Reconciling schizophrenic deficits in top-down and bottom-up processes: Not yet

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-96
Author(s):  
Angus W. MacDonald
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Computational Modeling ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Context Processing ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Modeling Techniques

AbstractThis commentary challenges the authors to use their computational modeling techniques to support one of their central claims: that schizophrenic deficits in bottom-up (Gestalt-type tasks) and top-down (cognitive control tasks) context processing tasks arise from the same dysfunction. Further clarification about the limits of cognitive coordination would also strengthen the hypothesis.

scholarly journals Antisaccade Deficits in Schizophrenia Can Be Driven by Attentional Relevance of the Stimuli

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonia Bansal ◽  
John M Gaspar ◽  
Benjamin M Robinson ◽  
Carly J Leonard ◽  
Britta Hahn ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Inhibitory Control ◽  
Antisaccade Task ◽  
Relevant Stimulus ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Impaired Performance ◽  
Attentional Resources ◽  
Control Subjects

Abstract The antisaccade task is considered a test of cognitive control because it creates a conflict between the strong bottom-up signal produced by the cue and the top-down goal of shifting gaze to the opposite side of the display. Antisaccade deficits in schizophrenia are thought to reflect impaired top-down inhibition of the prepotent bottom-up response to the cue. However, the cue is also a highly task-relevant stimulus that must be covertly attended to determine where to shift gaze. We tested the hypothesis that difficulty in overcoming the attentional relevance of the cue, rather than its bottom-up salience, is key in producing impaired performance in people with schizophrenia (PSZ). We implemented 3 versions of the antisaccade task in which we varied the bottom-up salience of the cue while holding its attentional relevance constant. We found that difficulty in performing a given antisaccade task—relative to a prosaccade version using the same stimuli—was largely independent of the cue’s bottom-up salience. The magnitude of impairment in PSZ relative to control subjects was also independent of bottom-up salience. The greatest impairment was observed in a version where the cue lacked bottom-up salience advantage over other locations. These results indicate that the antisaccade deficit in PSZ does not reflect an impairment in overcoming bottom-up salience of the cue, but PSZ are instead impaired at overcoming its attentional relevance. This deficit may still indicate an underlying inhibitory control impairment but could also reflect a hyperfocusing of attentional resources on the cue.

From Top-Down to Bottom-Up: Computational Modeling Approaches for Cellular Redoxin Networks

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (16) ◽  
pp. 2075-2086 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ché S. Pillay ◽  
Jan-Hendrik Hofmeyr ◽  
Lefentse N. Mashamaite ◽  
Johann M. Rohwer
Keyword(s):  
Computational Modeling ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Modeling Approaches

scholarly journals Contrasting reactive and proactive control of emotional distraction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gina M. Grimshaw ◽  
Laura Kranz ◽  
David Carmel ◽  
Rosie Moody ◽  
Christel Devue
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Perceptual Task ◽  
Environmental Cues ◽  
Adaptive Processing ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Reactive Control ◽  
Emotional Stimuli ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Emotional Distraction

Attending to emotional stimuli is often beneficial, because they provide important social and environmental cues. Sometimes, however, current goals require that we ignore them. To what extent can we control emotional distraction? Here we show that the ability to ignore emotional distractions depends on the type of cognitive control that is engaged. Participants completed a simple perceptual task at fixation while irrelevant images appeared peripherally. In two experiments, we manipulated the proportion of trials in which images appeared, in order to encourage use of either reactive control (rare distractors) or proactive control (frequent distractors). Under reactive control, both negative and positive images were more distracting than neutral images, even though they were irrelevant and appeared in unattended locations. However, under proactive control, distraction by both emotional and neutral images was eliminated. Proactive control was triggered by the meaning, and not the location, of distracting images. Our findings argue against simple bottom-up or top-down explanations of emotional distraction, and instead show how the flexible use of cognitive control supports adaptive processing of emotional distractors.

Psychology and Culture: Top Down Versus Bottom Up?

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (19) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cole
Keyword(s):  
Top Down ◽  
Bottom Up
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