scholarly journals GETTIERIZED KNOBE EFFECTS

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe ◽  
Joseph Shea
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Knowledge Attribution ◽  
Gettier Case ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Knobe Effect ◽  
Effect Literature

AbstractWe report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.

scholarly journals Interview on Experimental Philosophy with Joshua Knobe

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-28
Author(s):  
Pendaran S. Roberts ◽  
Joshua Knobe ◽  
Pendaran Roberts ◽  
Joshua Knobe
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Yale University ◽  
Knobe Effect ◽  
Experimental Philosopher ◽  
Interdisciplinary Collaborations ◽  
Conversation Piece

This conversation piece contains an interview with Joshua Knobe. It provides a useful introduction to what experimental philosophy is and the interdisciplinary collaborations it encourages. Pendaran Roberts and Joshua Knobe collaboratively developed this conversation piece via email. Joshua Knobe is a renowned experimental philosopher, who works on a range of philosophical issues, including philosophy of mind, action and ethics. He is a professor in the Program in Cognitive Science and the Department of Philosophy at Yale University. He is most known for what is now called the ‘Knobe effect’.

scholarly journals The Problem of ESEE Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Side Effect ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Knobe Effect ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Specific Instance ◽  
Theoretical Significance ◽  
Performance Error ◽  
A New Technique ◽  
Moral Valence

Traditionally it has been thought that the moral valence of a proposition is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to whether someone knows that the proposition is true, and thus irrelevant to the truth-value of a knowledge ascription. On this view, it’s no easier to know, for example, that a bad thing will happen than that a good thing will happen (other things being equal). But a series of very surprising recent experiments suggest that this is actually not how we view knowledge. On the contrary, people are much more willing to ascribe knowledge of a bad outcome. This is known as the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE), and is a specific instance of a widely documented phenomenon, the side-effect effect (a.k.a. “the Knobe effect”), which is the most famous finding in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I report a new series of five experiments on ESEE, and in the process accomplish three things. First, I confirm earlier findings on the effect. Second, I show that the effect is virtually unlimited. Third, I introduce a new technique for detecting the effect, which potentially enhances its theoretical significance. In particular, my findings make it more likely that the effect genuinely reflects the way we think about and ascribe knowledge, rather than being the result of a performance error.

IS KNOWLEDGE THE ABILITY TO ϕ FOR THE REASON THAT P?

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Gettier Case ◽  
Gettier Cases

AbstractHyman (1999, 2006) argues that knowledge is best conceived as a kind of ability: S knows that p iff S can ϕ for the reason that p. Hyman motivates this thesis by appealing to Gettier cases. I argue that it is counterexampled by a certain kind of Gettier case where the fact that p is a cause of the subject's belief that p. One can ϕ for the reason that p even if one does not know that p. So knowledge is not best conceived as an ability of this kind.

scholarly journals Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions

2010 ◽  
pp. 117-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Lutz
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Ideal Language ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy

Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical problems can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language or developing an ideal one. I review the debates on linguistic philosophy and between ordinary and ideal language philosophy. Using arguments from these debates, I argue that the results of experimental philosophy on intuitions support linguistic philosophy. Within linguistic philosophy, these experimental results support and complement ideal language philosophy. I argue further that some of the critiques of experimental philosophy are in fact defenses of ideal language philosophy. Finally, I show how much of the current debate about experimental philosophy is anticipated in the debates about and within linguistic philosophy. Specifically, arguments by ideal language philosophers support experimental philosophy.

The Knobe Effect, Indifference, and Constitutional Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-247
Author(s):  
Moshe Cohen-Eliya ◽  
Iddo Porat
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Moral Attitude ◽  
Knobe Effect ◽  
Large Scope ◽  
Effect Experiment ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Some constitutional accounts, in particular in the U.S., emphasize government attitudes to harming rights. Up till now, such accounts have primarily concentrated on intention to harm rights and on government acts of illicit intentions. However, such accounts have neglected a large scope of government attitudes that indicate indifference to harming rights rather than intention. In our article we use insights from experimental philosophy to develop an account of the role of indifference in constitutional law. We propose that the results of the Knobe Effect experiment show that the correlation between intent and indifference can be explained by the idea that indifference shows a lack of respect for the value or for the person harmed. Indifference, therefore, manifests a similar wrongness in terms of moral attitude as intent. The implications in terms of constitutional law are substantial. In principle, government actions manifesting indifference toward harming rights should be reviewed on the same lines as government actions based on intention to harm rights.

scholarly journals Western Skeptic vs Indian Realist. Cross-Cultural Differences in Zebra Case Intuitions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Sękowski ◽  
Adrian Ziółkowski ◽  
Maciej Tarnowski
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Gettier Case ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Cross Cultural Differences ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Larger Sample

AbstractThe cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001; hereafter: WNS) laid the ground for the negative program of experimental philosophy. However, most of WNS’s findings were not corroborated in further studies. The exception here is the study concerning purported differences between Westerners and Indians in knowledge ascriptions concerning the Zebra Case, which was never properly replicated. Our study replicates the above-mentioned experiment on a considerably larger sample of Westerners (n = 211) and Indians (n = 204). The analysis found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question in the predicted direction: Indians were more likely to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case than Westerners. In this paper, we offer an explanation of our result that takes into account the fact that replications of WNS’s other experiments did not find any cross-cultural differences. We argue that the Zebra Case is unique among the vignettes tested by WNS since it should not be regarded as a Gettier case but rather as a scenario exhibiting skeptical pressure concerning the reliability of sense-perception. We argue that skepticism towards perception as a means of gaining knowledge is a trope that is deeply rooted in Western epistemology but is very much absent from Classical Indian philosophical inquiry. This line of reasoning is based on a thorough examination of the skeptical scenarios discussed by philosophers of the Indian Nyaya tradition and their adversaries.

scholarly journals ATTRIBUTION OF EXTERNALITIES: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE KNOBE EFFECT

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Verena Utikal ◽  
Urs Fischbacher
Keyword(s):  
Side Effects ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Specific Language ◽  
Knobe Effect ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Negative Side Effects

A series of studies in experimental philosophy have revealed that people blame others for foreseen negative side effects but do not praise them for foreseen positive ones. In order to challenge this idea, also called the Knobe effect, we develop a laboratory experiment using monetary incentives. In a game-theoretic framework we formalize the two vignettes in a neutral way, which means that we abstain from the use of any specific language terms and can easily control and vary the economic parameters of the situation. We confirm the Knobe effect in one situation and present situations in which the effect vanishes or even reverses. Our results are in line with a theoretical approach where the assessment of intention is not based on the action itself but on the underlying motive – as modelled in Levine (1998).

scholarly journals Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Gettier Case ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Deep Fault ◽  
Theoretical Literature ◽  
Fault Lines ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

AbstractThe term “Gettier Case” is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called “Gettiering.” While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a “Gettier case” in a favour of more finely grained terminology. We propose such terminology, and use it to effectively sort the myriad Gettier cases from the theoretical literature in a way that charts deep fault lines in ordinary judgments about knowledge.

scholarly journals Gettier Cases

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Blouw ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Gettier Case ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Deep Fault ◽  
Theoretical Literature ◽  
Fault Lines ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The term ‘Gettier case’ is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called ‘gettiering.’ While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a ‘Gettier case’ in favor of more finely grained terminology. We propose such terminology, and use it to effectively sort the myriad Gettier cases from the theoretical literature in a way that charts deep fault lines in ordinary judgments about knowledge.

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