Plan Maximum

This chapter looks at Joseph Stalin's decision to put Lavrentiy Beria at the helm of the Soviet nuclear program as strategic weapon systems had become a priority. It notes the release of spacecraft designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolev from exile in Kolyma and who was appointed head of the NII-88 Institute to develop the first intercontinental ballistic missile 8K71. It also describes the efforts invested in the development of critical technologies as the Soviet Union refused to waste its energy on pointless local wars on its borders. The chapter demonstrates Marshal Tito's establishment of his power in Yugoslavia and relinquishment of the Yalta arrangement that obliged him to share power and cooperate with non-communists. It discusses the termination of the provisional wartime government of national unity, which is considered a fusion of the royal government and the puppet parliament.

North Korea will gain from diplomatic momentum

Significance North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited China during January 7-10. He spent his 35th birthday in Beijing and met Chinese President Xi Jinping for the fourth time in ten months. Meanwhile, Pompeo implied on January 11 that sanctions on North Korea could be eased, with a focus on removing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the United States rather than full denuclearisation. Impacts Xi might make an overdue return visit to Pyongyang in April, perhaps before Kim’s promised first visit to Seoul. Other Asian leaders may visit Pyongyang too, conferring legitimacy on Kim. South Korea may once again challenge China for influence in North Korea.

North Korea in 2017

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.

Russia will defer to China's policy on North Korea

Significance While Russia worries about the risk of instability triggered by a strict sanctions regime, its role in the North Korea crisis is limited to supporting China's calls for restraint on all sides. It has supported previous UN sanctions but is against US proposals for tougher action, partly because it insists the July 4 test was of an intermediate-range rather than intercontinental ballistic missile. Impacts Moscow will support the current UN sanctions regime while trying to block expansion and occasionally flouting the rules. South Korean automotive and hi-tech investment is more likely in European Russia than eastern Russia. Russia has neither the will nor the ability to keep North Korea provided with essential goods.