In Defense of Defense

Confusion and a deep division within the American public over die value of an anti-ballistic missile (A.B.M.) defense system was reflected in the midsummer vote in the Senate to authorize about $900 million for expenditure in fiscal year 1970 for President Nixon's Safeguard A.B.M. system.During the debate that preceded the Senate vote, public and religious presses carried many articles that presented forceful arguments against the Safeguard program. These seem to boil down to two principal issues of moral concern: it is alleged, first, that the Safeguard A.B.M. would introduce a destabilizing element into the strategic nuclear balance just at the time we are attempting to enter negotiations with the Soviet. Union for limitation on strategic armaments; second, that deployment of the Safeguard system would be wasteful of national resources needed for pressing domestic problems.

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International Whaling Commission

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818300024747 ◽

1961 ◽

Vol 15 (1) ◽

pp. 209-209 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Keyword(s):

Soviet Union ◽

Ad Hoc ◽

Fiscal Year ◽

Blue Whale ◽

Baleen Whales ◽

International Whaling Commission ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

Previous Season ◽

The Antarctic

The report covering the eleventh fiscal year, June 1, 1959, to May 31, 1960, of the International Whaling Commission, including the eleventh meeting of the Commission, held in London from June 22 to July 1, 1959, and also the meeting of the Commission's ad hoc Scientific Committee, held in London from May 10 to 13, 1960 was presented and approved by the Commission at its twelfth meeting in that city in June 1960. As no proposals were made at the eleventh meeting for altering the blue whale unit limit on baleen whales taken in the Antarctic, it remained the same (15,000 units) as for the previous season, and in the 1959/1960 season there were again twenty pelagic expeditions operating in the Antarctic, although the total number of catchers operating with the twenty expeditions was reduced from 235 in the previous season to 217, distributed among Japan, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Norway, and the Netherlands. The period over which the Antarctic catch was taken was considerably longer than in the previous three seasons, since, in accordance with a decision reached at the eleventh meeting of the Commission, the fin and sei whale season had opened ten days earlier than previously, although the opening date of the blue whale season had remained unaltered. Expeditions also continued whaling longer than in the previous season, the catching period for all the expeditions taken together averaging about 99 days in contrast to the 69-day total of the year 1958/1959, while the increase in the total catch was a little over 1 percent, consisting mainly of fin and sei whales.

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The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense.

Political Science Quarterly ◽

10.2307/2150772 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 103 (3) ◽

pp. 560

Author(s):

Peter C. Sederberg ◽

Bruce Parrott ◽

Walter Zegveld ◽

Christien Enzing

Keyword(s):

Soviet Union ◽

Ballistic Missile ◽

Missile Defense ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

Ballistic Missile Defense

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The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense

The Russian Review ◽

10.2307/129994 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 47 (2) ◽

pp. 221

Author(s):

Jack Snyder ◽

Bruce Parrott

Keyword(s):

Soviet Union ◽

Ballistic Missile ◽

Missile Defense ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

Ballistic Missile Defense

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11. The Second Nuclear Age:

Strategy in the Contemporary World ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198708919.003.0012 ◽

2015 ◽

Author(s):

C. Dale Walton

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

Soviet Union ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

International Security ◽

Absolute Number ◽

Ballistic Missile ◽

Cultural Dimensions ◽

Nuclear Age ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

The Cold War

This chapter examines how nuclear weapons have influenced international politics, both during and after the cold war. In particular, it distinguishes between the spread of nuclear weapons to more states, which poses an increasing threat to international security, and the decline in the absolute number of nuclear weapons due to the reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. The chapter first provides an overview of the First Nuclear Age — which lasted approximately from 1945 to the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union — before discussing the risks in the Second Nuclear Age. It also considers other contemporary issues such as ballistic missile defences, the cultural dimensions of nuclear weapons acquisition, and the possibility of using nuclear weapons for terrorism. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the prospects for a Third Nuclear Age.

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Plan Maximum

10.1093/oso/9780197572429.003.0034 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 219-226

Author(s):

William Klinger ◽

Denis Kuljiš

Keyword(s):

Soviet Union ◽

Ballistic Missile ◽

National Unity ◽

Nuclear Program ◽

Weapon Systems ◽

The Soviet Union ◽

A Priority ◽

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

This chapter looks at Joseph Stalin's decision to put Lavrentiy Beria at the helm of the Soviet nuclear program as strategic weapon systems had become a priority. It notes the release of spacecraft designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolev from exile in Kolyma and who was appointed head of the NII-88 Institute to develop the first intercontinental ballistic missile 8K71. It also describes the efforts invested in the development of critical technologies as the Soviet Union refused to waste its energy on pointless local wars on its borders. The chapter demonstrates Marshal Tito's establishment of his power in Yugoslavia and relinquishment of the Yalta arrangement that obliged him to share power and cooperate with non-communists. It discusses the termination of the provisional wartime government of national unity, which is considered a fusion of the royal government and the puppet parliament.

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