scholarly journals Multilevel regulatory governance: Establishing bank-regulator relationships at the European Banking Authority

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Coen ◽  
John-Paul Salter

AbstractFollowing the 2007–9 financial crisis, the EU strengthened its institutional apparatus for bank regulation, creating a trio of sectoral bodies, including the European Banking Authority (EBA). Various aspects of this new system have been studied, but to date, little is known about how banks engage with their new supranational regulator. We argue that such engagement fosters an interdependence between banks and regulators, thus contributing to the efficiency and robustness of the overall regulatory regime; but also that it is contingent on the regulator exhibiting the qualities of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency. These qualities are grounded in the domestic regulatory governance literature, but we suggest that they are rendered problematic by the complexities of the EU's multilevel system and, in particular, the overlap in competences between the EBA and the European Central Bank. We examine the EBA in the light of these criteria and find that banks’ engagement remains pitched towards established national regulators and the EU's legislative arena. This poses concerns for the efficacy of agency governance in the EU's regulatory regime for banking.

Studia BAS ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (67) ◽  
pp. 71-85
Author(s):  
Danuta Adamiec

The article explores the reaction of the European Central Bank (ECB) to two major economic crises that the EU had to face in the last two decades: the financial crisis which began in 2008 and the latest crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although causes underlying both crises were ultimately different, the response of the ECB was based on the same unconventional monetary policy tools. The author analyses the similarities and differences between both of these crises, as well as the ECB’s reaction to them, drawing attention to a shift in the ECB’s monetary policy towards unconventional tools and consequences of such a shift for the position and future policy directions of the ECB.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-342
Author(s):  
Valeria Ferrari

Based on the guidelines issued by the European Securities and Market Authority and by the European Banking Authority, the article deals with the legal qualification of blockchain-based crypto-assets under EU law. Focusing on crypto-assets that function as a) investment instruments (that is, investment tokens) and as b) electronic money (that is, payment tokens), the work outlines shortages and drawbacks in the applicability and enforcement of existing EU legal frameworks regulating investment activities and payment services. With such analysis, the article seeks to inform the ongoing debate within European institutions on the need of regulatory intervention in this area, and it points out pressing questions to be tackled by further research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.


Author(s):  
M. R. Saliya

The article discusses the issue of legal regulation of the digital currency of central banks. The experience of international organizations, as well as the fi rst steps in this direction from China, represented by the People’s Bank of China and the European Union, represented by the European Central Bank, are examined.


Author(s):  
Chiara Zilioli ◽  
Phoebus Athanassiou

The provisions on Monetary Union (MU), of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU or the Treaty), as well as the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the Statute), are important in their own right, and are amongst those from which any student of the European Union (EU) can learn a great deal with regard to the EU.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach

Haircut of public creditors as next step in the escalation of the euro debt crisis? – Exploring the boundaries set by the EU Treaty on debt restructuring – Limitations imposed by no-bailout clause and prohibition of monetary state financing – Standards set inPringleandGauweiler– Haircut on nominal debt infringes no-bailout clause – Active involvement by European Central Bank violates ban on monetary state financing – Other forms of ‘soft haircuts’ may be compatible with EU law


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Braun

Abstract The pre-crisis rise and post-crisis resilience of European repo and securitization markets represent political victories for the interests of large banks. To explain when and how finance wins, the literature emphasizes lobbying capacity (instrumental power) and the financial sector’s central position in the economy (structural power). Increasingly, however, finance also enjoys infrastructural power, which stems from entanglements between specific financial markets and public-sector actors, such as treasuries and central banks, which govern by transacting in those markets. To demonstrate the analytical value of this perspective, the article traces how the European Central Bank (ECB), motivated by monetary policy considerations, has shaped post-crisis financial policymaking in the EU. It shows that the ECB has played a key part in fending off a financial transaction tax on repos and in shoring up and rebuilding the securitization market. With market-based forms of state agency on the rise, infrastructural entanglement and power shed new light on the politics of finance.


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