2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 551-575
Author(s):  
KERSTIN BLOME ◽  
NORA MARKARD

AbstractThis article examines the problem of colliding international regimes by reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Security Council. Given the different logics or rationalities of these institutions – the Security Council is first and foremost a (power) political organ, while the ICC is in charge of legal assessments – the collision potential is high. A collision rule was therefore introduced into the Rome Statute in the form of Article 16; however, all instances of its application so far have been highly controversial. While norm application is always controversial to some extent, we argue – in reference to Thomas Franck's work on the legitimacy of international norms – that regime responsiveness, secondary rules or a neutral application control of Article 16 could contribute to successful collision management.


Author(s):  
Sean D. Sean D. Murphy

This chapter focuses on the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The discussion provides background to the crime of aggression and the resulting criminal accountability of the guilty party, paying particular attention to UN General Assembly’s adoption in 1974 of a resolution addressing aggression by states rather than the crimes of individuals and is designed as guidance for the Security Council when considering whether an act is one of ‘aggression’. The chapter examines the amendments to the ICC Rome Statute defining ‘act of aggression’ and ‘crime of aggression’ adopted at the ICC Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010. It also discusses the uncertainties and ambiguities in the process for activating ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. It considers the possible institutional effects of such jurisdiction on the UN Security Council and the ICC itself, as well as its long-term consequences for the jus ad bellum.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ademola Abass

AbstractThis article examines whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) can exercise universal jurisdiction. In particular, the author responds to the argument that the ICC can exercise universal jurisdiction on the basis of delegated criminal jurisdiction and the aut dedere aut judicare principle, and challenges the view that the trial of nationals of non-parties by the ICC neither creates obligations for such states nor contravenes the Monetary Gold principle. The author argues that although some Rome Statute crimes have universal character, this does not automatically entitle the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over non-party nationals outside such limited universal jurisdiction as may be conferred on the Court through the Security Council referral.


Author(s):  
Dannenbaum Tom

UN Security Council referrals are a legally sufficient basis for International Criminal Court (ICC) action under the Rome Statute and the United Nations (UN) Charter. However, the fact that each permanent member of the Security Council can veto any such referral and that three of those states have declined to ratify the Statute poses a legitimacy problem for the Court. Specifically, it undermines the Court’s moral standing to judge and thus its capacity to deliver on its core function. Because of both the structure and function of the Court, the privileged position of the Council’s permanent members is more undermining of ICC legitimacy than it is of Council-authorized military action in response to atrocity, and even than it was of the ad hoc tribunals created by the Council. One way to remedy this situation would be to vest the ICC with universal jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Court’s legitimacy would be enhanced if Security Council referrals were removed from the Statute. Those, however, are unlikely amendments. More modestly, the Prosecutor should decline all Security Council referrals under the ‘interests of justice’ test.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-591
Author(s):  
Talita de Souza Dias

Abstract On 17 July 2018, in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC, the Court), the jurisdiction of the Court was finally activated for the crime of aggression, following a decision made by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) in December 2017. This resulted from a long and painstaking process which not only furthered the divide between states parties and non-parties but also generated controversy within the ASP itself. In an attempt to reach a minimum common denominator, the ASP decided to exclude from the ICC’s jurisdiction situations involving states parties that have not ratified the amendments in respect of that crime (‘the Kampala Amendments’). Moreover, since the adoption of the Amendments in 2010, it has been agreed that the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if committed by nationals or on the territory of non-states parties, except when there is a Security Council referral. This combination of jurisdictional hurdles has led many to believe that the crime of aggression will have a limited role to play before the ICC. Nonetheless, a closer look at the Activation Decision, the Kampala Amendments and certain key provisions of the ICC Statute reveals that the activation of the crime of aggression might have a series of overlooked implications for non-parties and parties alike, including those that have not ratified the amendments. In particular, this article will argue that, aside from Security Council referrals, there may still be instances where the Court can apply the crime of aggression to situations involving those states.


2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise Keppler

AbstractThe International Criminal Court (ICC) suffered two notable setbacks in Africa in 2010: the African Union's (AU) renewed call for members not to cooperate in executing ICC arrest warrants for Sudanese President al-Bashir; and the president's first visits to the territory of ICC states parties since warrants were issued in 2009 and 2010. Factors surrounding these developments suggest they do not represent the predominant view or approach to the court in Africa, where there is considerable backing for the ICC among African government officials and civil society. African ICC states parties and civil society should enhance initiatives to demonstrate the support that exists for the court, and to ensure that attacks on it are understood as limited efforts that emanate more from criticisms of the UN Security Council than of the court. Developments in 2011 reinforce these assessments.


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