scholarly journals SENSE AND REFERENCE FROM A CONSTRUCTIVIST STANDPOINT

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
MICHAEL DUMMETT
Keyword(s):  
NeuroImage ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 993-1004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mante S. Nieuwland ◽  
Karl Magnus Petersson ◽  
Jos J.A. Van Berkum

2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Cornish

The traditional definition of anaphora in purely co-textual terms as a relation between two co-occurring expressions is in wide currency in theoretical and descriptive studies of the phenomenon. Indeed, it is currently adopted in on-line psycholinguistic experiments on the interpretation of anaphors, and is the basis for all computational approaches to automatic anaphor resolution (see Mitkov 2002). Under this conception, the anaphor, a referentially-dependent expression type, requires “saturation” by an appropriate referentially-autonomous, lexically-based expression — the antecedent — in order to achieve full sense and reference. However, this definition needs to be re-examined in the light of the ways in which real texts operate and are understood, where the resulting picture is rather different. The article aims to show that the co-textual conception is misconceived, and that anaphora is essentially an integrative, discourse-creating procedure involving a three-way relationship between an “antecedent trigger”, an anaphoric predication, and a salient discourse representation. It is shown that it is only in terms of a dynamic interaction amongst the interdependent dimensions of text and discourse, as well as context, that the true complexity of anaphoric reference may be satisfactorily described. The article is intended as a contribution to the broader debate within the pages of this journal and elsewhere between the formalist and the functionalist accounts of language structure and use.


Author(s):  
David J. Chalmers

Two-dimensional approaches to semantics, broadly understood, recognize two ‘dimensions’ of the meaning or content of linguistic items. On these approaches, expressions and their utterances are associated with two different sorts of semantic values, which play different explanatory roles. Typically, one semantic value is associated with reference and ordinary truth-conditions, while the other is associated with the way that reference and truth-conditions depend on the external world. The second sort of semantic value is often held to play a distinctive role in analyzing matters of cognitive significance and/or context-dependence. In this broad sense, even Frege's theory of sense and reference might qualify as a sort of two-dimensional approach.


2019 ◽  
pp. 74-87
Author(s):  
John Perry

I return to the problems concerning identity that plagued Frege’s Begriffsschrift and eventually led to the theory of sense and reference. I claim that within a flexible theory of the truth conditions, what I call the “reflexive-referential” theory, there is a common sense solution.


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