Judicial diplomacy of the German Federal Constitutional Court: bilateral court meetings as a novel data source to assess transnational communication of constitutional courts

Judicial diplomacy describes the courts’ efforts to promote liberal democracy and protect their institutional authority. Bilateral court meetings are essential for judicial diplomacy, encompassing jurisprudential (e.g., discussion of case law) and aims of strategic (e.g., maximising influence). This study presents a novel approach to assess such meetings. It analyses the German Federal Constitutional Court meeting reports between 1998–2019, using content and semantic network analysis. The content analysis shows that court meetings focus on jurisprudential aspects; however, strategic considerations also play a role in discussions with interlocutors from emerging democracies. These findings are substantiated by the semantic network analysis, which discloses that recent case law, Europeanisation, and globalisation are the main issues discussed. Hence, this study presents an analysis of a novel data source. Further, it contributes to judicial politics research as transnational court meetings could be a missing link to understand legal citation networks.

Two Constitutional Cultures, Technological Enforcement and User Creativity: The Impending Collapse of the EU Copyright Regime?

In Pelham, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court reached diametrically opposing conclusions on the relevance of freedom of art in copyright law. The different stances permit a speculative prediction – they can have immediate consequences for the predictable challenges against the new platform liability regime, and its associated dangers of widespread filtering and blocking. The article discusses the numerous constitutional implications, with specific attention given to the respective interests affected by the new regime (authors, exploiters, users, platforms) in light of the divergent approaches from the perspective of what appears to be two rather conflicting constitutional cultures: specific perceptions of fundamental rights and proportionality under German law versus an approach tending to emphasise market integration under the EU legal order. Recent assertions by the German Federal Constitutional Court redistributing the division of competences between national and EU law permit the prediction of a disturbing future collision course between the two systems, with potentially massive implications for EU copyright law by and large.

The Uncertain Structure of Process Review in the EU: Beyond the Debate on the CJEU’s Weiss Ruling and the German Federal Constitutional Court’s PSPP Ruling

The obligation to provide reasons (e.g. in Art. 296 TFEU) may appear rather a simple and straightforward, but in actual practice—as the mutually antagonistic Weiss rulings of the CJEU and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (“BVG”) amply demonstrate—is fraught with constitutional complication. On the one side, there lies the concern with a deeply intrusive form of judicial review which substitutes judicially determined “good” reasons for those of the reviewee decisionmaker—legislatures, administrative agencies, or, as in Weiss, the European Central Bank (ECB). On the other side lies the concern with judicial abdication in the face of technical expertise, uncertainty and complexity, turning the reason-giving requirement into a mere façade thereby placing democratic accountability in the modern administrative state beyond law’s remit. Either way, normatively and conceptually, we seem left with a half-way house only. Drawing on the recent US administrative law discourse—the neo-Fullerian concept of an “internal morality of law” (Sunstein / Vermeule) and democratic experimentalism (Sabel / Kessler)—this paper explores the concept of process review as tertium datur. Process review responds to concerns over the rule of law and administrative discretion through indirect, procedural safeguards, by imposing requirements of reasoned justification, rather than through wholesale invalidation or aggressive substantive review.

Euro-sceptical or Euro-phile? A critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the process of European integration and decision-making

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>

Euro-sceptical or Euro-phile? A critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the process of European integration and decision-making

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>