Plan Maximum

2021 ◽  
pp. 219-226
Author(s):  
William Klinger ◽  
Denis Kuljiš

This chapter looks at Joseph Stalin's decision to put Lavrentiy Beria at the helm of the Soviet nuclear program as strategic weapon systems had become a priority. It notes the release of spacecraft designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolev from exile in Kolyma and who was appointed head of the NII-88 Institute to develop the first intercontinental ballistic missile 8K71. It also describes the efforts invested in the development of critical technologies as the Soviet Union refused to waste its energy on pointless local wars on its borders. The chapter demonstrates Marshal Tito's establishment of his power in Yugoslavia and relinquishment of the Yalta arrangement that obliged him to share power and cooperate with non-communists. It discusses the termination of the provisional wartime government of national unity, which is considered a fusion of the royal government and the puppet parliament.

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 611-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhanat Kundakbayeva ◽  
Didar Kassymova

The general perception of Western analysts and observers is that the nation-states created as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union all treat the memory of the dark, repressive aspects of the Stalinist regime in public spaces as a symbolic element in the creation of a new post-Soviet identity [Denison, Michael. 2009. “The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan.”Europe-Asia Studies61 (7): 1167–1187]. We argue that the government of Kazakhstan employs non-nationalistic discourse in its treatment of Stalinist victims’ commemoration in a variety of forms, through the creation of modern memorial complexes at the sites of horrific Soviet activity (mass burial places, labor camps, and detention centers), purpose-built museum exhibitions, and the commemorative speeches of its president and other officials. Kazakhstan's strategy in commemorating its Soviet past is designed to highlight the inclusiveness of repression on all peoples living in its territory at that time, not just Kazakhs, thereby assisting in bringing together its multinational and multiethnic society. Thus, the official stance treats this discourse as an important symbolic source of shaping the collective memory of the nation, based on “a general civil identity without prioritizing one ethnic group over another — a national unity, founded on the recognition of a common system of values and principles for all citizens” [Shakirova, Svetlana. 2012. “Letters to Nazarbaev: Kazakhstan's Intellectuals Debate National Identity.” February 7. Accessed July 28, 2015.http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/letters-nazarbaev-kazakhstans-intellectuals-debate-national-identity].


Author(s):  
Yevgeny Zvedre

This article is primarily focused on the diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing the weaponisation of outer space, or development of weapon systems designed to destroy targets, either orbital or terrestrial, or from the ground in outer space. Along with that, a number of anti-satellite weapon projects that both the United States (US) and the Soviet Union/Russia have been developing since the 1950s are briefly described as examples of their military competition in space. Highlighted is the work that has been done within the United Nations (UN) context to develop a corpus of universal principles and norms governing international exploration of outer space as the common heritage of humankind, free from the use of force. The author also highlights the positive role that arms control treaties have been playing in preventing deployment of weapons in space. Particular emphasis is given to the potential consequences for global security should attack weapons appear in outer space, and to the importance of a further targeted effort by the international community to work out additional regulations strengthening space security. In this regard, draft treaties on the prevention of weapons in space introduced by Russia and China, and the European Union’s International Code of conduct for Space are emphasised.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Czubocha

International Responsibility of the Soviet Union for its Illegal Actions against Poland between 1939 and 1945SummaryThe author of the paper comes to a conclusion that many actions concerning Poland taken by the Soviet Union during The Second World War constituted an abuse of power. The Soviet U nion invaded Poland and illegally occupied its Eastern territories until 1945. As a result of the aggression, hundreds of thousands of Polish soldiers and citizens were killed or persecuted.At the end of The Second W orld W ar decisions concerning Poland were taken at inter-Allied conferences w ithout Poland’s participation. The Great Powers decided to deprive Poland of its Eastern territories against the will of the Polish Government-in-exile, which was legal at that time. W hat is more, Poland was not a signatory of the Jalta and Potsdam agreements. Therefore, the decisions referring to Polish Eastern border should be invalidAs far as the problem of a new Polish government is concerned, it is necessary to stress that according to international law a change of a government in a particular state should take place w ithout any external interference. Nevertheless, the Soviet U nion decided to create a new government for Poland to replace the legal government-in-exile. As a consequence, the Provisional Government of National Unity was created., It consisted mostly of communists who were dependent on the Soviet Union. Many o f them were Soviet spies. They were able to gain power only as a result of the Soviet military intervention in Poland. The government did not represent Polish society and was created against its will. The Soviet U nion did not have the right to impose this sort of government on Poland.The problem of reconciliation between Poland and Russia is also approached in the paper. During the Second World War Polish state and its citizens suffered great losses. Neither the Soviet U nion nor Russia has ever assumed responsibility for the Soviet U nion’s illegal actions against Poland and its citizens between 1939 and 1945. In such circumstances any sort of reconciliation cannot take place. 


Worldview ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 15-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Gessert

Confusion and a deep division within the American public over die value of an anti-ballistic missile (A.B.M.) defense system was reflected in the midsummer vote in the Senate to authorize about $900 million for expenditure in fiscal year 1970 for President Nixon's Safeguard A.B.M. system.During the debate that preceded the Senate vote, public and religious presses carried many articles that presented forceful arguments against the Safeguard program. These seem to boil down to two principal issues of moral concern: it is alleged, first, that the Safeguard A.B.M. would introduce a destabilizing element into the strategic nuclear balance just at the time we are attempting to enter negotiations with the Soviet. Union for limitation on strategic armaments; second, that deployment of the Safeguard system would be wasteful of national resources needed for pressing domestic problems.


2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvio Pons

Soviet policy toward the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from 1943 to 1948 exemplified Josif Stalin's complicated relationship with the West European Communist parties and Western Europe in general. For a considerable while, Stalin insisted that the PCI follow a policy of moderation. Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCI, heeded Stalin's orders and tried to ensure that the Italian Communists pursued a policy of national unity and avoided conflicts that might lead to civil war in Italy. But this moderate approach collapsed after the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan in 1947 and thereby forced the West European Communist parties into extra-parliamentary opposition. Not until after the poor showing of the PCI in the 1948 Italian elections was the party able to regain a viable role. Stalin's conflicting advice to the PCI was indicative of his tenuous grasp of the situation in Western Europe.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-46
Author(s):  
Peter A. Blitstein

Soviet nationality policy was one of several political responses to cultural diversity in the interwar period. The author situates that policy in its comparative context, contrasting the Soviet Union to its eastern European neighbors and to British and French rule in Africa. Contrary to the nationalizing policies of the new states of eastern Europe, which sought national unity at the expense of ethnic minorities, Soviet nationality policy was initially based on practices of diff erentiation. Contrary to the colonial policies of Britain and France, which were based on ethnic and racial diff erentiation, Soviet policy sought to integrate all peoples into one state. In the mid-to-late 1930s, however, Soviet policy took a nationalizing turn similar to its neighbors in eastern Europe, without completely abandoning policies of ethnic diff erentiation. We should thus understand the Soviet approach as a unique hybrid of contradictory practices of nationalization and diff erentiation.


Author(s):  
Olena Romanenko

Migration to the Australian continent has ancient origins. On 1 January 1901, the Federation of the Commonwealth of Australia included six former colonies: New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, Queensland, and Western Australia. The British origin had 78% of those who were born overseas. The immigration was high on the national agenda. The most ambitious nation-building plan based on immigration was adopted in Australia in the post-World War II period. The shock of the war was so strong that even old stereotypes did not prevent Australians from embarking on immigration propaganda with the slogan “Populate or Perish”. In the middle 1950s, the Australian Department of Immigration realized that family reunion was an important component of successful settlement. In 1955 the Department implemented “Operation Reunion” – a scheme was intended to assist family members overseas to migrate to the continent and reunite with the family already living in Australia. As a result, 30000 people managed to migrate from countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia under this scheme. Today Australia’s approach to multicultural affairs is a unique model based on integration and social cohesion. On governmental level, the Australians try to maintain national unity through respect and preservation of cultural diversity. An example of such an attitude to historical memory is a database created by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). For our research, we decided to choose information about residents of East-Central European origin (Ukraine-born, Poland-born, and Czech Republic-born citizens) in Australia, based on the information from the above mentioned database. The article provides the brief historical background of Polish, Ukrainian and Czech groups on the Continent and describes the main characteristics of these groups of people, such as geographic distribution, age, language, religion, year of arrival, median income, educational qualifications, and employment characteristics.


Slavic Review ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter A. Blitstein

Soviet nationality policy was one of several political responses to cultural diversity in the interwar period. Peter A. Blitstein situates that policy in its comparative context, contrasting the Soviet Union to its eastern European neighbors and to British and French rule in Africa. Contrary to the nationalizing policies of the new states of eastern Europe, which sought national unity at the expense of ethnic minorities, Soviet nationality policy was initially based on practices of differentiation. Contrary to the colonial policies of Britain and France, which were based on ethnic and racial differentiation, Soviet policy sought to integrate all peoples into one state. In the mid-to-late 1930s, however, Soviet policy took a nationalizing turn similar to its neighbors in eastern Europe, without completely abandoning policies of ethnic differentiation. We should thus understand the Soviet approach as a unique hybrid of contradictory practices of nationalization and differentiation


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-84
Author(s):  
SIMON HUXTABLE

This article challenges the assumption, frequently made in scholarship on Soviet media, that news was absent in the Soviet Union. Working across press, radio, and television, the article shows how after 1953 reform of Soviet news became a priority for journalists, editors and media professionals. The article focuses on discussions among journalists and officials about the future of journalism, arguing that journalists’ notions of professional excellence played a crucial role in shaping news coverage. In a climate of Cold War competition with western radio, new technological possibilities and changing political priorities, journalists gradually overcame their condescension towards news, emphasising its civic potential as an agent of social ‘democratisation’, and the artistic nature of reportage. This new configuration was precarious, however, and collapsed after the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968. As the Party placed new restrictions on the flow of information, news lost its professional prestige.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document