scholarly journals POLICE BAIL WITHOUT CHARGE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS

2010 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ed Cape ◽  
Richard A. Edwards

Whilst the power of the police to release a person on bail prior to trial has existed for centuries, the power to release on bail a person suspected of but not charged with a criminal offence has been available to the police only since 1925. The power to attach conditions to pre-charge bail is of very recent origin, having been introduced for the first time in 2003 but rapidly expanded since then. Whilst imposing restrictions on the liberty of a person should, constitutionally, be reserved to the judiciary, the fact that it was originally conceived, in part at least, as a mechanism for enhancing liberty reduced the constitutional tension created by allowing members of the executive such powers. However, the changing role of arrest in the investigation of crime and the granting of extensive powers to the police to impose bail conditions means that the police now have the ability to place controls on people not charged with a criminal offence for extended periods of time. It is argued here that this is in breach of the right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, in practice, may also breach other Convention rights.

Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

The police have extensive statutory powers to stop and search and to arrest a person in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence under various statutes, including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), the Terrorism Act 2000, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This chapter examines the powers of stop and search before arrest; powers of arrest under PACE 1984; powers to search a person and his property after arrest; the power to grant street bail; and the right to liberty under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950).


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

The police have extensive statutory powers to stop and search and to arrest a person in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence under various statutes, including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), the Terrorism Act 2000, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This chapter examines the powers of stop and search before arrest; powers of arrest under PACE 1984; powers to search a person and his property after arrest; the power to grant street bail; and the right to liberty under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950).


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

The police have extensive statutory powers to stop and search and to arrest a person in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence under various statutes, including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), the Terrorism Act 2000, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This chapter examines the powers of stop and search before arrest; powers of arrest under PACE 1984; powers to search a person and his property after arrest; the power to grant street bail; and the right to liberty under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950).


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

The police have extensive statutory powers to stop and search and to arrest a person in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence under various statutes, including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), the Terrorism Act 2000, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This chapter examines the powers of stop and search before arrest; powers of arrest under PACE 1984; powers to search a person and his property after arrest; the power to grant street bail; and the right to liberty under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950).


2021 ◽  
pp. 49-64
Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

The police have extensive statutory powers to stop and search and to arrest a person in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence under various statutes, including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), the Terrorism Act 2000, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This chapter examines the powers of stop and search before arrest; powers of arrest under PACE 1984; powers to search a person and his property after arrest; the power to grant street bail; and the right to liberty under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950).


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

The police have extensive statutory powers to stop and search and to arrest a person in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence under various statutes, including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), the Terrorism Act 2000, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. This chapter examines the powers of stop and search before arrest; powers of arrest under PACE 1984; powers to search a person and his property after arrest; the power to grant street bail; and the right to liberty under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950).


Author(s):  
Janne Rothmar Herrmann

This chapter discusses the right to avoid procreation and the regulation of pregnancy from a European perspective. The legal basis for a right to avoid procreation can be said to fall within the scope of several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an instrument that is binding for all European countries. Here, Article 12 of the ECHR gives men and women of marriageable age the right to marry and found a family in accordance with the national laws governing this right. However, Article 12 protects some elements of the right not to procreate, but for couples only. The lack of common European consensus in this area highlights how matters relating to the right to decide on the number and spacing of children touch on aspects that differ from country to country even in what could appear to be a homogenous region. In fact, the cultural, moral, and historical milieus that surround these rights differ considerably with diverse national perceptions of the role of the family, gender equality, religious and moral obligations, and so on.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 273-286
Author(s):  
Matthew Seet

There is a growing movement (globally and in Europe) addressing statelessness, and the July 2014 decision of Kim v Russia illustrates the role of the Strasbourg Court as a guardian of one of the most important fundamental rights of the ‘legally invisible’ in Europe. The court held that Russia’s two-year detention of a stateless person with a view to expulsion violated his right to liberty and security under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights. This comment argues that Kim v Russia represents an important step forward by the Strasbourg Court in safeguarding the stateless person’s right to liberty and security of person under echr doctrine, by highlighting and addressing the special vulnerability of stateless persons to prolonged, indefinite and cyclical detention in immigration control proceedings, although the court should have gone further and indicated general measures explicitly recommending for Russia to introduce statelessness determination procedures.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 1439-1444
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Marina M. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović

The paper is dedicated to ne bis in idem principle, which is a fundamental human right safeguarded by Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This principle is sometimes also referred to as double jeopardy.The principle implies that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted (internal ne bis in idem principle), and that in some other State or before the International Court (ne bis in idem principle in respect of the relations between the states or the State and the International Court) the procedure may not be conducted if the person has already been sentenced or acquitted. The identity of the indictable act (idem), the other component of this principle, is more complex and more difficult to be determined than the first one (ne bis).The objective of this principle is to secure the legal certainty of citizens who must be liberated of uncertainty or fear that they would be tried again for the same criminal offence that has already been decided by a final and binding decision. This principle is specific for the accusative and modern system of criminal procedure but not for the investigative criminal procedure, where the possibility for the bindingly finalised criminal procedure to be repeated on the basis of same evidence and regarding the same criminal issue existed. In its legal nature, a circumstance that the proceedings are pending on the same criminal offence against the same accused, represents a negative procedural presumption and, therefore, an obstacle for the further course of proceedings, i.e. it represents the procedural obstacle which prevents an initiation of new criminal procedure for the same criminal case in which the final and binding condemning or acquitting judgement has been passed (exceptio rei iudicatae).The right not to be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted is provided for, primarily, by the International Documents (Article 14, paragraph 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). The International framework has also been given to ne bis in idem principle through three Conventions adopted by the Council of Europe and those are the European Convention on Extradition and Additional Protocols thereto, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, and the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.Ne bis in idem principle is traditionally associated with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Likewise, no derogation from Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention at the time of war or other state of emergency which is threatening the survival of the nation (Article 4, paragraph 3 of Protocol No. 7). Thereby it is categorised as the irrevocable conventional right together with the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, and the legality principle. Similarly, ne bis in idem principle does not apply in the case of the renewed trials by the International criminal courts where the first trial was conducted in some State, while the principle is applicable in the reversed situation. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia could have conducted a trial even if a person had already been adjudicated in some State, in the cases provided for by its Statute and in the interest of justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-604
Author(s):  
Alex Ruck Keene ◽  
Xinyu Xu

Abstract How (if at all) can the right to liberty of a child under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) be balanced against the rights of parents, enshrined both at common law and under Article 8 ECHR? Is there a limit to the extent to which parents can themselves, or via others, seek to impose restrictions upon their disabled child’s liberty so as to secure their child’s interests? This case considers the answers to these questions given by and the implications of the decision of the Supreme Court in September 2019 in Re D (A Child) [2019] UKSC 42.


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