French Colonial Soldiers in German Captivity during World War II

Author(s):  
Raffael Scheck
Author(s):  
David T. Buckley

How did Senegal arrive at the twin tolerations after independence from French colonial rule? This chapter the existence of benevolent secularism in Senegal’s post-World War II founding documents, and traces its impact on Senegal’s Muslim majority, Catholic minority, and secular elites. Evidence draws on communication between political and religious elites during the independence period, with special attention to communication between Léopold Sédar Senghor and Muslim and Catholic elites. The chapter closes with an examination of tensions in Senegal’s benevolent secularism manifested in the controversy over the Code de la Famille.


2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-172
Author(s):  
Timothy L. Schroer

1974 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn K. Mytelka

Post-World War II French colonial reforms, most notably those of the 1956 loi-cadre, began the process of decentralising political authority to the territorial components of the Fédération d'Afrique occidentale française (A.O.F.),1 and the Fédération d'Afrique equatoriale française (A.E.F.).2 By 1958 most of these French colonies had become autonomous Republics within the Communauté franco-africaine. Although only Guinea had opted for complete political independence in the Gaullist referendum held that year, pressures were clearly mounting in that direction for other members of the now defunct Federations.


2019 ◽  
pp. 33-57
Author(s):  
Sean J. McLaughlin

This chapter explores Kennedy’s pre-presidential political career. By the end of World War II he had emerged as a well-connected Harvard graduate, author of a popular book, a decorated navy veteran of the Pacific War, and a budding young journalist with the Hearst chain. His political career began in 1946 when he was elected Representative for Massachusetts’s 11th Congressional District. In 1952 he was elected to the Senate, where he gained a reputation for sharp anti-colonial rhetoric that often targeted French policy. Throughout his pre-presidential political career, from 1946 to 1960, Kennedy’s most biting commentary was consistently reserved for the French in Vietnam and later Algeria. While Britain had negotiated its way out of India and later ran a successful counterinsurgency campaign against communist Malayan rebels, Kennedy worried openly that French colonial rule would drive the most rebellious of the Fourth Republic’s subjects toward the Sino-Soviet camp. Early postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy’s perception that the British were clear thinkers with long-term vision, while the French by contrast were characterized by a toxic mixture of short-sightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West.


Author(s):  
Patrick Royer

Burkina Faso has a remarkable history owing to repeated dissolution and reunification of its territory. Following the French colonial conquest in 1896, a military territory was established over a large part of what would become Upper Volta. In 1905, the military territory was integrated in the civilian colony of Upper Senegal and Niger with headquarters in Bamako. Following a major anticolonial war in 1915–16, the colony of Upper Volta with Ouagadougou as its capital was created in 1919, for security reasons and as a labor reservoir for neighboring colonies. Dismantled in 1932, Upper Volta was partitioned among neighboring colonies. It was recreated after World War II as an Overseas Territory (Territoire d’Outre-mer) within the newly created French Union (Union française). In 1960, Upper Volta gained its independence, but the nation experienced a new beginning in 1983 when it was renamed Burkina Faso by the revolutionary government of Thomas Sankara. The policies and debates that shaped the colonial history of Burkina Faso, while important in themselves, are a reflection of the larger West African history and French colonial policy.


1978 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. Andrew ◽  
A. S. Kanya-Forstner

World War I marked the final phase of French colonial expansion. France's African war aims were determined not by the cabinet but by the leaders of the colonialist movement and by a handful of African enthusiasts in the colonial and foreign ministries. Most of these men harboured the unrealistic aim of acquiring not merely German territory but also other foreign ‘enclaves’ in A.O.F. At the peace conference, however, France's African gains were limited to mandates over the greater part of German West Africa.Before August 1914 no government had given serious thought to the potential contribution of French Africa, either in men or raw materials, to a war in Europe. The enormous losses on the Western Front led to the recruitment of French Africa's first great conscript army. By the end of the War French Africa had sent 450,000 soldiers and 135,000 factory workers to Europe. The crisis of French food supply also led in 1917–18 to the first concerted campaign, mounted jointly by the colonialists and the colonial ministry, for the mise en valeur of the Empire. But France's shipping losses made it impossible to increase her African imports.In the aftermath of victory French Africa appeared genuinely popular in France for the first time. The main reason for that popularity was the naïve belief that the resources of the Empire would free France from dependence on foreign suppliers and speed her post-war recovery. When the resources of the Empire proved even slower to arrive than reparations, the Empire quickly lost its newfound popularity. The War nonetheless left behind it the myth of the Empire as a limitless reservoir of men and raw materials: a myth which, though dormant for most of the inter-war years, was to be revived by the coming of World War II.


2008 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 724-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine E. Hoffman

Among French scholars and administrators during the French Protectorate of Morocco (1912–1956), especially prior to World War II, there was both a great belief in, and widespread suspicion of, a group's language as a reliable indicator of its ethnicity. Legend among the Ida ou Zeddout Berber people of southwestern Morocco holds that Captain Ropars, who ran the French Protectorate's Anti-Atlas mountain military post in Igherm from 1949–1954, not only spoke the Tashelhit Berber language, but also ordered the local men to do so under threat of imprisonment. “You're Ishelhin (Tashelhit speakers),” he allegedly told people in this collective memory as recounted to me. “You should speak Tashelhit, not Arabic.” The widespread eighteenth- and nineteenth- century idea of Volkgeist (‘soul of the folk’) that Ropars evoked has become commonplace today. A group's language is often considered to function as what Herder called the “treasury of the thought of an entire people” and “the mirror of its history, its deeds, joys and sorrows” (in Bauman and Briggs 2003: 169–70; see also Lorcin 1999: 44), and even what Abbey Condillac earlier called the “genius of each people” (Steedly 1996: 447). Captain Ropars followed Samuel Johnson's claim that identifying languages was the same as identifying “nations,” and, as Irvine and Gal paraphrase, “a logical first step in comparing, understanding, and ordering [nations'] relations to each other and to Europeans” (2000: 50). Yet, other French Protectorate administrators and scholars saw the link between language and primordial ethnicity as false, since histories of language use may be obscured or simply uninterrogated by a group's members.


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