scholarly journals “Simply not comprehensible.” Why?

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 950-955
Author(s):  
Sven Simon ◽  
Hannes Rathke
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
First Time

AbstractThe German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling of May 5, 2020 on the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) stated, for the first time ever, that some decisions by European institutions are not covered by the competence allocations of the European Treaties and cannot therefore take effect in Germany. This article argues that the judgment came as no surprise, as it is consistent with the principle of conferral of powers. According to this principle the EU and its institutions can only act within the limits of their competences. The German Basic Law prohibits any transfer of sovereign rights whose exercise would confer sua sponte additional competences to the supranational level. Against this background, the Federal Constitutional Court judgment does not seek to limit the ECB’s scope for appraisal and evaluation in the exercise of its monetary policy mandate. It focuses rather on the conditions which legitimize the ECB’s leeway. The issue in this case is not the applicability of the proportionality principle as a criterion governing the delimitation of powers, but the different reference points for the assessment of proportionality. In this regard the CJEU had failed to discuss whether monetary policy and the effects on economic policy are proportionate by themselves. Hence, in constitutional terms, the CJEU’s interpretation was found to be “arbitrary”, since the German Constitutional Court defined arbitrariness as jurisprudence that “in a reasonable reading … [appears] unintelligible and clearly untenable.” In other words, it is “simply not comprehensible.” Despite the harsh words of the German Constitutional Court, the authors argue that the judgement in the end can help to create a European legal culture that will strengthen the European Union in the long term if, in future, the CJEU engages more constructively with criticisms from Member State courts.

Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Goldmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Measure ◽  
European Central ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional

In Karlsruhe's recent request for a preliminary ruling, an unconventional monetary policy measure of the European Central Bank (ECB) finds an unconventional judicial response. Based on its mandate to enforce the fundamental right to vote, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) leaves no doubt about its view that the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT Programme) violates the law of the European Union and hence the German Basic Law, unless one reads them in a rather restrictive way. But as unconventional monetary policy steps up the need for the ECB to justify the legality of its measures, so does the FCC's unconventional expansion of the scope of judicial review raise questions which the recent decision in its—generally laudable—brevity leaves underexplored. In particular, the decision does not dwell much on the issue whether it is appropriate for a court to review issues of monetary policy, and which standard of review should apply. Only Judge Gerhardt calls the majority's standard of review into question when he doubts whether the requirement for transgressions of the European Union's competences to be “manifest” is a workable criterion for defining the scope of the FCC's ultra vires control.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Das Anleihenkaufprogramm APP der Europäischen Zentralbank vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht und dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Degenhart ◽  
Hans-Detlef Horn ◽  
Dietrich Murswiek ◽  
Markus C. Kerber
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Liability Risks

Since 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been purchasing, among other assets, primarily government bonds of the euro zone countries and including them in its balance sheet on a permanent basis (Public Sector Purchase Programme - PSPP). Does the ECB thereby engage in prohibited monetary public financing? Does it exceed its monetary policy competences? Does it cause incalculable liability risks for the German federal budget? Does this all in all constitute an infringement of the legal and democratic order of the European Union? The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 is therefore of historical significance. By making it clear that the ECB's independence does not justify "ultra vires acts", it marks - also vis-à-vis the Court of Justice of the European Union - the limits which the Basic Law has set for European Union Law. The volume brings together the main procedural documents of the four constitutional complaints, which have thus been partially granted.

Direct Cooperation Has Begun: Some Remarks on the Judgment of the ECJ on the OMT Decision of the ECB in Response to the German Federal Constitutional Court's First Request for a Preliminary Ruling

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1025-1048 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Simon
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Critical Question ◽  
Political Problem ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism

By its first request for a preliminary ruling, the German Constitutional Court aired its doubts about the lawfulness of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program. In this article it is argued that the ECB's pledge in the summer of 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism in all countries of the euro area by buying government bonds was generally compatible with EU law. However, it is argued that there is some potential for the ECB to infringe the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) while acting according to this announcement. The peculiarity of the situation, the author argues, is that we might be dealing with a “self-fulfilling prophecy” in that the ECB announces a particular policy, which might not be compatible with EU law, but the act announced, will never take place because the political problem would have been resolved by the measure previously announced. The critical question in this scenario refers to how a court should react to such a situation. The author argues that a court in such a situation has to show the legal limits of the particular institution, but neither the ECJ nor the German Constitutional Court may replace the central banks' task to maintain financial stability. Finally, a comment is given on how the German Constitutional Court will react to the ECJ's decision in that case.

David Currie and German Constitutional Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2081-2094
Author(s):  
Peter E. Quint
Keyword(s):  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the order of first appearance) Donald Kommers's monumental casebook, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany and David Currie's magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Professor Kommers's comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late 1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and, drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first major work in English on that court. Since then, Kommers has produced a steady stream of significant works on German constitutional law.

scholarly journals Bring Back the Politics: The PSPP Ruling in Its Institutional Context

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1045-1057
Author(s):  
Teresa Violante
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Eu Integration ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that the conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union is the story of a clash foretold, if one takes seriously constitutional courts as institutions designed to be “dogs that bite.” The German Court consistently developed a doctrinal tool to guide its role as guardian of the national constitutional order and the democratic principle, and enforced it when the constitutional control of monetary policy measures so required. I analyze the PSPP ruling, focusing on where the Court concluded that the lack of a satisfactory statement of reasons by the European Central Bank prevented it from reviewing the proportionality of the program. I argue that the Court, after conducting a substantive assessment, applied a weak remedy, thereby deferring the last word on the constitutionality of the PSPP to the political branches. In doing so, the Court opens space for the political assessment of a controversial monetary policy, enhancing the politicization of the Economic and Monetary Union, and provides a doctrinal toolbox for national constitutional courts that face competence creep of EU law in their jurisdictions. I conclude that, ultimately, the main merit of constitutional courts’ interventions in the EU integration is that they are in a privileged position to allow for the politicization of technocratic processes.

scholarly journals Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Arrest Warrant ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Features European Arrest Warrant – Article 16(2) German Basic Law, which allows exceptionally for the extradition of German nationals, not read in the light of the European Union integration clause in Article 23(1) Basic Law – Complaint of violation of the democratic principle put in perspective – Preservation of the statehood of Germany – Lack of proportionality in and procedural defects of the implementing Act

Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht's Epigones At Sea

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1201-1218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Schönberger
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Federal States ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Moment ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

On 30 June 2009, the Second Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court handed down its long-awaited decision on the compatibility of the Treaty of Lisbon with the German Constitution, the Basic Law. It was no surprise that the Court upheld the constitutionality of the treaty. Even the plaintiffs could not have imagined in their wildest dreams that the Court would actually say “no”. What is more than disturbing, however, is the tortuous way in which the Court's vast and verbose opinion purports to be justifying the approval of the treaty. There is probably no other judgment in the history of the Karlsruhe Court in which the argument is so much at odds with the actual result. To the point of perplexity and bewilderment, the reader of the opinion is hardly able to find any reasons supporting the outcome of the case. At the moment when the Court approves the most far-reaching revision of the European founding treaties since Maastricht, it does not present any serious argument supporting the conclusion it has reached, except sketchy evocations of a principle of “openness towards European law” it finds enshrined in the Basic Law and brief solemn reminders of a murderous past. Instead, the main thrust of the argument is a ringing indictment of European integration based on a certain idea of egalitarian and majoritarian parliamentary democracy that the Court derives from the Basic Law. Unfortunately, this standard of democratic legitimacy can only describe certain centralized states; it is unable to account for federal States, including Germany, and cannot be made to fit the federal system of the European Union.

Multilevel cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Voβkuhle
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
European Court ◽  
Broad Concept ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court

Broad concept of constitutional jurisdiction – Triangle between Karlsruhe, Strasbourg and Luxembourg – European vocation of the German Constitutional Court and Basic Law – European Convention on Human Rights – Karlsruhe decisions can be reviewed in Strasbourg – Human rights-related constitutional court – European Court of Justice developed into constitutional court of the Union – Verbund between three courts – No simplistic hierarchy – Verbund techniques – Dialogue in Human Rights; Interplay in Integration – Federal Constitutional Court and European Court of Human Rights functionally comparable – Both Courts seek substantive coherence as Verbund technique – Federal Constitutional Court commits all German authorities to the Convention – Federal Constitutional Court and ECJ – Principle of openness to European Law – Sharing and assigning responsibilities in complex system – Solange, ultra vires and identity review – Responsibility for integration, due by Court and other German bodies – Federal Court contributes to common European Constitutional order – Europe-wide discursive struggle and ‘Lernverbund’

The Participation of the German Länder in Formulating German EU-policy

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 1215-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magdalena Suszycka-Jasch ◽  
Hans-Christian Jasch
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
German Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Länder ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

On the 30 June 2009 the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, FCC) has passed its long-awaited decision on the compatibility of the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon and the accompanying legislation with the Basic law (Grundgesetz). The FCC's decision according to which the ratification law is compatible with the Basic law was greeted with relief by many German and European policy makers. It has removed another obstacle for the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in the European Union (EU), which still has to be ratified by Ireland, Poland and the Czech Republic, though. But also Germany's ratification still depends on the amendment of the accompanying “Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters” (“Extending Act”) which the FCC has declared incompatible with the Basic law insofar as the legislature, Bundestag and Bundesrat, have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European law-making and treaty amendment procedures. The FCC has therefore ruled that the Federal Republic of Germany's instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force. This puts pressure on German law-makers to amend the accompanying “Extending Act” possibly before the referendum in Ireland and before German elections in autumn 2009.

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