Religious fictionalism and the problem of evil

2015 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
JON ROBSON
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
General Application ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief

AbstractThe problem of evil is typically presented as a problem – sometimes the problem – facing theistic realists. This article takes no stance on what effect (if any) the existence of evil has on the rationality of theistic belief. Instead, it explores the possibility of using the problem of evil to generate worries for some of those who reject theistic realism. Although this article focuses on the consequences for a particular kind of religious fictionalist, the lessons adduced are intended to have more general application.

The Problem with the ‘Problem of Evil’

1994 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-97
Author(s):  
David ◽  
Randall Basinger
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Exact Nature ◽  
Logical Consistency ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief

Current discussions of the ‘problem of evil’ vary greatly in atleast two ways. First, those involved in such discussions often differ on the exact nature of the problem. Some see it as primarily logical (deductive), some as primarily evidential (inductive), and still others as primarily psychological (personal, pastoral).1 Second, those involved in such discussions differ radically on what is required of the theist in response. Some claim that unless the theist can offer an explanation for evil (a theodicy) that is satisfying to rational individuals in general, theistic belief is rendered unjustified.2 Others agree that the theist must offer a theodicy, but deny that such an explanation must be found convincing by most if theistic belief is to remain justified.3 And still others deny that the theist is required to offer any sort of explanation (theodicy), arguing instead that the theist need only defend the logical consistency of simultaneous belief in the existence of evil and God.4

Are causes of belief reasons for belief? Silver on evil, religious experience, and theism

2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC SNIDER
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Way

AbstractDavid Silver has argued that there is an illegitimate circularity in Plantinga's account of how a Christian theist can defend herself against the potential defeater presented by Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. The way out of the circle for the theist, thinks Silver, would be by adopting a kind of evidentialism: she needs to make an appeal to evidence that is independent of the reasons she has for holding theistic belief in the first place. I shall argue that Silver's argument is unsuccessful, mainly because he does not get Plantinga's thought right. Silver's confusion is in taking causes of belief as reasons for belief, and in failing to account for the impact of belief holism and our web of beliefs on the very hope for independent reasons.

Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SILVER
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.

Psychology and the problem of evil

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.

The Argument from Evil and God’s Contingent Ethics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus it is the sole focus of inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).

The Problem of Divine Hiddenness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Detailed Characterization ◽  
The Past ◽  
Divine Hiddenness ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter provides a detailed characterization of the various meanings of the term “divine hiddenness,” carefully and rigorously articulates the version of the problem of divine hiddenness that has dominated contemporary philosophical discussion for the past twenty-five years, and then explains the relationship between that problem and the problem of evil.

Anti-theodicy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Model ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Methodological Considerations

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.

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