Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Humean Skepticism

2020 ◽  
pp. 213-236
Author(s):  
Don Garrett
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Causal Reasoning ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Causal Relation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Historical Understanding ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Academic Skepticism

Richard Popkin famously argued that David Hume “maintained the only consistent Pyrrhonian point of view”; yet Hume explicitly rejected Pyrrhonism, as he understood it, in favor of a mitigated “Academic” skepticism. The keys to understanding Hume’s relationship to Pyrrhonism lie partly in his own historical understanding of it, but even more in his own distinctive and non-Pyrrhonian theories of belief and evidence, theories that allow him to employ common sense and reflection to correct what he regards as “excessive” skeptical doubts. Central to those theories, in turn, are his conceptions of causal reasoning and of the causal relation itself. Ultimately, it is on the topic of the nature of causation that Hume comes closest to a Pyrrhonian outlook.

NONSENSE, ABSURDITY AND PARADOX AS LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL CATEGORIES

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Ontological Category ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
New Meanings ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Human Thinking

In the article the analysis of nonsense, absurdity and paradox from the standpoint of linguistics is giv-en. Different points of view on these categories in relation to the meaning are considered. An attempt is made to reveal the commonality and specificity of nonsense, absurdity and paradox. Some researchers consider nonsense and paradox as a kind of absurdity. There is a dichotomous point of view on nonsense as one of the components of absurdity. However, there are works where these categories are differentiat-ed, for example, absurdity is understood as an ontological category, and nonsense as an epistemological category. There is a view of these categories through the allocation of "non-sense", "out-sense" and 136 "counter-sense" there is also a view that in the case of nonsense we are talking about the incompatibility of representations, and in the case of absurdity-the incompatibility of objects. If there are criteria that allow us to consider the presence of this phenomenon as natural, absurdity ceases to exist. Consequently, the view is expressed that nonsense, absurdity and paradox are different categories of thinking. Paradox is a contradiction arising from the presence of two or more common sense. The absurdity can be seen as a" counter-sense» opposing common sense and putting forward the concept of active impossibility of the latter's existence. As for nonsense, it is the meaning of metaphysical level – a meaning that goes beyond the ordinary meaning and creates new meanings. It is concluded that nonsense, absurdity and paradox are independent categories of human thinking, which is a manifestation of the cognitive function of hu-man consciousness.

scholarly journals El papel de la educación en la filosofía moral de David Hume / The role of education in Hume's moral philosophy

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (30) ◽  
pp. 17-37
Author(s):  
Santiago Álvarez García
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point

El presente artículo muestra cómo la crítica humeana a los fundamentos del racionalismo moral y a sus consecuencias en el terreno de las ideas educativas propició un cambio significativo en la comprensión de los objetivos de la educación moral que pasaron de buscar el perfeccionamiento de la agencia, a perseguir la perfección y el refinamiento de las capacidades del individuo como espectador y evaluador moral imparcial. Esta trasformación de la finalidad y del currículo de la educación moral será la solución que Hume ofrezca a los problemas de parcialidad derivados de la historicidad y la caducidad del general point of view como criterio último para el juicio moral. La exposición constante del educando a todas las formas históricas de la belleza, junto con la poesía, la literatura, el estudio de la historia y la filosofía, constituirán para Hume la base de esta revolución pedagógica.

Incomplete Routes to Moral Objectivity: Four Variants of Naturalism

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
David Hume ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
History Of ◽  
Integrated Or

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.

The Paragon of Knowledge

Philosophy ◽  
1954 ◽  
Vol 29 (110) ◽  
pp. 216-230
Author(s):  
Karl Britton
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Ordinary Conversation

I. “Our reason must be consider'd as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect.”1 In these quaint words, David Hume expresses the Philosophers’ point of view. By means of reason we must be able to see the truth of principles and to see that truth without any possibility of error. This view has been so long and so firmly held that it may be called the philosophical ideal of knowledge. Reason is not truly reason, unless by it we can come to know truths that are absolutely certain; truths of principle that are absolutely universal. It has always been admitted that much that is called “knowledge” in ordinary conversation, much that passes for knowledge in the schools, is neither absolutely certain nor absolutely universal. But it has been held that knowledge has been achieved or might be achieved in certain sciences: in ethics (according to some), or in metaphysics, or in physics or in mathematics.

„Seltsame Frage. –“– Eine Interpretation von PU § 263

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Mühlhölzer
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Future ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Common

AbstractIn the first sentence of PI § 263 - “»Surely I can (inwardly) resolve to call THIS ›pain‹ in the future.«” - Wittgenstein uses the word “pain” and not, as one would expect, the sign “S” of §§ 258, 260 and 261 because this sentence is voiced by a common sense person who doesn’t yet see the deep difference between “S” and “pain” as it is demonstrated in the sections before. The subsequent twofold question - “»But is it certain that you have resolved this? Are you sure that it was enough for this purpose to concentrate your attention on your feeling?«” - is Wittgenstein’s own question, induced by his philosophical considerations before, but now seen from the point of view of the common sense person with whom Wittgenstein temporarily identifies himself. He looks at the philosopher Wittgenstein with the eyes of the common sense person Wittgenstein. This explains why not only the first sentence of § 263 but also the subsequent question is put in quotation marks. It furthermore explains why Wittgenstein writes at the end: “An odd question.” From a common sense standpoint the question certainly sounds odd. What does the dash at the end of § 263 mean? According to the interpretation just given, it may be understood as follows: the dashes before and after “An odd question” can be read as quotation marks indicating that this remark is voiced by the common sense Wittgenstein in response to the philosopher Wittgenstein.

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