Divine Commands and Arbitrariness

1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Rooney
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
The Will ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
Religious Objection

According to the divine command theory of morality, what is right or wrong, good or bad, is entirely dependent on the will and command of God: what He commands is right and what He forbids is wrong just because He commands or forbids it. It is argued here that the principal religious objection to this theory – that if it were true, moral precepts would be arbitrary – is rendered ineffective when due consideration is given to the consequences of God's omnipotence, and in particular, to His rationality and to His responsibility for deciding, in creation, what the characteristics of human nature are to be.

Divine Command Theory in the Passage of History

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-328
Author(s):  
Simin Rahimi
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
The Will ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Moral Facts

Are actions that are morally good, morally goosd because God makes them so (e.g., by commanding them)? Or does God urge humans to do them because they are morally good anyway? What is, in general, the relationship between divine commands and ethical duties? It is not an uncommon belief among theists that morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: all moral facts consist exclusively in facts about his will or commands. Thus, not only is an action right because it is commanded by God, but its conformity to his commands is what alone makes it right. An action is right (wrong) solely because he commands (forbids) it, and solely in virtue of his doing so. This view has come to be known as the „divine command theory of morality". This paper is devoted to a brief reconstruction of claims and controversies surrounding the theory, beginning with Plato's Euthyphro, which is the historical initiator of the debate and to a reconstruction of the various lines of argument that have been set forth to defend the theory.

Divine attitudes, divine commands, and the modal status of moral truths

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATTHEW CAREY JORDAN
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Attitude Theory ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Divine Commands

AbstractThis essay presents a theistic account of deontic properties that can lay claim to many of the advantages of divine command theory but which avoids its flaws. The account, divine attitude theory, asserts that moral properties should be understood in terms of divine attitudes, such that an action is morally wrong just in case God would be displeased with the performance of that action. Among the virtues of this account is its ability to explain the modal status of fundamental moral truths, something that divine command theory cannot do.

Moral Autonomy and Divine Commands

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chan L. Coulter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
James Rachels

A Divine Command Theory of Ethics is sometimes rejected on the grounds that such a theory is incompatible with human moral autonomy. If we assume that human beings are morally autonomous, the argument goes, then no human being can be obligated to perform any action simply because God (or any other agent) has commanded it. The incompatibility between a Divine Command Ethic and moral autonomy is a corollary of an argument James Rachels uses to deny the very existence of God. He argues that any being which can be denoted by the term God must be a being worthy of worship. But, in order to be a being worthy of worship it must be such that other beings owe it unconditional obedience. Since human beings are morally autonomous and cannot owe unconditional obedience to any other being, nothing can meet the criterion for being God. Hence, there is no possible state of affairs which includes both a being worthy of worship and morally autonomous human agents.

Is the divine command theory defensible?

1984 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Chandler
Keyword(s):  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Positive Argument ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
Current Systems ◽  
Moral Requirements

Recent defences of the Divine Command Theory have ranged from those which attempt to meet objections half-way, and in the process transform the theory, to restatements and defences of the theory in its full rigour. Philip Quinn's Divine Commands and Moral Requirements is one of the latter. Quinn's purpose is to show that the theory, in its several variants, can be stated precisely within several current systems of deontic logic, and that contrary to a common belief, there are no logically decisive objections to the theory. In accordance with this limited aim, there is little positive argument for the theory, little attempt to exhibit it as a plausible or attractive position, and this gives the book a rather narrow formalist aspect.

An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action

Sophia ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Forrest
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Right Action

scholarly journals Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral realism in the Hebrew Bible

2009 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke
Keyword(s):  
Hebrew Bible ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Israelite Religion ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma

Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.

scholarly journals Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Michelle Panchuk
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Commands

This paper demonstrates that the skeptical theist’s response to the problem of evil deprives the analytic theologian of theoretical resources necessary to avoid accepting as veridical merely apparent divine commands that endorse cruelty. In particular, I argue that the same skeptical considerations that lead analytic theologians to endorse skeptical theism also lead to what I call “divine command skepticism”—an inability to make certain kinds of judgements about what a good God would or would not command. The danger of divine command skepticism is not that it generates new reasons to think that God has commanded horrors, but, rather, that it undercuts the defeaters we might otherwise have for thinking that God has commanded those horrors.  It does so both by rendering illicit certain theological and hermeneutical methodologies employed within liberatory frameworks (i.e., various kinds of liberation theologies) and by depriving the theologian of some of the more “traditional” mechanisms for resolving such apparent conflicts.

scholarly journals What if God commanded something terrible? A worry for divine-command meta-ethics

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
WES MORRISTON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Divine Transcendence

AbstractIf God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that we should obey such a command by appealing to divine transcendence and mystery. I show that each approach faces significant challenges, and that none is completely satisfying.

Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
Simin Rahimi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Necessary Truths

Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.

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