The Participation of the German Länder in Formulating German EU-policy

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 1215-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magdalena Suszycka-Jasch ◽  
Hans-Christian Jasch
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
German Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Länder ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

On the 30 June 2009 the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, FCC) has passed its long-awaited decision on the compatibility of the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon and the accompanying legislation with the Basic law (Grundgesetz). The FCC's decision according to which the ratification law is compatible with the Basic law was greeted with relief by many German and European policy makers. It has removed another obstacle for the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in the European Union (EU), which still has to be ratified by Ireland, Poland and the Czech Republic, though. But also Germany's ratification still depends on the amendment of the accompanying “Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters” (“Extending Act”) which the FCC has declared incompatible with the Basic law insofar as the legislature, Bundestag and Bundesrat, have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European law-making and treaty amendment procedures. The FCC has therefore ruled that the Federal Republic of Germany's instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force. This puts pressure on German law-makers to amend the accompanying “Extending Act” possibly before the referendum in Ireland and before German elections in autumn 2009.

The European Union as An Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1219-1240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Schorkopf
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legal Foundations ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Sixty years after the promulgation of the German constitution, which from the beginning was distinguished by its “visionary openness towards Europe,” the German Federal Constitutional Court reassessed the historic process of European integration. It reviewed the compatibility of the legal foundations of the European Union with the German Basic Law and provided a thorough overview. The Treaty of Lisbon and its sweeping, integrating reform of the European Union is compatible with the Basic Law, the Court's Second Senate ruled, so long as it is applied within the framework outlined by the Federal Constitutional Court. However, the Court found that the German implementation law is not consistent with the Basic Law. Accordingly, the Court made clear that Germany can continue with the ratification of the treaty only after introducing a new implementation law. The 147-page decision could be summarised in the following way: The European Union is an association of sovereign states and, hence, a secondary political area.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

scholarly journals Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Arrest Warrant ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Features European Arrest Warrant – Article 16(2) German Basic Law, which allows exceptionally for the extradition of German nationals, not read in the light of the European Union integration clause in Article 23(1) Basic Law – Complaint of violation of the democratic principle put in perspective – Preservation of the statehood of Germany – Lack of proportionality in and procedural defects of the implementing Act

scholarly journals The German Federal Constitutional Court's Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – Another Step towards National Closure?

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Schiek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
German Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Impact ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruling of 14 January 2014 deserves a thorough evaluation on several accounts: It is the first ever reference by the FCC to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it represents a continuation of FCC case law aimed at restricting the impact of European Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justices of the European Union (CJEU) on German law as well as questioning Germany's participation in an ever closer European Union, and it has the potential to dictate the future course of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Das Anleihenkaufprogramm APP der Europäischen Zentralbank vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht und dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Degenhart ◽  
Hans-Detlef Horn ◽  
Dietrich Murswiek ◽  
Markus C. Kerber
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Liability Risks

Since 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been purchasing, among other assets, primarily government bonds of the euro zone countries and including them in its balance sheet on a permanent basis (Public Sector Purchase Programme - PSPP). Does the ECB thereby engage in prohibited monetary public financing? Does it exceed its monetary policy competences? Does it cause incalculable liability risks for the German federal budget? Does this all in all constitute an infringement of the legal and democratic order of the European Union? The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 is therefore of historical significance. By making it clear that the ECB's independence does not justify "ultra vires acts", it marks - also vis-à-vis the Court of Justice of the European Union - the limits which the Basic Law has set for European Union Law. The volume brings together the main procedural documents of the four constitutional complaints, which have thus been partially granted.

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court – New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration?

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Core Competencies ◽  
National Level ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
State Functions

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has found that there are no constitutional objections against the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the FCC imposed limitations to future integration by identifying a number of state functions that are non-amenable to integration and which have to be retained at the national level. This article examines the scope and content of these core competencies. It also discusses to what extent the criteria used by the FCC for the determination of core competencies might reflect a European-wide standard for the determination of limits to the transfer of competencies to the European Union. The article concludes that the judgment clarifies the limitations of the transfer of competencies, even though the criteria used by the FCC cannot claim to produce the set of inalienable sovereign powers that were recognized as such throughout the Union.

The Lisbon Case of 30 June 2009 - A Comment from the European Law Perspective

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1267-1276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Niedobitek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Law ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

In its 30 June 2009 judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court stated that “there are no decisive constitutional objections to the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon,” but only as long as “the provisos that are specified in the grounds” are taken into account. Thus, in conformity with the terms of the judgment, the Court has made the constitutionality of the Act Approving the Lisbon Treaty dependent on an amendment of the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag (German Federal Parliament) and the Bundesrat (German Federal Council of States) in European Union Matters. One could also put it another way: The Act Approving the Lisbon Treaty is unconstitutional as long as the constitutional concerns specified in the judgment are not met.

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