From Disobedience to Toleration: William of Ockham and the Medieval Discourse on Fraternal Correction

2001 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
TAKASHI SHOGIMEN

In order to tackle the problem of ecclesiastical heresy, late medieval theologians elaborated on the idea of fraternal correction. Alexander of Hales laid the foundation of the standard theological discourse, which was developed by Thomas Aquinas. In applying this concept to the problem of papal heresy, William of Ockham questioned and reversed the hierarchical assumptions and premises in the traditional discourse. Drawing on his ethical theory of invincible ignorance, he also provided a moral basis for an inferior's dissent from ecclesiastical authority. Ockham's emphasis on the inalienable obligation of conscience in defence of ecclesiastical disobedience shows a striking similarity to some of John Locke's ideas on religious toleration.

Author(s):  
Dominik Perler

Abstract Late medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition developed two theoretical models in order to explain the signication of words. Some - including Thomas Aquinas - claimed that spoken words immediately signify concepts, but extramental things only mediately, while others - such as William of Ockham - held the view that they immediately signify things. The present essay analyzes these two semantic models, paying particular attention to their metaphysical and epistemological background. It shows that the «indirect signication model» defended by Thomas is not a model committed to representationalism or semantic idealism, as some recent commentators have claimed. It is rather a model that relies upon two crucial theses: (i) human beings form concepts by abstracting universal forms from extramental things; and (ü) spoken words signify those universal forms having an immaterial existence in the intellect. Ockham's refusal of the «indirect signication model» is mainly motivated by his rejection of these controversial claims.


Author(s):  
Magali Roques

Abstract In this paper, I intend to examine the conception of metaphor developed by fourteenth-century nominalist philosophers, in particular William of Ockham and John Buridan, but also the Ockhamist philosophers who were condemned by the 1340 statute of the faculty of arts of the University of Paris. According to these philosophers, metaphor is a transfer of meaning from one word to another. This transfer is based on some similarity, and is intentionally produced by a speaker. My aim is to study whether this view on metaphor is related to a specific view on the relation between thought, language, and communication. With this case study, I intend to argue that the view on the nature of thought one holds does not necessarily determine what the nature and function of metaphor are. I will show that the three philosophical doctrines under study diverge in their understanding of the mechanisms of a metaphor, while they share the same view on the nature of thought, namely that thought is a mental language.


Traditio ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 87-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cary J. Nederman

Among the range of moral concepts that the Middle Ages derived from Aristotle, few exercised greater influence than the doctrine of habitus (a term ordinarily translated as ‘habit,’ but more properly meaning ‘state’ or ‘condition’). In the thirteenth century, such prominent thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham placed habitus (derived from the Greek term ἅξις) near the heart of their studies of ethics. It is largely possible to explain thirteenth-century interest in the concept of habitus on the basis of the appearance of Robert Grosseteste's full translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Grosseteste's Latin version, taken in conjunction with a growing interest in the field of ethics among arts masters, rendered the technical vocabulary of Aristotelian moral thought into a commonplace of scholastic philosophy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johann Beukes

From Ockham to Cusa: The encyclopaedic case for ‘post-scholasticism’ in Medieval philosophy. This article argues for the encyclopaedic recognition of ‘post-scholasticism’, indicating the very last and complex period (circa 1349–1464) in late Medieval philosophy, where the via moderna and logica modernorum have clearly departed from the fundamental premises of high scholasticism, the via antiqua and the logica novus, as manifested in the work of William of Ockham (and, eventually, in the political theory of Marsilius of Padua). The article argues that post-scholasticism should be distinguished from late scholasticism (exiting Ockham) and early Renaissance philosophy (entering Nicholas of Cusa). The article indicates that there is a tendency in many introductions to and secondary texts in Medieval philosophy to proceed straight from Ockham to Cusa (the ‘very last Medieval and very first Renaissance philosopher’), understating more than a century of pertinent Medieval scholarship. In the modern encyclopaedia of philosophy, this understatement manifests in either a predating of Renaissance philosophy to close the gap between Ockham and Cusa as far as possible, or in understating this period as philosophically sterile, or in, without argument, simply proceeding straight from Ockham to Cusa. The article covers some of the essential philosophical contributions presented during this fragile philosophical-historical period, indicating that post-scholasticism is indeed a difficult and complex, yet productive period in the history of late Medieval philosophy, which should not be bypassed as a trivial gateway to either Renaissance philosophy or early modernity as such, but valued for its own idiosincracies, intricacies and overall contribution to the history of ideas in philosophy and theology.


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