Cicero’s Academic Skepticism

2021 ◽  
pp. 103-119
Author(s):  
Tobias Reinhardt
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Don Garrett

Richard Popkin famously argued that David Hume “maintained the only consistent Pyrrhonian point of view”; yet Hume explicitly rejected Pyrrhonism, as he understood it, in favor of a mitigated “Academic” skepticism. The keys to understanding Hume’s relationship to Pyrrhonism lie partly in his own historical understanding of it, but even more in his own distinctive and non-Pyrrhonian theories of belief and evidence, theories that allow him to employ common sense and reflection to correct what he regards as “excessive” skeptical doubts. Central to those theories, in turn, are his conceptions of causal reasoning and of the causal relation itself. Ultimately, it is on the topic of the nature of causation that Hume comes closest to a Pyrrhonian outlook.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-35
Author(s):  
Ilya Sergeyevich Vevyurko ◽  

At first sight, in Cicero’s treatise «De natura deorum», written in the form of a dialogue, metaphysical ideas are expressed only by a stoic participant, Balbus, who cannot argue them convincingly enough in the face of criticism from Cotta, a representative of the academic tradition, to which, in epistemology at least, the author considers himself to belong. However, the situation looks like this only if you read the treatise in isolation from other works of Cicero and taking into account what is stated, but not what is hidden. Meanwhile, there is every reason to consider this treatise as the central one in the group of works of the second half of the 40s, which is why the omissions in it are no less important than the direct text. From the comparison of various statements of Cicero about the divine, scattered in different works, it turns out that there undoubtedly was some metaphysical content in them, and it was built with an appeal to Plato, reinterpreted in the context of academic skepticism. And the key to understand the treatise «De natura deorum» is to be found in its composition, built on the opposition of the exoteric religiosity of the epicurean and stoic participants to the unspoken ideas of both their academic critics.


Author(s):  
Richard Bett

This chapter assesses the relations between Greco-Roman philosophical skepticism, centered on the attitude of suspension of judgment, and the Second Sophistic. It begins with Favorinus, who identified as an Academic skeptic, and whose rhetorical activity is recognizably related to the practice of Academic skepticism, but who also engaged with the Pyrrhonist skeptical tradition. The rest of the chapter addresses Pyrrhonism, particularly Sextus Empiricus. The central point is Sextus’s complete lack of reference to the Second Sophistic, despite its being almost certainly contemporary with him. This may be due in part to his self-effacement and disengagement from the public arena, which is encouraged by the Pyrrhonist goal of ataraxia. But it also seems to be connected with the peculiar anachronism of his intellectual engagements, both concerning philosophy and (in his Against the Rhetoricians) concerning rhetoric itself.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document