BENEFITS FOR EU CITIZENS: A U-TURN BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE?

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Peers

THE recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of Dano (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358) clarified some important points as regards access to social welfare benefits by EU citizens who move to another Member State. Furthermore, the judgment could have broad implications for any attempts by the UK Government to renegotiate the UK's membership of the EU, which is likely to focus on benefits for EU citizens coming to the UK. This note is an updated and expanded version of my analysis on the EU Law Analysis blog: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/benefit-tourism-by-eu-citizens-cjeu.html.

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Michael Connolly

On the 13 July of this year, the UK Government published the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 1 more commonly called the ‘Great Repeal Bill’. Aside from the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 (and with it the proposed ousting of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice), the Bill’s purpose is to ‘convert the acquis’ of EU law and preserve any UK law implementing EU law.2 This will include ‘workers’ rights’ and with it their employment discrimination rights.3 The efficacy of such a move will be limited if the British judges fail to adopt the same interpretations of these rights as their counterparts in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Over the years of Britain’s membership, there have been many references to Luxembourg to clarify the meaning of particular aspects of the discrimination provisions, with the Court generally giving a more liberal interpretation than the domestic courts had suggested would be their preference. One element of the law largely untouched by this process is the objective justification defence to claims of indirect discrimination. This is because the domestic courts have maintained a fiction that their interpretation is consistent with the EU formula. For no apparent reason, the domestic courts have reworded the EU formula while labelling it as being no different. This presents a major challenge for the Bill. It would be all too easy for Parliament to assume all is well with this aspect of workers’ rights, especially when the judges tell them so. Using a handful of cases, this article exposes the shortfalls within the domestic law and suggests some solutions. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the Bill (which no doubt is due for many amendments), but to focus on one important aspect of discrimination law, both pre- and post-Brexit.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-147
Author(s):  
Mariana Alvim

Article 50 TEU has caused considerable interest following its introduction in EU law, but mostly since the UK voted in favour of leaving the Union, a vote that provoked its first ever activation. However, this Article raises a few unanswered questions, such as if a Member State that formally notifies to the European Council of its intention to leave the EU, can it subsequently change its mind about this decision during the two-year period established in the Treaty. In the first part of the article, I intend to put the notification to leave the European Union under Article 50 of the TEU in perspective, elucidating the steps that have to be taken, and to address the silent aspects of Article 50. In the second Part, I will assess if a Member State that triggers Article 50 TEU, can still withdraw the notification to leave, once Article 50 TEU is completely soundless in this respect, and in doing so answer the central question of this article: “Can we still save the marriage?”


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-71
Author(s):  
Maciej Etel

Abstract The European Union and its member-states’ involvement in the economic sphere, manifesting itself in establishing the rules of entrepreneurs’ functioning – their responsibilities and entitlements – requires a precise determination of the addressees of these standards. Proper identification of an entrepreneur is a condition of proper legislation, interpretation, application, control and execution of the law. In this context it is surprising that understanding the term entrepreneur in Polish law and in EU law is not the same, and divergences and differences in identification are fundamental. This fact formed the objective of this article. It is aimed at pointing at key differences in the identification of an entrepreneur between Polish and EU law, explaining the reasons for different concepts, and also the answer to the question: May Poland, as an EU member-state, identify the entrepreneur in a different way than the EU?


2021 ◽  
pp. 124-141
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the Treaty framework and sources of EU law as well as the institutions of the EU. It covers the legal background to the UK’s departure from the EU, the legal process through which the UK left the EU, the key provisions of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020), and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. This chapter also discusses the effect of the UK’s departure from the EU on the status of the sources of EU law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as well as failure to transpose a Directive into national law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Francovich principle.


2021 ◽  
pp. 21-47
Author(s):  
Michael Dougan

This chapter sets out the basic constitutional framework, under EU law, governing the withdrawal of a Member State. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union recognizes the sovereign right of any State to leave the EU and sets out a process for agreeing the terms of an orderly departure. But Brexit also required the EU and the UK to undertake extensive internal preparations, to ensure their own legal systems were ready for the UK’s departure. Moreover, Article 50 itself is drafted in only brief and sketchy terms, leaving many important decisions about Brexit to be worked out in practice. And EU law allows for other final outcomes to the withdrawal process—including a ‘no deal Brexit’; or the UK’s right to ‘revoke and remain’ under the Wightman ruling.


Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU). The Withdrawal Agreement, adopted on the basis of Article 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU), spells out the terms and conditions of the UK departure from the EU, including ground-breaking solutions to deal with the thorniest issues which emerged in the context of the withdrawal negotiations. Admittedly, the Withdrawal Agreement is only a part of the Brexit deal. The Agreement, in fact, is accompanied by a connected political declaration, which outlines the framework of future EU–UK relations. The chapter then offers a chronological summary of the process that led to the adoption of the Withdrawal Agreement, describing the crucial stages in the Brexit process — from the negotiations to the conclusion of a draft agreement and its rejection, to the extension and the participation of the UK to European Parliament (EP) elections, to the change of UK government and the ensuing constitutional crisis, to the new negotiations with the conclusion of a revised agreement, new extension, and new UK elections eventually leading to the departure of the UK from the EU.


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