The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the answers?

2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 881-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

AbstractThis article describes the relevant interpretation of the right to life by human rights treaty bodies and analyses how this might influence the law relating to the use of force in armed conflicts and occupations where international humanitarian law is unclear. The concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to hostilities in armed conflict does not mean that the right to life must, in all situations, be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law. The author submits that the human rights law relating to the right to life is suitable to supplement the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the use of force for non-international conflicts and occupation, as well as the law relating to civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. Finally, by making reference to the traditional prohibition of assassination, the author concludes that the application of human rights law in these situations would not undermine the spirit of international humanitarian law.

Author(s):  
Kleffner Jann K

This chapter explains the application of human rights in armed conflicts. International humanitarian law has much in common with the law of human rights, since both bodies of rules are concerned with the protection of the individual. Nevertheless, there are important differences between them. Human rights law is designed to operate primarily in normal peacetime conditions, and governs the vertical legal relationship between a state and its citizens and other persons subject to its jurisdiction. Human rights law applies primarily within the territory of the state that is subject to the human rights obligation in question. International humanitarian law, by contrast, is specifically designed to regulate situations of armed conflict. These differences between human rights law and international humanitarian law have led some to argue that human rights law is only intended to be applicable in time of peace. However, it is now generally accepted that human rights continue to apply during armed conflict. Hence, international humanitarian law and human rights law can apply simultaneously in situations of armed conflict.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosuke Onishi

This article advocates limiting the permissive impact of military necessity on the right to life. It has been argued that military necessity justifies deviations from international human rights law (IHRL) because this body of law is inadequate to deal with the necessities arising out of armed conflict. The article argues that while this rationale is convincing, it should not mean that conduct that is lawful under humanitarian law is necessarily also lawful under human rights law. The degree of force that may be used under international humanitarian law (IHL) is often superfluous. In some instances such violence is tempered by thejus ad bellum, but this body of law does not apply in internal non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The article concludes by exploring the potential for IHRL to play a role in tempering superfluous violence in NIAC that is similar to that whichjus ad bellumplays in international conflict.


Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

This chapter provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. It argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the jus ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The chapter then considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the application of the right to life in armed conflict, particularly in territory not controlled by the state conducting the strike. The chapter then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes, such as the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section considers the law relating to the use of force by states against non-state groups abroad.


Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.


Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

This chapter examines the rules and principles of the international humanitarian law (IHL) governing the right to life. It discusses the origins and scope of the right to life and clarifies that the protection provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not cease in times of war. It also considers some widely-recognized exceptions to or limitations upon the right to life, including killing in self-defence and the lethal use of force by the authorities in order to prevent crime. This chapter argues that while resorting to armed force may be necessary to prevent human rights violations, its benefits should not be exaggerated.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

The controversy surrounding the applicability of the right to life during armed conflict makes it arguably one of the most divisive and topical issues at the junction of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Recent litigation has, among other things, prompted the UK government to signal an intention to derogate from Article 2, ECHR, subject to certain caveats, in future armed conflicts. The litigation pursuant to Article 2 is also set to continue as the UK, and many other States with right to life obligations, will continue to use lethal force overseas; thus the significance of the issue will remain unabated. The scope and application of the right to life in armed conflict not only concerns parties to the ECHR; the predominance of coalition military operations in recent years has necessitated that it is essential for all troop-contributing States to understand the legal limitations of those States bound by the ECHR. It is equally important that the UN, NATO, NGOs, and other governments not directly involved in the armed conflict are aware of any States’ right to life obligations. Notwithstanding this, the applicability of the right to life in armed conflict is yet to be fully considered in academic literature. This book aims to close this lacuna and address the issue of the right to life in armed conflict by identifying and analysing the applicable law, citing recent examples of State practice, and offering concrete proposals to ensure that States comply with their right to life obligations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-58
Author(s):  
Sardar M. A. Waqar Khan Arif

Human rights are available to everyone on the basis of humanity. Universality, non-discrimination, equality and inalienability are core principles governing International Human rights Law (IHRL). The law governing armed conflict or war is known as International humanitarian Law (IHL). In the case of armed conflict, IHRL poses certain obligations on states along with humanitarian obligations. In this context, this article identifies the international human rights obligations of States in armed conflict. It argues that States must respect, promote, protect and fulfill human rights obligations of individuals, in the case of armed conflict, with increasing and serious concern, by analyzing the applicable legal framework under IHRL. It also addresses the extraterritorial application of IHRL and its limitations and derogations in armed conflict. Further, it discusses contemporary challenges for States in jurisdictional applicability and implementation of IHRL. To that extent, the argument developed throughout this article is that States have obligations under IHRL, irrespective of humanitarian obligations, not only in peace situations but also in the case of war or armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

A state’s procedural right to life obligations relate to the circumstances in which a state must conduct an investigation following a death. Procedural right to life obligations also extend to how and when the investigation is conducted, and by whom. This chapter explores these issues in detail and advances a hypothesis in respect of what amounts to a human rights law-compliant investigation that would satisfy a state’s procedural right to life obligations during armed conflict. It also considers the similarities and differences between the requirement to investigate a death pursuant to international humanitarian law and that pursuant to international human rights law.


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