The Hinterland Strategy

This chapter describes the concept of what constituted a “frontier,” which was always fluid in the early days of the crusader states. It talks about the Franks' intention to control the interior of the Christian states of Palestine and the Syrian littoral. It analyzes the strategic context of crusaders in recapturing cities of the hinterland and held against the inevitable Muslim counteroffensives. The chapter looks at the northern Christian states that had been able to move forward with the “hinterland strategy” before 1125. It also recounts major Muslim cities that were attacked by crusaders in increasingly desperate attempts to open up the interior, such as Aleppo that was the objective for two serious campaigns and Shaizar that was besieged twice.

Prelude

This chapter describes a time before strategy, when the lands of the Middle East were intensely fractured, and trust and loyalty were scarce commodities. It looks at a time when self-interest was paramount and where chaos was so ingrained that an entire life could be lived without knowing anything else. It also talks about wars that are guided by politics, driven by policy objectives, and implemented through strategy but often lost in the rushed outpouring of human actions and emotions. The chapter discusses the liberation of Jerusalem and the end of the First Crusade, where most of the original crusaders returned home and some remained to defend the Holy Land. It also includes the four political entities that are collectively known as the “crusader states”: The Kingdom of Jerusalem, the County of Tripoli, the Principality of Antioch, and the County of Edessa.

The Frontier Strategy

This chapter discusses Reynald of Châtillon, lord of the Transjordan, who had made a statement of aggressive intent in 1183 and taunt Saladin in an extremely public and personal way. It describes Reynald as the most persistently belligerent and arrogant of the crusader commanders. It also recounts raid of the Gulf of Aqaba, where Reynald and his Christian crew brought havoc to the unsuspecting sailors and merchants of the Muslim “mare nostrum.” The chapter also talks about the near collapse of the eastern frontiers of the crusader states in the 1160s while the Frankish field armies were trying to take Egypt. It looks into the rise of Saladin and the creation of a new Muslim empire from Yemen and Egypt in the south up to Syria and Mesopotamia in the north, in which the crusaders found themselves surrounded and outnumbered.

The Egyptian Strategy

This chapter talks about a young Frankish lord called Hugh of Caesarea who led a group of knights through the labyrinthine passages of the caliphal palace in Cairo in 1167. It describes Hugh's simple but brutal mission, in which he was tasked to negotiate a military alliance with the Fatimid government and extort a vast sum of protection money from them in the process. The chapter discusses the crusaders' loss of Edessa in 1144 and failure to take Damascus in 1148, which showed that the Egyptian strategy was an inevitable consequence of the crusaders' failure to establish themselves inland. It explains the critical shortage of land within the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. It also points out the significance of Egypt to Franks and establishment of a central policy objective that constituted an “institutional” strategic view for the bureaucracy of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The Ascalon Strategy

This chapter talks about the Egyptian army that poured out of Ascalon and onto the plain of Sharon. It describes the invasion of the Egyptiam army and advanced elements that attacked Ramla in order to flush out the Frankish garrison. It also mentions the local bishop, Robert of Rouen, who gave the first warning of the Egyptian attack to King Baldwin at Jaffa after seeing enemy scouts raiding around his monastery in Lydda. The chapter explains how the Fatimid army was underestimated and yet considered the largest and best-resourced military force facing the crusader states. It also illustrates the massive Fatimid military base at Ascalon on the southern fringes of the loosely defined border zone between the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and Egypt, which remained the only stronghold along the entire coastline by 1125.

Interlude

This chapter introduces vocabulary in the Palestine that the crusaders found in 1099. It points out special words for a settlement whose population had fled, the gastina or khirbet, meaning a deserted village. It also relates gastina or khirbet to some of the traditional views of the crusades. The chapter focuses on the narrative which envisages Frankish rule as an oppressive regime, imposing itself on crusader states by violence or the threat of violence. It analyzes the gastinae or deserted villages as an inevitable consequence of local peasants fleeing from hated invaders. It also describes Frankish castle building within the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, which were often done during times when the level of external threat was ostensibly at its lowest.

The Coastal Strategy

This chapter mentions an English pilgrim named Saewulf, who made the trip in the summer of 1102 to the Palestinian coast, where he was caught in the midst of battle with crusaders. It talks about the Franks, European settlers in the Holy Land, who kept coming to the new crusader states even in the most dangerous of times and the most perilous of conditions. It analyzes the capture of Jerusalem and the extraordinary culmination of the First Crusade in which strategy exists only in the context of objectives and the decisions that lead up to them. The chapter explains the first phase of Frankish strategy on taking control of the entire coastline of Syria and Palestine. It also looks at the coastal strategy that followed a remarkable trajectory across the three crusader states that bordered on the eastern Mediterranean.

Strategy in a Medieval State

This chapter focuses on Gerard of Ridefort, master of the entire Templar Order. It describes how Gerard dominated the chain of command and brook no opposition, outranking and outshouting every other knight on the field. It discusses Gerard's well-deserved reputation for arrogance and overweening sense of entitlement and colossal self-belief, which was famous across Europe for its pride and fanaticism. The chapter talks about the battle of the Spring of the Cresson as the archetypical crusader battle, encapsulating both the best and worst approach to war. It analyzes how Gerard lost the battle and some of the kingdom's best warriors at Cresson and then the repeat of his appalling performance a few weeks after on a far larger scale.

Reflections

This chapter reviews how crusaders were considered as intuitive strategists. It explains crusader strategy that was inevitably formulated in the absence of a clear, intellectually rigorous, theoretical framework. It emphasizes how Franks were not exactly theorists, but in the Western medieval world they were the most experienced practitioners of the art of war. The chapter looks at theorists and military philosophers from the eighteenth century onwards that have identified a number of features that define and characterise “strategy.” It also analyzes the models of strategic thinking that have moved on radically over the past 50 years and exercised an obsessive attraction for military theorists.