The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge
Abstract Various theorists have endorsed the “communication argument”: communicative capacities are necessary for morally responsible agency because blame aims at a distinctive kind of moral communication. I contend that existing versions of the argument, including those defended by Gary Watson and Coleen Macnamara, face a pluralist challenge: they do not seem to sit well with the plausible view that blame has multiple aims. I then examine three possible rejoinders to the challenge, suggesting that a context-specific, function-based approach constitutes the most promising modification of the communication argument.
2012 ◽
pp. 86-105
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2012 ◽
Vol 41
(6)
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pp. 1959-1966
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2016 ◽
Vol 197
(8)
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pp. 3049-3058
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2020 ◽
Vol 36
(5)
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pp. 767-776
2009 ◽
Vol 14
(2)
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pp. 109-119
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