Foreign Acquisition and Credit Risk: Evidence from the U.S. CDS Market

Author(s):  
Umit Yilmaz
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kwabena Boasiako

<p><b>This thesis is composed of three self-contained empirical essays in corporate finance, with the first two exploring the financial policy and credit risk implications of data breaches, and the third examining whether financing influences the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility. In the first essay, we contribute to the growing debate on cybersecurity risks and how firms can insulate themselves, at least partially, from the adverse effects of data breach risks. Specifically, we examine the effects of data breach disclosure laws and the subsequent disclosure of data breaches on the cash policies of corporations in the United States (U.S.). Exploiting a series of natural experiments regarding staggered state-level data breach disclosure laws, we find that the passage of mandatory disclosure laws leads to an increase in cash holdings. Our finding suggests that mandatory data breach disclosure laws increase the ex ante risks related to data breaches, hence, firms hold on to more cash as a precautionary motive. Further, we find firms that suffer data breaches adjust their financial policies by holding more cash as well as decreasing external finance and investment.</b></p> <p>The second essay examines the impact of data breaches on firm credit risk. Using firm-level credit ratings and credit default swap (CDS) spreads to proxy for credit risk, we find that data breaches lead to increases in firm credit risk. Firms exposed to data breaches are more likely to experience credit rating downgrades and an increase in the CDS spread of traded bonds. Also, firms who suffer data breaches report lower sales and ROA, experience an increase in financial distress, and conditional on a data breach incident, the likelihood of a future data breach increases. Lastly, these effects are magnified for firms with low-interest coverage ratios.</p> <p>In the third essay, using the financial deregulation of seasoned equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, I investigate the influence of financing on the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility. I show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility and promotes investment and firm growth. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S., benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external equity financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.</p>


1980 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-55
Author(s):  
A.D. Cao
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivo Pezzuto

In the fall of 2008, the U.S. subprime mortgage loans defaults have turned into Wall Street’s biggest crisis since the Great Depression. As hundreds of billions in mortgage-related investments went bad, banks became suspicious of one another’s potential undisclosed credit losses and preferred to reduce their exposure in the interbank markets, thus causing interbank interest rates and credit default swaps increases, a liquidity shortage problem and a worsened credit crunch condition to consumers and businesses. Massive cash injections into money markets and interest rates reductions have been assured by central banks in an attempt to shore up banks and to restore confidence within the financial system. Even Governments have promoted bail-out deal agreements, protections from bankruptcies, recapitalizations and bank nationalizations in order to rescue banks from disastrous bankruptcies. The credit crisis originated in the previous years when the Federal Reserve sharply lowered interest rates (Fed Funds at 1%) to limit the economic damage of the stock market decline due to the 2000 dot.com companies’ crisis. Lower interest rates made mortgage payments cheaper, and the demand for homes began to rise, sending prices up. In addition, millions of homeowners took advantage of the rate drop to refinance their existing mortgages. As the industry ramped up, the quality of the mortgages went down due to poor credit origination and credit risk assessment. Delinquency and default rates began to rise in 2006 as interest rates rose (Fed Funds at 5,25%) and poor households across the US struggled to pay off their mortgages. Many of them went bankrupt and lost their homes but the pace of lending did not slow. Banks have transformed much of the high-risk mortgage debt (securitizations) into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDO), and have sold these assets on the financial markets to investment firms and insurance companies around the world, transferring to these investors the rights to the mortgage payments and the related credit risk. With the collapse of the first banks and hedge funds in 2007 the rising number of foreclosures helped speed the fall of housing prices, and the number of prime mortgages in default began to increase. As many CDO products were held on a “mark to market” basis, the paralysis in the credit markets and the collapse of liquidity in these products let to the dramatic write-downs in 2007. When stock markets in the United States, Europe and Asia continued to plunge, leading central banks took the drastic step of a coordinated cut in interest rates and Governments coordinated actions that included taking equity stakes in major banks. This paper written by the Author (on October 7th, 2008) at the rise of these dramatic events, aims to demonstrate, through solid and fact-based assumptions, that this dramatic global financial crisis could have been addressed and managed earlier and better by many of the stakeholders involved in the subprime mortgage lending process such as, banks’ and investment funds management, rating agencies, banking and financial markets supervisory authorities. It also unfortunately demonstrates the corporate social responsibility failure and the moral hazard of many key players involved in this crisis, since a lot of them probably knew quite well what was happening but have preferred not to do anything or to do little and late in order to change the dramatic course of the events.


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