scholarly journals What if God commanded something terrible? A worry for divine-command meta-ethics

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
WES MORRISTON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Divine Transcendence

AbstractIf God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that we should obey such a command by appealing to divine transcendence and mystery. I show that each approach faces significant challenges, and that none is completely satisfying.

Kierkegaard and divine-command theory: replies to Quinn and Evans

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. ZACHARY MANIS
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Essential Difference ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Works Of Love ◽  
Recent Developments

AbstractOne of the most important recent developments in the discussion of Kierkegaard's ethics is an interpretation defended, in different forms, by Philip Quinn and Stephen Evans. Both argue that a divine-command theory of moral obligation (DCT) is to be found in Works of Love. Against this view, I argue that, despite significant overlap between DCT and the view of moral obligation found in Works of Love, there is at least one essential difference between the two: the former, but not the latter, is committed to the claim that, necessarily, p is morally obligatory only if God commands that p.

scholarly journals The Prior Obligations Objection to Theological Stateism

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 372-384
Author(s):  
Frederick Choo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Divine Command Theory

Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection.

An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action

Sophia ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Forrest
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Right Action

scholarly journals Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral realism in the Hebrew Bible

2009 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke
Keyword(s):  
Hebrew Bible ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Israelite Religion ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma

Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.

Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
Simin Rahimi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Necessary Truths

Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.

Contemporary Moral Apologists

2019 ◽  
pp. 198-209
Author(s):  
David Baggett ◽  
Jerry L. Walls
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
William Lane Craig ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Arguments

A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert Adams did work in theistic ethics that produced innovative variants of the moral argument; his wife, Marilyn Adams, demonstrated how God’s incommensurable goodness can address versions of the problem of evil. Linda Zagzebski identified three ways we need moral confidence. C. Stephen Evans defended divine command theory and a natural signs approach to apologetics. John Hare did landmark work on moral arguments. William Lane Craig used the moral argument to powerful effect in books and debates. C. Stephen Layman used the overriding reason thesis and conditional thesis in his variant of the argument. Scott Smith, Mark Linville, Angus Menuge, and Angus Ritchie have offered brilliant epistemic moral arguments. Paul Copan has used history to augment the moral argument.

Reply to Almeida

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK C. MURPHY
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Property A ◽  
Property B ◽  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
Moral Supervenience

Michael J. Almeida offers two criticisms of the argument of my ‘A trilemma for divine command theory’. The first criticism is that I mistakenly assume the validity of the following inference pattern: property A is identical to property B; property B supervenes on property C; therefore, property A supervenes on property C. The second criticism is that I have misinterpreted the moral-supervenience thesis upon which I rely in making this argument. The first of Almeida's criticisms is completely untenable. The second of his criticisms casts doubt on my argument, a doubt that I can mitigate but not entirely dispel.

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