The “General Principles” of humanitarian law according to the International Court of Justice

1987 ◽  
Vol 27 (259) ◽  
pp. 367-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Abi-Saab

In its Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case concerning “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua”, the International Court of Justice dealt at length with some of the most vexed questions in humanitarian law. Although the Court had previously touched upon certain problems in this legal field, for example in the Corfu Channel case and that of the Pakistani Prisoners, this was the first time it expressed itself in detail on more general issues, notably on the customary nature of the “general principles” of humanitarian law.

Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

Chapter 2 focuses on the meaning and content of necessity. It argues for the first time that there are two different ‘types’ of necessity. In so doing, this author proposes a novel taxonomy to distinguish between them. This distinction addresses, and better explains, the two principal and distinct concerns of necessity that are reflected in state practice, International Court of Justice jurisprudence and scholarship: (a) is military force required at all in the circumstances (an issue of ‘general necessity’), and (b) if so, where must such force be directed (an issue of ‘specific necessity’)? Without general necessity, the applicability of both specific necessity and proportionality is moot. Drawing on core principles of international humanitarian law, Chapter 2 provides a clearer and more workable understanding of necessity that highlights both the weaknesses in, and opportunities for, its operation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-901
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Geoffrey R. Watson

Mara'Abe v. Prime Minister of Israel. Case No. HCJ 7957/04. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html> (English translation).Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, September 15, 2005.In Mara ‘abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the routing of a portion of Israel's “security fence” in the northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ordered the Israeli government to consider alternative paths for the barrier. The Mara'abe decision expanded on the Court's earlier ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, in which the Court ordered the rerouting of another segment of the obstacle. Mara ’abe also revealed some of the Israeli Court's views on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory— the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that construction of the barrier anywhere in occupied territory violates international law.


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip C. Jessup

For the first time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled upon the right of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties. The litigation was the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application of Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of April 14, 1981. The Court unanimously denied permission to intervene, but three judges appended separate opinions which contain matters of considerable interest.


Author(s):  
Esam Elden Mohammed Ibrahim

The International Court of Justice had the opportunity to establish the principles of international humanitarian law and restrict the use or threat of nuclear weapons, on the occasion of its fatwa, on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, after realizing that the continued development of nuclear weapons exposes humanity to great risks, and its request It states, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permissible under the rules of international law" (Atalm, 1996), (Shahab, 2000), Therefore, the comment seeks to answer the question: What is the legality of possession, production and development of nuclear weapons? What is the extent of the legality of the threat to use it in light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in this regard? Was the decision of the International Court of Justice in favor of documenting the principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law? Or was it biased in its decision to the interests of a particular class itself? The researcher used in that descriptive, descriptive and critical analytical method, and the results that lead to criticism of the work of the International Court of Justice in this regard were reached on the premise that they tended towards tipping the political nature of the issue presented to it under the pressures and directions of the major nuclear states and this strengthens my criticism to the United Nations that I see It only works for the benefit of the major powers under the auspices of the Security Council by veto (right to veto) at a time when the Security Council itself is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, just as it can be said that the United Nations does not work for the benefit of mankind but works for the five major countries Even with regard to nuclear weapons Regardless of whether or not there was a threat to international peace and security. From this standpoint, the researcher reached several recommendations, the most important of which is the necessity of the independence of the International Court of Justice in its work from the political considerations of member states, especially the major countries, as a step to establish and support international peace and security in a practical way in practice. The United Nations should also reconsider what is known as a veto, which is and it is rightly one of the most important and most important measures that truly threaten international peace and security.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 56-64
Author(s):  
Hisakazu Fujita

The Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons contains many elements that are of fundamental interest from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. Indeed, humanitarian law, which has developed to a remarkable extent since the Second World War, has always lacked an express ruling on nuclear weapons.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
FABIÁN O. RAIMONDO

This article seeks to examine whether the International Court of Justicehas developed jurisprudence on international humanitarian law and whether this has exerted any influence on the decisions adopted by other international courts and tribunals. In so doing, it revisits the issue of the value ofjudicial decisions under international law. Finally, it reveals that despite the non-operation of the rule of stare decisis in international law, the Court's jurisprudence on international humanitarian law has been a persuasive precedent for other international courts and tribunals.


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