Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1591-1622
Author(s):  
Mihail Vatsov

The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request preliminary rulings from the CJEU but is yet to do so. In the other Member States (MS) with Constitutional Courts, references have not been sent yet, although worthy occasions in terms of EU-law-related cases have occurred, as also observed in various contributions in this special issue. These MSs include Bulgaria.


Author(s):  
Elena A. Sorokina

The preliminary ruling procedure as stipulated by Article 276 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union had a significant impact on the de-ve lop ment of EU law and became a collaborative tool as part of the dialogue bet-ween supranational and national judges.The mechanism of preliminary ruling enables to ensure a uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of EU law with all member states and consti tutes an instrumental element for preserving the uniformity of the European legal system.When developing the mechanism of preliminary ruling at EU level one consi-dered constitutional & legal traditions of member states, however, for long periods, the EU was perceived as "exotic" one and its impact on the national law was often underesti mated. Initially there were no any clear concepts how the mechanism of preliminary ruling would work. The EU court encouraged national judges of member states to use this mechanism; however, gradually it started introducing certain acceptability criteria in respect of such requests.The practice of the EU Court was summarized in the updated Rules of Procedure of 25 September 2012. During the period from 2014 to 2018, the number of cases sub mitted for preliminary ruling procedure was increasingly growing. Consequently, natio nal courts had started using this procedure relatively intensively and the con so-li dation of acceptability criteria created no serious problems for them.The imposition by the EU Court of minimal requirements towards the substance of requests does not reduce their number, since the acknowledgement of a re quest as inadmissible does not prevent a national court from sending a repeated re quest. However, it contributes to the improvement of quality and efficiency of the pre li mi-nary ruling procedure. The establishment of the respective requirements is necessary to ensure that the EU Court could provide national courts with an interpretation of EU law useful for resolution of a specific dispute and ensure constructiveness of the dialogue.


Author(s):  
Maryna Semenova

Problem setting. The Court of the European Union is a central term, which characterizes the entire court system of the European Union, which, without a doubt, includes three lanes: the Court of Justice, the Zagalny Court and special judges. Such an institute is aimed at accepting new acts of legal form and legal significance, and the very decision, the decision of the institution. The acceptance of such acts is a manifestation of the implementation of the judicial competence of the named institution, however, the link with the system is determined by the following: which may be the reason for the nature of precedent practice; both the established stench for the use of the Court itself by the Court of Justice itself, as well as by the other institutions, which have been approved by Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union; what is the decision of the Court EU norms of law EU. Analysis of the meaningful nutrition is the subject of a complete dosage. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The legal meaning of the decision to the Court of the European Union and the possibility of implementing such decisions before the legislation of Ukraine. Target of research is to examine the status of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union as a precedent. Article’s main body. The research is devoted to the analysis of the legal significance of the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the application of acts of the legislation of the Energy Community in the field of energy by the courts of Ukraine in resolving relevant disputes. It is noted that the Court of Justice of the EU is a judicial institution of another legal order, an international organization – the European Union, whose practice is fundamental to the development of the rule of law in the European Union. However, it is stated that the national courts of the EU member states are tasked with the daily application of EU law in accordance with the principles of supremacy, direct action and responsibility of member states for compliance with EU law. It is established that the legal basis for the functioning of the electricity market is the Constitution of Ukraine, special laws, international treaties of Ukraine, approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and other legislation of Ukraine, according to which the subjects of power and courts In applying the provisions of this Law, the law enforcement practice of the Energy Community and the European Union shall be taken into account, in particular decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (European Court of Justice, General Court), the European Commission and the Energy Community Secretariat. Conclusions and prospects for the development. A systematic analysis of the norms of national and international law allows us to conclude that the provisions of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU are part of the national legislation of Ukraine, its provisions are mandatory and binding throughout Ukraine. Therefore, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is applicable to the courts of Ukraine in resolving disputes concerning the application of energy legislation in the field of energy by other member states in full in the same manner as for the application of European Court of Human Rights.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2021 ◽  
pp. 141-165
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the supremacy of EU law from both the point of view of the Union, as understood by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the point of view of member states. A consensus seems to be emerging from the national and constitutional courts that EU law supremacy is accepted only in so far as it does not infringe the individual rights protection of the national constitutions, in which case the constitutional courts will exercise their reserved rights over national constitutions to uphold them over inconsistent EU law or to review EU law in light of their own constitutions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 1395-1428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Bobić

The theory of constitutional pluralism as advanced by MacCormick and Walker witnessed immense success in its attempt to explain the relationship between courts of Member States performing constitutional review and the Court of Justice. Despite its success, the theory has often been criticized for its lack of normative prescriptions and legal certainty in resolving the question of the final arbiter in the EU. It is the aim of this Article to address and move beyond these criticisms by introducing and exploring the auto-correct function necessary for the proper and balanced functioning of the pluralist system.The auto-correct has the function of preventing an outbreak of conflict between the constitutional jurisdictions involved—in the EU judicial architecture, an awareness on the part of all the actors involved of the benefits of a pluralist setting results in conflict management and control. The auto-correct function operates as follows: in the EU as we know it, issues prone to constitutional conflict arise regularly, and both the Court of Justice and national constitutional jurisdictions are able, through their respective procedural avenues, to control the extent of the conflict. There are also two legal imperatives driving this dynamic in two opposite directions—the principle of primacy of Union law on the one hand, and the obligation to respect the national identity of Member States on the other.As analyzing judicial behaviour shows, the application of self-restraint and mutual accommodation avoids a clash between parallel sovereignty claims on EU and national levels. In particular, national and EU law interaction demonstrates the existence of in-built conditions for the auto-correct function's application, such as the principle of EU-friendly interpretation in national constitutional law, or the national identity clause in primary EU law. The auto-correct function manifests itself and brings about a balance between the different constitutional orders only through the interaction of parallel claims to sovereignty.


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