Rethinking the Permissive Function of Military Necessity in Internal Non-International Armed Conflict

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosuke Onishi

This article advocates limiting the permissive impact of military necessity on the right to life. It has been argued that military necessity justifies deviations from international human rights law (IHRL) because this body of law is inadequate to deal with the necessities arising out of armed conflict. The article argues that while this rationale is convincing, it should not mean that conduct that is lawful under humanitarian law is necessarily also lawful under human rights law. The degree of force that may be used under international humanitarian law (IHL) is often superfluous. In some instances such violence is tempered by thejus ad bellum, but this body of law does not apply in internal non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The article concludes by exploring the potential for IHRL to play a role in tempering superfluous violence in NIAC that is similar to that whichjus ad bellumplays in international conflict.

Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

This chapter provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. It argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the jus ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The chapter then considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the application of the right to life in armed conflict, particularly in territory not controlled by the state conducting the strike. The chapter then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes, such as the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section considers the law relating to the use of force by states against non-state groups abroad.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

A state’s procedural right to life obligations relate to the circumstances in which a state must conduct an investigation following a death. Procedural right to life obligations also extend to how and when the investigation is conducted, and by whom. This chapter explores these issues in detail and advances a hypothesis in respect of what amounts to a human rights law-compliant investigation that would satisfy a state’s procedural right to life obligations during armed conflict. It also considers the similarities and differences between the requirement to investigate a death pursuant to international humanitarian law and that pursuant to international human rights law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 663-680
Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen

AbstractInternational human rights law is an as-yet underused branch of international law when assessing the legality of nuclear weapons and advocating for their elimination. It offers a far greater range of implementation mechanisms than does international humanitarian law (IHL), and arguably strengthens the protections afforded to civilians and combatants under IHL, particularly in non-international armed conflict. Of particular relevance are the rights to life, to humane treatment, to health and to a healthy environment, associated with the right to a remedy for violations of any human rights.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 881-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

AbstractThis article describes the relevant interpretation of the right to life by human rights treaty bodies and analyses how this might influence the law relating to the use of force in armed conflicts and occupations where international humanitarian law is unclear. The concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to hostilities in armed conflict does not mean that the right to life must, in all situations, be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law. The author submits that the human rights law relating to the right to life is suitable to supplement the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the use of force for non-international conflicts and occupation, as well as the law relating to civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. Finally, by making reference to the traditional prohibition of assassination, the author concludes that the application of human rights law in these situations would not undermine the spirit of international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
Hans Boddens Hosang

The chapter explores the challenges related to the conduct of operations and the preparations for such operations as regards implementing international humanitarian law and international human rights law, exploring some of the differences between the two systems. In particular, the concepts of necessity and proportionality are examined, as well as the right to life and issues related to capture and detention, and the different meanings of those concepts and their scope in each of the two paradigms. As regards international humanitarian law, the chapter also discusses a number of challenges to interoperability in multinational military operations. The discussion on international human rights law, on the other hand, focuses on the inherent challenges in implementing that body of law in the context of (multinational) military operations outside a nation’s own borders.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.


2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. In particular, it is increasingly the case that hostilities now occur alongside ‘everyday’ situations. This has led to a pressing need to determine when a ‘conduct of hostilities’ model (governed by international humanitarian law – IHL) applies and when a ‘law enforcement’ model (governed by international human rights law – IHRL) applies. This, in turn, raises the question of whether these two legal regimes are incompatible or whether they might be applied in parallel. It is on this question that the current article focuses, examining it at the level of principle. Whilst most accounts of the principles underlying these two areas of law focus on humanitarian considerations, few have compared the role played by necessity in each. This article seeks to address this omission. It demonstrates that considerations of necessity play a prominent role in both IHL and IHRL, albeit with differing consequences. It then applies this necessity-based analysis to suggest a principled basis for rationalising the relationship between IHL and IHRL, demonstrating how this approach would operate in practice. It is shown that, by emphasising the role of necessity in IHL and IHRL, an approach can be adopted that reconciles the two in a manner that is sympathetic to their object and purpose.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

The controversy surrounding the applicability of the right to life during armed conflict makes it arguably one of the most divisive and topical issues at the junction of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Recent litigation has, among other things, prompted the UK government to signal an intention to derogate from Article 2, ECHR, subject to certain caveats, in future armed conflicts. The litigation pursuant to Article 2 is also set to continue as the UK, and many other States with right to life obligations, will continue to use lethal force overseas; thus the significance of the issue will remain unabated. The scope and application of the right to life in armed conflict not only concerns parties to the ECHR; the predominance of coalition military operations in recent years has necessitated that it is essential for all troop-contributing States to understand the legal limitations of those States bound by the ECHR. It is equally important that the UN, NATO, NGOs, and other governments not directly involved in the armed conflict are aware of any States’ right to life obligations. Notwithstanding this, the applicability of the right to life in armed conflict is yet to be fully considered in academic literature. This book aims to close this lacuna and address the issue of the right to life in armed conflict by identifying and analysing the applicable law, citing recent examples of State practice, and offering concrete proposals to ensure that States comply with their right to life obligations.


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