scholarly journals Two Perspectives on the Issue of Prudence (Prudentia): Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-60
Author(s):  
Rastislav Nemec ◽  
Andrea Blaščíková
Traditio ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 87-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cary J. Nederman

Among the range of moral concepts that the Middle Ages derived from Aristotle, few exercised greater influence than the doctrine of habitus (a term ordinarily translated as ‘habit,’ but more properly meaning ‘state’ or ‘condition’). In the thirteenth century, such prominent thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham placed habitus (derived from the Greek term ἅξις) near the heart of their studies of ethics. It is largely possible to explain thirteenth-century interest in the concept of habitus on the basis of the appearance of Robert Grosseteste's full translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Grosseteste's Latin version, taken in conjunction with a growing interest in the field of ethics among arts masters, rendered the technical vocabulary of Aristotelian moral thought into a commonplace of scholastic philosophy.


Vivarium ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter King

AbstractMediaeval psychological theory was a “faculty psychology”: a confederation of semiautonomous sub-personal agents, the interaction of which constitutes our psychological experience. One such faculty was intellective appetite, that is, the will. On what grounds was the will taken to be a distinct faculty? After a brief survey of Aristotle's criteria for identifying and distinguishing mental faculties, I look in some detail at the mainstream mediaeval view, given clear expression by Thomas Aquinas, and then at the dissenting views of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. I conclude with some reflections on why the mainstream mediaeval view was discarded by Descartes.


Author(s):  
Johann Beukes

The constellation language-logic in medieval philosophy (2): Duns Scotus to De Rivo. This second in a series of two articles continues the attempt to provide an in-depth overview of some of the most prominent – and some of the most underpublished - medieval thinkers’ stances on the constellation of language and logic, thus as a combined and condensed problem in western philosophy between the 5th and 15th centuries. The two articles form part of a rehabilitating series of modern-critical articles on understated and marginalised themes, texts and figures in medieval philosophy. The positions of the well-known philosophers that are covered in the two articles, St Augustine, Peter Abelard, St Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, are juxtaposed with some less familiar philosophical positions, amongst others those of Boethius, Peter of Spain, John Wyclif and Peter de Rivo.


Author(s):  
Margaret Cameron

There was enormous debate in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries over the nature of truth and our relation to it. This chapter presents the central positions and debates, ultimately rooted in ancient theories from Aristotle and Augustine, but magnificently transformed by medieval interests. Topics considered include the metaphysical and the propositional status of truth, the paradigm of scientific knowledge as necessary truth known with certainty and evidentness, and the debates over how truth is cognized, which concern whether illumination from God is required or whether by human effort alone truth can be accessed. Major figures in these debates include many of the medieval period’s heavy-hitters, including Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus. Finally, in the fourteenth century, from William of Ockham and John Buridan emerges a new paradigm: the theory of semantic truth.


2001 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
TAKASHI SHOGIMEN

In order to tackle the problem of ecclesiastical heresy, late medieval theologians elaborated on the idea of fraternal correction. Alexander of Hales laid the foundation of the standard theological discourse, which was developed by Thomas Aquinas. In applying this concept to the problem of papal heresy, William of Ockham questioned and reversed the hierarchical assumptions and premises in the traditional discourse. Drawing on his ethical theory of invincible ignorance, he also provided a moral basis for an inferior's dissent from ecclesiastical authority. Ockham's emphasis on the inalienable obligation of conscience in defence of ecclesiastical disobedience shows a striking similarity to some of John Locke's ideas on religious toleration.


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