International humanitarian law and nuclear weapons

1996 ◽  
Vol 36 (313) ◽  
pp. 500-502
Author(s):  
The Review

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion in response to two enquiries as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Whilst the Court did not examine in detail the request put forward by the World Health Organization, it did give very close attention to the question presented by the General Assembly:“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. F. Amerasinghe

The World Health Organization (WHO) had, among other things, been examining and deliberating the hazardous effects to health by the use of nuclear weapons. These discussions culminated in a resolution which requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in the following terms: [i]n view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a Stare in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 56-64
Author(s):  
Hisakazu Fujita

The Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons contains many elements that are of fundamental interest from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. Indeed, humanitarian law, which has developed to a remarkable extent since the Second World War, has always lacked an express ruling on nuclear weapons.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 554-555
Author(s):  
Peter H. F. Bekker

This Note summarizes the judicial work of the International Court of Justice during 1996, using the updated General List, pleadings filed, Orders and Judgments given and hearings held at the Peace Palace in The Hague to describe the Court’s current record.During the calendar year 1996, the Court was seized of one new contentious case: Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia). In 1996 a total of eleven cases appeared on the General List. Besides the new case referred to, the contentious proceedings before the full Court were Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. United States), Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom) and (Libya v. United States), Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), and Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria). Advisory proceedings were concluded in Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (request for an advisory opinion by the World Health Organization) and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations).


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 35-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice represents the first time that the Court's judges have been called upon to analyse in some detail rules of international humanitarian law. Other instances, for example, the Nicaragua case, involved nowhere near such an extensive analysis. The Advisory Opinion is therefore of particular interest in that it contains important findings on the customary nature of a number of humanitarian law rules and interesting pronouncements on the interpretation of these rules and their relationship with other rules. Most judges based their final decision on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons on teleological interpretations of the law, choosing either the right of self-defence as being the most fundamental value, or the survival of civilization and the planet as a whole as paramount. Unfortunately, space does not permit a comment on these highly important analyses of the underpinnings of humanitarian law and its purpose in the international order. Therefore, rather than focusing primarily on the Court's conclusion as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, this short comment will concentrate on the various pronouncements made on humanitarian law rules. Reference to the Court's finding on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons will only be made from the point of view of how it has contributed to the interpretation of those rules. For this purpose, reference will be made not only to the Advisory Opinion as such (hereafter referred to as the “Opinion”), but also to the various Separate and Dissenting Opinions.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Gardam

This article considers the contribution of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) to the development of the rules and principles of international humanitarian law (‘IHL’). In recent times, the contribution of the Court to this body of the law has been overshadowed by the work of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR, established by the Security Council to punish those responsible for serious breaches of IHL. Nevertheless, the ICJ, in both its contentious and advisory jurisdictions, has considered the provisions of IHL on a number of occasions, and in the process has clarified many areas of IHL. This article is concerned with one particular issue: how does the Court perceive the fundamental nature of IHL? The analysis adopts two themes. First, an assessment is made of the part played by the Court in the process of bringing IHL into conformity with the changing emphasis of general international law. In both the Nicaragua case and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the Court continued the process of what has been referred to as the “humanization of international law.” Second, the approach of the Court to the vexed issue of the relationship between ius ad bellum and IHL is considered. The conclusion is reached that the approach of the Court to this latter issue has undermined its contribution to infusing the humanitarian ethos into IHL.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 118-119

The debate in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (51st Session, 1996) on agenda items 71 and 75 (disarmament and the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention) gave the ICRC the opportunity to make the following brief comment on the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice relating to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons:This was the first time that the International Court of Justice analysed at some length international humanitarian law governing the use of weapons. We were pleased to see the reaffirmation of certain rules which the Court defined as “intransgressible”, in particular the absolute prohibition of the use of weapons that are by their nature indiscriminate as well as the prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. We also welcome the Court's emphasis that humanitarian law applies to all weapons without exception, including new ones. In this context we would like to underline that there is no exception to the application of these rules, whatever the circumstances. International humanitarian law is itself the last barrier against the kind of barbarity and horror that can all too easily occur in wartime, and it applies equally to all parties to a conflict at all times.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy L.H. McCormack

The Advisory Opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons was a somewhat disappointing if not entirely unexpected decision. After the final paragraph, which constitutes the dispositif, all fourteen judges appended either personal declarations, separate opinions or dissenting opinions to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with specific findings and particular aspects of the reasoning behind the Opinion.


Author(s):  
Esam Elden Mohammed Ibrahim

The International Court of Justice had the opportunity to establish the principles of international humanitarian law and restrict the use or threat of nuclear weapons, on the occasion of its fatwa, on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, after realizing that the continued development of nuclear weapons exposes humanity to great risks, and its request It states, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permissible under the rules of international law" (Atalm, 1996), (Shahab, 2000), Therefore, the comment seeks to answer the question: What is the legality of possession, production and development of nuclear weapons? What is the extent of the legality of the threat to use it in light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in this regard? Was the decision of the International Court of Justice in favor of documenting the principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law? Or was it biased in its decision to the interests of a particular class itself? The researcher used in that descriptive, descriptive and critical analytical method, and the results that lead to criticism of the work of the International Court of Justice in this regard were reached on the premise that they tended towards tipping the political nature of the issue presented to it under the pressures and directions of the major nuclear states and this strengthens my criticism to the United Nations that I see It only works for the benefit of the major powers under the auspices of the Security Council by veto (right to veto) at a time when the Security Council itself is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, just as it can be said that the United Nations does not work for the benefit of mankind but works for the five major countries Even with regard to nuclear weapons Regardless of whether or not there was a threat to international peace and security. From this standpoint, the researcher reached several recommendations, the most important of which is the necessity of the independence of the International Court of Justice in its work from the political considerations of member states, especially the major countries, as a step to establish and support international peace and security in a practical way in practice. The United Nations should also reconsider what is known as a veto, which is and it is rightly one of the most important and most important measures that truly threaten international peace and security.


1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 92-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Mohr

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice finally rendered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The procedure had been dragging on since the start of the public sittings on 30 October 1995. Several deadlines set by the Court for reaching a decision came and went, ultimately giving rise to the fear that there would be no decisive majority to affirm the basic unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons. This would have been a bitter setback for the initiators of the Advisory Opinion proceeding and for the development of international law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document