treaty of lisbon
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2021 ◽  
pp. 51-77
Author(s):  
Luuk van Middelaar ◽  
Uwe Puetter

This chapter discusses the central role of the European Council in European Union (EU) politics and policymaking. Even though it was not listed among the EU’s core institutions until the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council regularly intervenes in EU decision-making to make other institutional actors follow its guidance. Initially, it was meant to be predominantly an informal institution for direct exchanges between the heads of state or government of the member states. Yet it assumed responsibility for landmark decisions which paved the way for key steps in integration, such as EU enlargements and the euro. The European Council has arguably saved the Union from break-up by acting as its ultimate crisis manager and, at times, has skirted the boundaries of EU law by finding institutional compromises and fixes. The institution plays a guiding role, especially in relation to the Commission and the Council of the European Union, which was formerly known as the Council of Ministers. The European Council devises strategic guidelines for policy development, shapes processes of institutional reform, and breaks impasses when agreement cannot otherwise be found. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, European Council intervention has become a routine in new EU policy areas, such as euro area economic governance and foreign policy. The Treaty of Lisbon assigns the European Council its own full-time president and places the institution right after the European Parliament (EP) in the list of EU institutions. Even though it has shaped European integration since 1975, the European Council did not find much recognition in traditional theories of European integration. This has changed more recently, with renewed debate about intergovernmentalism in EU politics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 368-385
Author(s):  
Frank Turner

This chapter describes the work of the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE), its evolving relationship with central institutions of the European Union, and with its partners in the Catholic world. The chapter then considers particular challenges, both intrinsic (arising from the character of COMECE itself) and extrinsic (focusing on those entailed by the EU’s culture of secularity). For example, the Treaty of Lisbon assures religious organizations, like non-religious ones, both access to and dialogue with EU institutions. COMECE’s advocacy, however, is necessarily grounded in Catholic beliefs and principles, in particular those of Catholic social thought. Such foundational principles cannot be coherently articulated in the language of secularity alone.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
James Gallagher

<p>The European Union (EU) has undergone constant political and economic integration since its inception in 1952. It has developed from a community in the aftermath of World War Two, into a Union of diverse states with its own political and legal system. It is the best example of international integration and co-operation in the world.  A number of treaties represent the primary law of the EU. The treaties represent the EU’s commitment to promote human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. The Treaty of Lisbon¹ was introduced and adopted by the Member States to increase participatory democracy within the EU. Originally called the Reform Treaty, it amended the existing EU and EC treaties, providing the EU with the legal framework to meet the future challenges and to respond to the increasing demands of the citizens’ for a more transparent and open institution.  The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution of the EU, and traditionally had the least amount of power of the EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty attempted to address the so-called democratic deficit through a range of institutional reforms that recognised the importance of European citizen involvement in the EU. Citizen involvement in the EU has also been increased through the implementation of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). The ECI represents a further step towards the EU becoming a true participatory democracy.  This purpose of this paper is to critically assess the democratic involvement of European citizens in the operation of the EU, and how the constitutional foundation of the EU provides for this involvement. The paper will seek to answer to what extent European Citizens’ have the ability to affect real and meaningful change upon the EU, a power that currently sits with the governments of Member States.  Democracy is often associated with the power of the citizens to affect change in the institutions that govern them. The theory of constituent power goes one step further and argues that it gives citizens the ability to alter not only the governing institutions, but the also the power that those institutions exercise. This begins with an introduction of the main institutions of the EU, before moving to discuss the theory of constituent power, before assessing what factors would be necessary for constitutent power to be successful in the EU.  ¹ Official Journal of the European Union 2007 No C 306/1 (herein after referred to as the Treaty of Lisbon). Adopted 2008, entered into force 1 December 2009.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
James Gallagher

<p>The European Union (EU) has undergone constant political and economic integration since its inception in 1952. It has developed from a community in the aftermath of World War Two, into a Union of diverse states with its own political and legal system. It is the best example of international integration and co-operation in the world.  A number of treaties represent the primary law of the EU. The treaties represent the EU’s commitment to promote human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. The Treaty of Lisbon¹ was introduced and adopted by the Member States to increase participatory democracy within the EU. Originally called the Reform Treaty, it amended the existing EU and EC treaties, providing the EU with the legal framework to meet the future challenges and to respond to the increasing demands of the citizens’ for a more transparent and open institution.  The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution of the EU, and traditionally had the least amount of power of the EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty attempted to address the so-called democratic deficit through a range of institutional reforms that recognised the importance of European citizen involvement in the EU. Citizen involvement in the EU has also been increased through the implementation of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). The ECI represents a further step towards the EU becoming a true participatory democracy.  This purpose of this paper is to critically assess the democratic involvement of European citizens in the operation of the EU, and how the constitutional foundation of the EU provides for this involvement. The paper will seek to answer to what extent European Citizens’ have the ability to affect real and meaningful change upon the EU, a power that currently sits with the governments of Member States.  Democracy is often associated with the power of the citizens to affect change in the institutions that govern them. The theory of constituent power goes one step further and argues that it gives citizens the ability to alter not only the governing institutions, but the also the power that those institutions exercise. This begins with an introduction of the main institutions of the EU, before moving to discuss the theory of constituent power, before assessing what factors would be necessary for constitutent power to be successful in the EU.  ¹ Official Journal of the European Union 2007 No C 306/1 (herein after referred to as the Treaty of Lisbon). Adopted 2008, entered into force 1 December 2009.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
Zorančo Vasilkov ◽  
Dragana B. Lazić

The criminal jurisdictions of the European Community and subsequently the European Union began to develop as subsidiary competencies aimed at protecting economic and industry policies established by the founding treaties. Their development has pointed to the necessity of using forced measures for the preventing abuse and countering criminal activities in the area of the customs union and the common market. This paper presents the gradual transfer of limited criminal jurisdictions from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and communitarian law into the contractual competences of the European Union with an explicit legal basis after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Using the teleological method, the method of the content analysis (of the legal norms) and the comparative method the paper emphasizes examples of using criminal jurisdictions within the framework of communitarian law, the delimitation of competencies between the EU and the EC, and the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon in relation to the EU Treaty of Amsterdam. Amendments to the founding treaties have set the foundations for developing criminal jurisdictions into the supranational criminal law that through its norms would supplement national criminal justice systems in the areas of substantive criminal law and the law of criminal procedure.


2021 ◽  
pp. 27-34
Author(s):  
Victor Juc ◽  
◽  
Maria Diacon ◽  
Anastasia Catan ◽  
◽  
...  

The study represents the analysis of the legal support for the creation and functioning of the European Union and offers the possibility to know its structure, contributing to the definition and understanding of the objectives of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties on the organization and functioning of the European Union. Nice and the Convention on the Future of Europe and providing information on the new system of organization and functioning of the Union in the light of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon.


Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Vasileios G. Tzemos ◽  
Konstantinos Margaritis

Since 1 December 2009, the time when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: the EU Charter, the Charter) has been formally included in the EU legal order as primary EU law [...]


2021 ◽  
pp. 12-41
Author(s):  
Margot Horspool ◽  
Matthew Humphreys ◽  
Michael Wells-Greco

This chapter discusses the Treaties which together represent the primary law of the European Union; its constitutional base. These include the Single European Act 1986; the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) 1993; the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed June 1997, entered into force 1 May 1999); the Nice Treaty (adopted December 2001, entered into force 1 February 2003); and the Treaty of Lisbon (signed December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009).


ERA Forum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Cygan

AbstractEuropeanisation has marginalised national parliaments and their democratic practices leading to a ‘de-parliamentarisation’ within the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon included substantive provisions designed to improve participation by national parliaments in EU decision-making, the most significant of which is the allocation of subsidiarity monitoring. This was intended to address concerns that national parliaments are peripheral within the EU Polity, and that EU legislation lacks legitimacy amongst its citizens. Protocols 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon promote a horizontal political dialogue between national parliaments within subsidiarity monitoring, but, experience of the last ten year indicates that this has not improved legislative legitimacy, nor adequately addressed de-parliamentarisation. This article argues that, while the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced the privileges of national parliaments, they have not been ‘re-centred’ as an influential collective bloc of actors within the EU’s institutional framework.


2021 ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Carlos Espaliú Berdud

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens. Received:  03 February 2021Accepted: 25 March 2021


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