Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment in Nineteenth-Century Peru

2009 ◽  
Vol 69 (02) ◽  
pp. 358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catalina Vizcarra
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
Debt Repayment

Sovereign Debt Crises

2018 ◽  
pp. 28-44
Author(s):  
Rosa María Lastra ◽  
Vassilis Paliouras
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Relief ◽  
Debt Management ◽  
International Financial Institutions ◽  
Economic Adjustment ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
Debt Repayment

Creditor responses to sovereign debt crises suggest that they view such crises as problems of debt management on the part of the countries facing debt repayment difficulties. Thus, for example, debt relief and restructuring mechanisms coordinated by the international financial institutions place emphasis on correcting perceived imprudent debt management through a series of economic adjustment measures. Little attention, if any, is paid to addressing the underlying causes of the debt crises. This chapter examines the various causes of sovereign debt crises and the role that debt management plays in their eruption or in addressing them in a sustainable manner.

scholarly journals Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment

2011 ◽  
pp. 155-167
Author(s):  
Kris Jamesmitchener ◽  
Marc D. Weidenmier
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Repayment

A Sovereign Debt Arbitral Mechanism from a Human Rights Perspective

2018 ◽  
pp. 458-476
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Economic Viability ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Debt Restructuring ◽  
International Human ◽  
Debt Repayment ◽  
States Experience ◽  
Experience Difficulty

From time to time, States experience difficulty in servicing their debts. This necessitates changes to the repayment terms of repayment on at least some of their debt—either that the terms are made flexible or the debt or part of it be cancelled. Importantly, there is a recognised need for debt repayment problems and debt-related disputes to be resolved through an independent and impartial process. This chapter discusses efforts to create an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism which is not only independent of both lenders and borrowers but also seeks to ensure that States that are struggling with debt repayment can achieve economic viability and growth and restore their capacity to service their external debts without compromising the fulfilment of their international human rights obligations. Particular attention will be paid to the UN Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring and their implications for the future of sovereign debt restructuring.

The Devil’s Haircut: Investor–State Disputes over Debt Restructuring

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (8) ◽  
pp. 1889-1922 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew DiGiuseppe ◽  
Patrick E. Shea
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Hurdle Model ◽  
Debt Restructuring ◽  
Double Hurdle Model ◽  
Globalized Economy ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
Double Hurdle ◽  
Debt Repayment

When do private creditors versus debtor states accept a greater burden in resolving sovereign debt crises? In this study, we argue that distributive politics helps explain the “haircut”—or losses—private creditors take in debt restructuring cases. Despite the expected convergence of partisan policies in a globalized economy, we argue that right and left leaders extract different settlements in debt negotiations. Left governments, representing constituents most likely to be hurt from higher debt repayment, credibly demonstrate more bargaining power and extract greater concessions from creditors. Distributive politics, however, is an indeterminate factor in explaining states entrance into debt negotiations. We use recently released data on the outcome of sovereign debt restructuring cases between states and private creditors from 1975 to 2013 to test our expectations. Results from a double-hurdle model indicate that creditors receive a larger haircut when negotiating with left governments.

scholarly journals Supersanctions and sovereign debt repayment

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kris James Mitchener ◽  
Marc D. Weidenmier
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Repayment

scholarly journals Bonds and Brands: Foundations of Sovereign Debt Markets, 1820–1830

2009 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 646-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Flandreau ◽  
Juan H. Flores
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Investment Strategies ◽  
Information Asymmetries ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Finance Theory

How does sovereign debt emerge? In the early nineteenth century, intermediaries' market power and prestige served to overcome information asymmetries. Relying on insights from finance theory, we argue that capitalists turned to intermediaries' reputations to guide their investment strategies. Intermediaries could in turn commit or else they would lose market share. This sustained the development of sovereign debt. This new perspective is backed by archival evidence and empirical data, and it suggests why strong but undemocratic states could borrow.“A good name is worth more than a gem.”Yiddish proverb

Silver Risk, Silver Exports, and Sovereign Debt in the Nineteenth Century

2020 ◽  
pp. 21-38
Author(s):  
Michael Schiltz
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Currency Risk ◽  
Essential Ingredient ◽  
Bond Issues ◽  
Monetary Order

Whereas in the traditional view, bimetallism has been considered innately flawed, and the worldwide adoption of the gold standard, for that reason, inevitable, this chapter finds traces of evidence of the opposite course of events. Building on a revisionist strand in the literature, it describes that, for the period 1871‒90, contemporaries viewed silver as an essential ingredient of the international monetary order. They had, therefore, no immediate reason to question its credibility in the denomination of a country’s sovereign debt; instead, they considered the likeliness that a country would be able to continue to service its debts more or less independently of the denomination of these debts; and they were preoocupied by the question of whether currency risk should be taken by the issuing country or investors. Silver’s credibility eroded gradually, for instance through adding premia to bond issues; only in the 1890s was its credibility lost.

“Germany”, Asset Class Contagion, and Contagious Stability*

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-70
Author(s):  
Sascha Engel
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Bonds ◽  
Socially Constructed ◽  
Asset Class ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Debt Repayment ◽  
Crisis Conditions

In this paper, I examine the effects of socially constructed financial market lending patterns in the Eurozone crisis. Under the assumption that the crisis is one of sovereign debt, the term “contagion” is frequently used to describe the doubts about governmental debt repayment abilities that were spreading from Greece to Ireland and Portugal and then to Spain and Italy from 2010 to 2012. Consequently, austerity policies are indiscriminately applied to the governments of all five of these countries to ensure the countries’ sustainable growth for their debt repayment. This paper, by contrast, argues that “contagion” is the origin of peripheral repayment troubles rather than their effect. The Eurozone crisis is the result of the procyclical lending patterns of the European banking system, which turns liquidity shortages into solvency problems for governments depending upon debt roll-over operations. I then apply the related analysis to Germany's funding situation during the crisis and argue that “stability,” i.e., the ability to maintain sustainable growth under Eurozone crisis conditions, is not the result of endogenous austere virtue. Rather, it is likewise largely a result of procyclical lending patterns: liquidity retracted from peripheral sovereign bonds is invested into core sovereign bonds. Moreover, I show that a similar effect has been in place prior to the crisis. “Stability” is as contagious as “contagion.”

scholarly journals Sovereign Debt Diplomacies

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Colonial History ◽  
Debt Repayment ◽  
Collection Practices ◽  
Debt Collection

This volume offers two important contributions to the literature on sovereign debt. First, it provides a unique genealogy of debt collection practices in terms of their availability, acceptability and efficacy. We argue that creditors’ tactics and methods to enforce debt repayment emerged and solidified to a large extent in relation to the threads of colonial history, from the building of empires to the decolonisation era. Second, this volume reflects critically on the relevance of neo-colonial interpretations in recent cases of sovereign debt disputes

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