Jesner v. Arab Bank (U.S. Sup. Ct.)

On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in Jesner v. Arab Bank. In only the third case in which the Supreme Court has considered the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) since its enactment in 1789, the Court held that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS. In foreclosing foreign corporate liability under the ATS, the Court limited the pool of possible ATS claims that can be brought. However, it left open the question of whether U.S. corporations could be sued under the ATS.

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Reviving Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel

The American Journal of International Law ◽

10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.4.0858 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 107 (4) ◽

pp. 858-863 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Vivian Grosswald Curran ◽

David Sloss

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Human Rights ◽

Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Human Rights Abuses ◽

Foreign Countries ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Death Knell ◽

Alien Tort Statute

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court held that “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the [Alien Tort Statute (ATS)], and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.” The Court preserved the possibility that claims arising from conduct outside the United States might be actionable under the ATS “where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States ... with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” However, the Court’s decision apparently sounds the death knell for “foreign-cubed” human rights claims under the ATS—that is, cases in which foreign defendants committed human rights abuses against foreign plaintiffs in foreign countries.

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THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AFTER KIOBEL: THE POSSIBILITY FOR UNLAWFUL ASSERTIONS OF UNIVERSAL CIVIL JURISDICITON STILL REMAINS

International and Comparative Law Quarterly ◽

10.1017/s0020589314000335 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 63 (3) ◽

pp. 699-719 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

PAUL DAVID MORA

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

International Law ◽

The United States ◽

District Court ◽

Universal Principle ◽

Foreign State ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Foreign Corporations ◽

Universal Civil Jurisdiction ◽

Alien Tort Statute

AbstractThe jurisdictional reach of causes of action brought under the Alien Tort Statute 17891 (ATS) was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum.2 The claimants in this decision sought to bring an action before a US District Court asserting universal civil jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign corporations performed against non-US nationals in the territory of a foreign State. Although the Supreme Court dismissed the particular claim on the basis of a domestic canon of statutory interpretation (the presumption against extraterritoriality), the narrowness of its reasoning left open the possibility for actions to continue being brought under the ATS which assert universal civil jurisdiction over the harm caused by individuals rather than corporations. Moreover, this position was specifically endorsed by a four-member minority of the Supreme Court in the Concurring Opinion of Justice Breyer. This paper argues that the reasoning of Justice Breyer is unconvincing and goes on to suggest that assertions of civil jurisdiction made under the universal principle are unlawful in international law as they fail to find a legal basis in either customary or conventional international law.

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Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1945653 ◽

1916 ◽

Vol 10 (3) ◽

pp. 481-499

Author(s):

Henry Merritt Wriston

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

The Third ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Considerable Discussion ◽

The Revolution

The unusual circumstances of the present diplomatic situation of the United States resulting from the European war and the revolution in Mexico have led the present administration to resort to the use of presidential diplomatic agents. The missions of ex-Governor John Lind and of William Bayard Hale to Mexico, and the errands of Col. E. M. House in Europe have aroused considerable discussion of their diplomatic status, which gives point to an effort to explain the basis for the employment of presidential special agents in diplomacy.At no point is the Constitution more definite and specific than in dealing with the appointing power of the President. Part of Article II, Section 2 reads: “He shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.” The third section of the same article reads: “The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.” There would seem to be no loophole here by which the President could either create an office not before existing, or, unless there is specific statutory warrant, appoint an individual to office without senatorial confirmation.

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