Some Preliminary Remarks on the Relationship Between the Envisaged International Criminal Court and the un Security Council

1999 ◽  
Vol 46 (03) ◽  
pp. 313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriël H. Oosthuizen
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Relationship

scholarly journals Coexistent but Uncoordinated: Asset Freezing Measures at the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 983-1025
Author(s):  
Daley J. Birkett
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Parallel Implementation ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Effective Discharge ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Two Bodies

Abstract Both the International Criminal Court (icc) and the UN Security Council (unsc) are vested with the capacity to request States to freeze individuals’ assets. The two bodies are also bound to cooperate closely under the terms of their relationship agreement ‘with a view to facilitating the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities’. This article examines whether this obligation extends to the unsc coordinating its targeted sanctions regime to support the icc in respect of the enforcement powers with which the latter is equipped. It does so by analysing eight cases where unsc action (could) have coincided with icc operations, with a particular focus on the (non-)parallel implementation of the two bodies’ asset freezing procedures. The article demonstrates that, though the activities of the unsc and the icc in this sphere of their respective operations might have overlapped on a number of occasions, they have rarely been deliberately coordinated. This leads the author to conclude that close cooperation as envisaged in the relationship agreement between the two bodies is unlikely on this front.

Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise Keppler
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
African Government ◽  
Un Security Council

AbstractThe International Criminal Court (ICC) suffered two notable setbacks in Africa in 2010: the African Union's (AU) renewed call for members not to cooperate in executing ICC arrest warrants for Sudanese President al-Bashir; and the president's first visits to the territory of ICC states parties since warrants were issued in 2009 and 2010. Factors surrounding these developments suggest they do not represent the predominant view or approach to the court in Africa, where there is considerable backing for the ICC among African government officials and civil society. African ICC states parties and civil society should enhance initiatives to demonstrate the support that exists for the court, and to ensure that attacks on it are understood as limited efforts that emanate more from criticisms of the UN Security Council than of the court. Developments in 2011 reinforce these assessments.

scholarly journals The African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Politicisation of International Justice in Africa

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benson Chinedu Olugbuo
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
African Union ◽  
African Countries ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Relationship

There are two questions with multiple answers regarding the relationship between Africa and the International Criminal Court. The first is whether the International Criminal Court is targeting Africa and the second is if politics plays any role in the decision to investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. For the African Union, the International Criminal Court has become a western court targeting weak African countries and ignoring the atrocities committed by big powers including permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The accusation by the African Union against the International Criminal Court leads to the argument that the International Criminal Court is currently politised. This is a charge consistently denied by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between the United Nations Security Council, the International Criminal Court and the African Union. It articulates the role of the three institutions in the fight against impunity and the maintenance of international peace and security with reference to the African continent. The paper argues that complementarity should be applied to regional organisations and that the relationship between the African Union and the International Criminal Court should be guided by the application of positive complementarity and a nuanced approach to the interests of justice. This offers the International Criminal Court and the African Union an opportunity to develop mutual trust and result-oriented strategies to confront the impunity on the continent. The paper further argues that the power of the United Nations Security Council to refer situations to the International Criminal Court and defer cases before the Court is a primary source of the disagreement between the prosecutor and the African Union and recommends a division of labour between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council.

Status and Intervention in Libya, 2011–2012

2019 ◽  
pp. 88-107
Author(s):  
Courtney J. Fung
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Global South ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Tiananmen Square ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Feasible Option ◽  
Socially Isolated

Chapter 5 analyzes China’s response to the 2011 Libya crisis. In the space of three weeks, China would vote on two landmark resolutions at the UN Security Council: a yes vote for a unanimous referral of a sitting head of state to the International Criminal Court, and shortly after, an abstention vote permitting sanctions and a “no-fly zone plus” over Libyan territory. China’s votes were largely a surprise—many analyses had predicted that China and Russia would cast tandem vetoes. Status is key to understanding China’s response. China was particularly sensitized to status due to a well-publicized speech by Colonel Gaddafi citing his domestic repression as a parallel to the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. Against this status trigger, the great powers (the “P3” of the United States, the United Kingdom, France) came out forcefully for intervention, and representatives of China’s Global South peer group—the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Gulf Cooperation Council—were among the first to call for a strong response. China was able to reconcile its concerns regarding an International Criminal Court referral of the Libya case as China prioritized status; China was socially isolated from its great powers peers at the UN Security Council and from its Global South peers in regional organizations. When the Global South reference group disagreed about the call for a no-fly zone, China viewed the next most feasible option as an abstention vote, so as to offend no peer.

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