Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa. By Clark C. Gibson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 262p. $70.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.

This interesting and insightful book on the political economy of wildlife policy in Africa is an important contribution to the literature not only on African politics but also on the role that institutions play in shaping behavior and decisions. Although wildlife may not occupy the same centrality in African economies as oil and precious metals do, it is a crucial natural resource that earns countries, especially in eastern and southern Africa, significant revenue. Few political scientists have paid attention to this sector. No one has really approached it from a political economy perspective. Yet the struggle over access to natural resources in Africa is very much a political matter. Gibson's well-crafted and thorough study fills this gap. Its main contribution to the discipline at large is its focus on the distributive nature of institutions. The latter do not just produce collective or public goods. They also serve individual interests differentially. By concentrating on the strategic interaction of individuals within institutions, Gibson, following in the tradition of Douglass North and Robert Bates, identifies the intended and unintended consequences of policy decisions made with regard to the use and conservation of wildlife in Africa.