systems, respondents who identified themselves as having Republican (Democratic, Independent) political af-filiations were more (less) likely to prefer both the flat tax and the sales tax systems over the current system.


2020 ◽  
pp. 18-27
Author(s):  
Steve Tibble

This chapter describes a time before strategy, when the lands of the Middle East were intensely fractured, and trust and loyalty were scarce commodities. It looks at a time when self-interest was paramount and where chaos was so ingrained that an entire life could be lived without knowing anything else. It also talks about wars that are guided by politics, driven by policy objectives, and implemented through strategy but often lost in the rushed outpouring of human actions and emotions. The chapter discusses the liberation of Jerusalem and the end of the First Crusade, where most of the original crusaders returned home and some remained to defend the Holy Land. It also includes the four political entities that are collectively known as the “crusader states”: The Kingdom of Jerusalem, the County of Tripoli, the Principality of Antioch, and the County of Edessa.


2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292096023
Author(s):  
Markus Tepe ◽  
Pieter Vanhuysse ◽  
Maximilian Lutz

When are high earnings considered a legitimate target for redistribution, and when not? We design a real-effort laboratory experiment in which we manipulate the assignment of payrates (societal “reward rules”) that translate performance on a real-effort counting task into pre-tax earnings. We then ask subjects to vote on a flat tax rate in groups of three. We distinguish three treatment conditions: the same payrate for all group members (“equal” reward rule), differential (low, medium, and high) but random payrates (“luck” rule), and differential payrates based on subjects’ performance on a quiz with voluntary preparation opportunity (“merit” rule). Self-interest is the dominant tax voting motivation. Tax levels are lower under “merit” rule than under “luck” rule, and merit reasoning overrides political ideology. But information is needed to activate merit reasoning. Both these latter effects are present only when voters have “full merit knowledge” that signals precisely how others obtained their incomes.


Author(s):  
Alexander Blaszczynski

Abstract. Background: Tensions exist with various stakeholders facing competing interests in providing legal land-based and online regulated gambling products. Threats to revenue/taxation occur in response to harm minimisation and responsible gambling policies. Setting aside the concept of total prohibition, the objectives of responsible gambling are to encourage and/or restrict an individual’s gambling expenditure in terms of money and time to personally affordable limits. Stakeholder responsibilities: Governments craft the gambling environment through legislation, monitor compliance with regulatory requirements, and receive taxation revenue as a proportion of expenditure. Industry operators on the other hand, compete across market sectors through marketing and advertising, and through the development of commercially innovative products, reaping substantial financial rewards. Concurrently, governments are driven to respond to community pressures to minimize the range of negative gambling-related social, personal and economic harms and costs. Industry operators are exposed to the same pressures but additionally overlaid with the self-interest of avoiding the imposition of more stringent restrictive policies. Cooperation of stakeholders: The resulting tension between taxation revenue and profit making, harm minimization, and social impacts creates a climate of conflict between all involved parties. Data-driven policies become compromised by unsubstantiated claims of, and counter claims against, the nature and extent of gambling-related harms, effectiveness of policy strategies, with allegations of bias and influence associated with researchers supported by industry and government research funding sources. Conclusion: To effectively advance policies, it is argued that it is imperative that all parties collaborate in a cooperative manner to achieve the objectives of responsible gambling and harm minimization. This extends to and includes more transparent funding for researchers from both government and industry. Continued reliance on data collected from analogue populations or volunteers participating in simulated gambling tasks will not provide data capable of valid and reliable extrapolation to real gamblers in real venues risking their own funds. Failure to adhere to principles of corporate responsibility and consumer protection by both governments and industry will challenge the social licence to offer gambling products. Appropriate and transparent safeguards learnt from the tobacco and alcohol field, it is argued, can guide the conduct of gambling research.


1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 481-482
Author(s):  
Graham L. Staines
Keyword(s):  

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Peters ◽  
Kees Van den Bos ◽  
Ramona Bobocel
Keyword(s):  

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