Intervention in the International Court

1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip C. Jessup

For the first time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled upon the right of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties. The litigation was the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application of Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of April 14, 1981. The Court unanimously denied permission to intervene, but three judges appended separate opinions which contain matters of considerable interest.

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-330
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY GORDON

AbstractTraditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.


1959 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasim Hasan Shah

Do states possess the right to seize evidence located within the territory of another, by forcible measures if necessary, if the object of this action is to procure the best evidence and thereby facilitate the task of an international tribunal in the decision of a dispute brought before it? In other words do states have the right to obtain discovery of evidence by intervention? This was one of the questions which the International Court of Justice was called upon to decide in the Corfu Channel Case.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Riesenberg

In 2012, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its fourth judgment in Nicaragua v. Colombia. The case was first initiated by Nicaragua under the Bogotá Pact in 2001. The fourth judgment affirmed Colombia’s territorial sovereignty over a group of islands in the western Caribbean Sea and delimited a boundary between the two states’ zones of maritime jurisdiction. Even after eleven years of complicated proceedings, however, the parties’ conflicting claims are not yet completely resolved. The ICJ explicitly declined to address Nicaragua’s potential entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coastal baselines, including the portion of Nicaragua’s ‘‘outer’’ continental shelf that allegedly overlaps with Colombia’s maritime entitlements. For the foreseeable future, this aspect of the controversy will likely remain unresolved. One week after the ICJ rendered its fourth judgment, Colombia withdrew from the Bogotá Pact and thereby terminated its consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niccolo Ridi

This article considers the approach to the res judicata principle taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and, specifically, its application in its 2016 judgment on preliminary objections in the latest dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. The judgment joins the small number of ICJ decisions in which the Court was evenly split, an altogether rare situation, which, at the time of the decision, had not occurred since the Nuclear Weapons Avisory Opinion. Intriguingly, such a fracture seems to have been prompted by differences over the operation of a procedural principle the understanding of which is comparatively uncontroversial. Upon closer analysis, however, the disagreement reveals that more significant questions were at stake, with members of the minority issuing a vocal joint dissent and several individual declarations. This study will move in three parts: first, it will provide an overview of the nature and purpose of the principle of res judicata, its application in international adjudication, and its use by the ICJ; second, it will analyse the Court’s reading of the principle in the case at issue; third, it will expose the broader implications of one such approach for the role and authority of the World Court and the international judiciary.


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