scholarly journals Contrasting reactive and proactive control of emotional distraction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gina M. Grimshaw ◽  
Laura Kranz ◽  
David Carmel ◽  
Rosie Moody ◽  
Christel Devue
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Perceptual Task ◽  
Environmental Cues ◽  
Adaptive Processing ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Reactive Control ◽  
Emotional Stimuli ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Emotional Distraction

Attending to emotional stimuli is often beneficial, because they provide important social and environmental cues. Sometimes, however, current goals require that we ignore them. To what extent can we control emotional distraction? Here we show that the ability to ignore emotional distractions depends on the type of cognitive control that is engaged. Participants completed a simple perceptual task at fixation while irrelevant images appeared peripherally. In two experiments, we manipulated the proportion of trials in which images appeared, in order to encourage use of either reactive control (rare distractors) or proactive control (frequent distractors). Under reactive control, both negative and positive images were more distracting than neutral images, even though they were irrelevant and appeared in unattended locations. However, under proactive control, distraction by both emotional and neutral images was eliminated. Proactive control was triggered by the meaning, and not the location, of distracting images. Our findings argue against simple bottom-up or top-down explanations of emotional distraction, and instead show how the flexible use of cognitive control supports adaptive processing of emotional distractors.

scholarly journals Proactive Control of Emotional Distraction: An ERP Investigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Emotional Processing ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Reactive Control ◽  
Frequency Condition ◽  
Distractor Processing ◽  
Early Posterior Negativity ◽  
Distraction Task ◽  
Emotional Distraction

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>

scholarly journals Proactive Control of Emotional Distraction: An ERP Investigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Emotional Processing ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Reactive Control ◽  
Frequency Condition ◽  
Distractor Processing ◽  
Early Posterior Negativity ◽  
Distraction Task ◽  
Emotional Distraction

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>

scholarly journals Learning to Expect the Predictable: The Role of Expectation in the Cognitive Control of Attention

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Andre Botes
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Control Strategies ◽  
Perceptual Task ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Emotional Stimuli ◽  
Unique Challenge ◽  
Fourth Trial ◽  
Selection History ◽  
Task Irrelevant ◽  
The Cost

<p>Some of the visual world is relevant to our goals and needs. Much more is not. A problem we face frequently in day-to-day living is that we are distracted by what is not relevant to our goals at the cost of attention towards what is. Emotional stimuli in particular have been shown to be very effective distractors, out-competing task-relevant stimuli for our attentional resources (Carretié, 2014; Pessoa, 2005; Pourtois et al., 2013).  How often emotional distractors occur can alter our ability to ignore them and remain task focussed (Grimshaw et al., 2018; Schmidts et al., 2020). The Dual Mechanisms of Control framework (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) suggests that, because we can expect upcoming distractors when they occur frequently, we can effectively avoid distraction through proactive control; the use of effortful preparatory cognitive control strategies.  That said, when distractors are frequent, we also become more experienced with them, and resolving the attentional conflict they create. The present investigation spanned two experiments assessing whether expectation of upcoming distractors would elicit proactive control while holding the experience of previous distractors constant. In Experiment 1 participants performed a simple perceptual task at fixation while neutral or negative task irrelevant images appeared peripherally on 25% of trials, either predictably in sequence (every fourth trial) or randomly. Expectation of distraction did not improve participants’ ability to avoid emotional distraction. A paradoxical expectation effect was also found wherein distraction was increased rather than decreased when distractors occurred predictably.  In Experiment 2 distractors appeared either predictably (every fourth trial), on a random 25% of trials, or on a random 75% of trials. However, neutral and emotional images were now presented at fixation with the perceptual task presented above and below. Greater distractor frequency led to lower distraction and expectation of upcoming distractors again did not improve control, although a paradoxical increase in distraction was not replicated.  Findings indicate that expectation of upcoming distractors alone is not sufficient to drive individuals to implement proactive control. Rather, distractor frequency is suggested to drive proactive control through implicit changes in top-down control settings based on experience. While the processes behind experience-driven proactive control are unclear, conflict adaptation and selection history are discussed as possible mechanisms of experience driven proactive control. Critically, present findings also indicate that emotional stimuli may present a unique challenge to our ability to control our attention.</p>

scholarly journals Learning to Expect the Predictable: The Role of Expectation in the Cognitive Control of Attention

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Andre Botes
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Control Strategies ◽  
Perceptual Task ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Emotional Stimuli ◽  
Unique Challenge ◽  
Fourth Trial ◽  
Selection History ◽  
Task Irrelevant ◽  
The Cost

<p>Some of the visual world is relevant to our goals and needs. Much more is not. A problem we face frequently in day-to-day living is that we are distracted by what is not relevant to our goals at the cost of attention towards what is. Emotional stimuli in particular have been shown to be very effective distractors, out-competing task-relevant stimuli for our attentional resources (Carretié, 2014; Pessoa, 2005; Pourtois et al., 2013).  How often emotional distractors occur can alter our ability to ignore them and remain task focussed (Grimshaw et al., 2018; Schmidts et al., 2020). The Dual Mechanisms of Control framework (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) suggests that, because we can expect upcoming distractors when they occur frequently, we can effectively avoid distraction through proactive control; the use of effortful preparatory cognitive control strategies.  That said, when distractors are frequent, we also become more experienced with them, and resolving the attentional conflict they create. The present investigation spanned two experiments assessing whether expectation of upcoming distractors would elicit proactive control while holding the experience of previous distractors constant. In Experiment 1 participants performed a simple perceptual task at fixation while neutral or negative task irrelevant images appeared peripherally on 25% of trials, either predictably in sequence (every fourth trial) or randomly. Expectation of distraction did not improve participants’ ability to avoid emotional distraction. A paradoxical expectation effect was also found wherein distraction was increased rather than decreased when distractors occurred predictably.  In Experiment 2 distractors appeared either predictably (every fourth trial), on a random 25% of trials, or on a random 75% of trials. However, neutral and emotional images were now presented at fixation with the perceptual task presented above and below. Greater distractor frequency led to lower distraction and expectation of upcoming distractors again did not improve control, although a paradoxical increase in distraction was not replicated.  Findings indicate that expectation of upcoming distractors alone is not sufficient to drive individuals to implement proactive control. Rather, distractor frequency is suggested to drive proactive control through implicit changes in top-down control settings based on experience. While the processes behind experience-driven proactive control are unclear, conflict adaptation and selection history are discussed as possible mechanisms of experience driven proactive control. Critically, present findings also indicate that emotional stimuli may present a unique challenge to our ability to control our attention.</p>

scholarly journals Motivation enhances control of positive and negative emotional distractions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Teresa Walsh ◽  
David Carmel ◽  
David Harper ◽  
Gina M. Grimshaw
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Perceptual Task ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Task Motivation ◽  
Task Irrelevant ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Positive Stimuli ◽  
Emotional Distraction ◽  
Do So

Using cognitive control to ignore distractions is essential for successfully achieving our goals. In emotionally-neutral contexts, motivation can reduce interference from irrelevant stimuli by enhancing cognitive control. However, attention is commonly biased towards emotional stimuli, making them potent distractors. Can motivation aid control of emotional distractions, and does it do so similarly for positive and negative stimuli? Here, we examined how task motivation influences control of distraction from positive, negative, and neutral scenes. Participants completed a simple perceptual task while attempting to ignore task-irrelevant images. One group received monetary reward for fast and accurate task performance; another (control) group did not. Overall, both negative (mutilation) and positive (erotic) images caused greater slowing of responses than neutral images of people, but emotional distraction was reduced with reward. Crucially, despite the different motivational directions associated with negative and positive stimuli, reward reduced negative and positive distraction equally. Our findings suggest that motivation may encourage the use of a sustained proactive control strategy that can effectively reduce the impact of emotional distraction.

scholarly journals S140. CHARACTERISTICS OF COGNITIVE CONTROL SPECIALIZATION IN HEALTHY AND PATIENT POPULATIONS

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S89-S89
Author(s):  
Anita Kwashie ◽  
Yizhou Ma ◽  
Andrew Poppe ◽  
Deanna Barch ◽  
Cameron Carter ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Parietal Cortex ◽  
Posterior Parietal Cortex ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Reactive Control ◽  
Goal Maintenance ◽  
Posterior Parietal

Abstract Background Cognitive control mechanisms enable an individual to regulate, coordinate, and sequence thoughts and actions to obtain desired outcomes. A theory of control specialization posits that proactive control is necessary for anticipatory planning and goal maintenance and recruits sustained lateral prefrontal activity, whereas reactive control, essential for adapting to transient changes, marshals a more extensive brain network (Braver, 2012). Increased task errors and reduced frontoparietal activity in proactive contexts is observed in severe psychopathology, including schizophrenia (Poppe et al., 2016), leading to the prediction that patients rely on reactive control more when performing such tasks. However, evidence of primate prefrontal ‘switch’ neurons, active during both proactive and reactive contexts, challenges the notion that cognitive control relies on discrete processing networks (Blackman et al., 2016). To examine this contradiction, we sought to characterize the distinctiveness between proactive and reactive control in healthy and patient populations using the Dot Pattern Expectancy Task (DPX). We also examined if a bias toward proactive or reactive control predicted behavioral metrics. Methods 44 individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and 50 matched healthy controls (HC) completed 4 blocks of the DPX during a 3-Tesla fMRI scan (Poppe et al., 2016). Participants followed the ‘A-then-X’ rule, in which they pressed one button whenever an A cue followed an X probe, and pressed a different button for any other non-target stimulus sequence. We examined bilateral frontoparietal ROIs from the literature for evidence of cognitive control specialization as well as whole-brain analyses. Subsequent nonparametric tests and measures of neural response variation strengthened our interpretations. Participant d’-context (dependent on task accuracy) measured their tendency to engage in proactive control. Results Behavioral data revealed that HC participants showed a greater proclivity for proactive control than did their SZ counterparts. HC reaction time outpaced SZ reaction time in trials requiring successful marshalling of proactive control. Preliminary neuroimaging analyses suggest marginal between-group differences in control specialization. HC specialization appeared to be most apparent in diffuse frontal lateral regions, and bilateral posterior parietal cortex. Within the SZ group, specialization was most evident in bilateral posterior parietal cortex. Between-group control specialization differences were most apparent in right hemisphere frontal regions. Superior frontal gyrus and medial temporal lobe activity during proactive processes accounted for modest variance in d’-context. Discussion There were significant between-group differences in goal maintenance behavioral metrics such as reaction time and a tendency to engage in proactive control. Control specialization occurred more diffusely in controls compared to patient counterparts. However, activity in these regions had minimal ability to predict behavioral metrics. Overall, the relatively small size of control-specific areas compared to regions involved in dual processing offers support for the malleable nature of regions implicated in human cognitive control.

scholarly journals Antisaccade Deficits in Schizophrenia Can Be Driven by Attentional Relevance of the Stimuli

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonia Bansal ◽  
John M Gaspar ◽  
Benjamin M Robinson ◽  
Carly J Leonard ◽  
Britta Hahn ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Inhibitory Control ◽  
Antisaccade Task ◽  
Relevant Stimulus ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Impaired Performance ◽  
Attentional Resources ◽  
Control Subjects

Abstract The antisaccade task is considered a test of cognitive control because it creates a conflict between the strong bottom-up signal produced by the cue and the top-down goal of shifting gaze to the opposite side of the display. Antisaccade deficits in schizophrenia are thought to reflect impaired top-down inhibition of the prepotent bottom-up response to the cue. However, the cue is also a highly task-relevant stimulus that must be covertly attended to determine where to shift gaze. We tested the hypothesis that difficulty in overcoming the attentional relevance of the cue, rather than its bottom-up salience, is key in producing impaired performance in people with schizophrenia (PSZ). We implemented 3 versions of the antisaccade task in which we varied the bottom-up salience of the cue while holding its attentional relevance constant. We found that difficulty in performing a given antisaccade task—relative to a prosaccade version using the same stimuli—was largely independent of the cue’s bottom-up salience. The magnitude of impairment in PSZ relative to control subjects was also independent of bottom-up salience. The greatest impairment was observed in a version where the cue lacked bottom-up salience advantage over other locations. These results indicate that the antisaccade deficit in PSZ does not reflect an impairment in overcoming bottom-up salience of the cue, but PSZ are instead impaired at overcoming its attentional relevance. This deficit may still indicate an underlying inhibitory control impairment but could also reflect a hyperfocusing of attentional resources on the cue.

scholarly journals Metacognitive Processes in Executive Control Development: The Case of Reactive and Proactive Control

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1125-1136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Chevalier ◽  
Shaina Bailey Martis ◽  
Tim Curran ◽  
Yuko Munakata
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Task Switching ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Target Onset ◽  
Proactive Control ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Reactive Control ◽  
Critical Aspect ◽  
Metacognitive Processes

Young children engage cognitive control reactively in response to events, rather than proactively preparing for events. Such limitations in executive control have been explained in terms of fundamental constraints on children's cognitive capacities. Alternatively, young children might be capable of proactive control but differ from older children in their metacognitive decisions regarding when to engage proactive control. We examined these possibilities in three conditions of a task-switching paradigm, varying in whether task cues were available before or after target onset. RTs, ERPs, and pupil dilation showed that 5-year-olds did engage in advance preparation, a critical aspect of proactive control, but only when reactive control was made more difficult, whereas 10-year-olds engaged in proactive control whenever possible. These findings highlight metacognitive processes in children's cognitive control, an understudied aspect of executive control development.

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