Status and Intervention in Darfur, Sudan 2004–2008

Chapter 4 analyzes China’s decision to shift its position on intervention in Sudan over the Darfur crisis. China went from viewing Sudan’s problems as domestic affairs not for the UN Security Council’s purview, to actively supporting intervention. China wrangled and effectively “enforced” consent from Khartoum for a UN Charter Chapter VII peacekeeping mission, and acquiesced to a referral of the Sudan case to the International Criminal Court, which led to an indictment of sitting President Omar al-Bashir. Though this case is popularly understood as being determined by material drivers—like shielding the Sino-Sudanese economic relationship, or addressing the reputational threat of the “Genocide Olympics” to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games—the chapter demonstrates that status is the key variable to explain China’s shifting position. Under mounting pressure from both the great powers (the “P3” of the United States, the United Kingdom, France) and the African Union, in particular, China gravitated to supporting and permitting intervention with a yes vote for the UN-AU Hybrid Peace Operation (UNAMID) and an abstention vote for an International Criminal Court referral in 2005, and again in 2008.

Status and Intervention in Libya, 2011–2012

Chapter 5 analyzes China’s response to the 2011 Libya crisis. In the space of three weeks, China would vote on two landmark resolutions at the UN Security Council: a yes vote for a unanimous referral of a sitting head of state to the International Criminal Court, and shortly after, an abstention vote permitting sanctions and a “no-fly zone plus” over Libyan territory. China’s votes were largely a surprise—many analyses had predicted that China and Russia would cast tandem vetoes. Status is key to understanding China’s response. China was particularly sensitized to status due to a well-publicized speech by Colonel Gaddafi citing his domestic repression as a parallel to the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. Against this status trigger, the great powers (the “P3” of the United States, the United Kingdom, France) came out forcefully for intervention, and representatives of China’s Global South peer group—the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Gulf Cooperation Council—were among the first to call for a strong response. China was able to reconcile its concerns regarding an International Criminal Court referral of the Libya case as China prioritized status; China was socially isolated from its great powers peers at the UN Security Council and from its Global South peers in regional organizations. When the Global South reference group disagreed about the call for a no-fly zone, China viewed the next most feasible option as an abstention vote, so as to offend no peer.

Chinese-Language Discourse on Regime Change

Chapter 2 uses an original dataset of Chinese-language sources to understand Chinese views on the connection between regime change and intervention, and unpacks why China finds regime change so problematic. Unlike intervention, which may be permissible under specific conditions, regime change is systematically dismissed. China’s controversies over regime change fall into five categories: defining which actor has the authority to impose regime change; critiques about the aftermath of regime change; misgivings about how regime change affects China’s overseas interests, the role of the United Nations in executing regime change, and how regime change presents challenges to China’s core interests. Most importantly, Chinese writings reflect concerns regarding cases of regime change setting a precedent for actions against China. This chapter adds to an emerging literature that discusses the issue of regime change for China’s foreign policy behavior.

Conclusion

Chapter 7 offers the conclusion, summarizing the findings of the book regarding China’s status dilemma, pinpointing when status matters to China and how status affects China’s position on intervention. The chapter then discusses the implications for understanding China’s foreign policy and the scope conditions for status, showing that even China’s core interests are permeable to status concerns. The analysis shifts to China as an actor in global governance and China’s contributions to modifying normative discourse regarding global peace and security looking at the developmental peace concept, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the “Community for a Shared Future of Mankind.” Next, the chapter considers implications for International Relations, including understanding status as an element for cooperation—as opposed to conflict—and the external validity of the status dilemma for other rising powers. The chapter closes on the implications for international politics of the contestation of regime change and intervention, and further research avenues regarding the status dilemma, intervention, and China’s behavior at the UN Security Council.

Status and Intervention in Syria, 2011–2015

Chapter 6 analyzes China’s decision to halt intervention into the Syria crisis, issuing repeated vetoes instead in 2011, twice in 2012, and again in 2014 against the P3 advocated intervention calling for verbal censure, sanctions, compliance with peace plans, and referral of the Syria case to the International Criminal Court. The chapter challenges the popular view that these four vetoes were a “given” due to the Libya case, which ultimately had led to regime change. The vetoes were not automatic per se; China reconsidered its position, weighing factors against one another before each landmark vote. However, China’s status concerns were largely discounted in this case: there was no status trigger, and concerns about acting within peer group standards did not come into play. None of China’s peer groups could exact social costs on an unresponsive China. China rejected the great powers position that President Bashar al-Assad was no longer a legitimate ruler, and regional players were in internal disarray preventing them from successfully transmitting status signals to China. This is not to say that China was insensitive to status concerns, but that China reconciled status concerns against other interests. China used rhetorical adaptation to clearly distinguish intervention from regime change, and to modify the normative content of the responsibility to protect.

Historical Overview of China and Intervention at the UN Security Council

Chapter 1 sets the scene regarding China’s record on intervention at the UN Security Council since assuming its seat in 1971. The chapter illustrates how the UN Security Council takes an increasingly expansive view as to what is under its purview—including massive human rights abuses as threats to international peace and security—and the different tools to address these threats (sanctions, the International Criminal Court, peacekeeping operations etc.), against a changing normative discourse regarding the protection of civilians, the responsibility to protect, and the norm of accountability. While China shows calibrated flexibility regarding intervention across the decades, China is still consistent in preferring UN Security Council authorized, consent-based interventions, supported by regional players. However, these principles are applied pragmatically, against an assessment of China’s interests, the circumstances of each country case, and a changing normative framework regarding intervention. In the last decades, there are three trends in China’s approach to intervention: enduring scepticism about the benefits of non-consensual Chapter VII activities; a preference to not make Chapter VII intervention a trend; and the persistence of status as a concern in China’s decision-making. The chapter discusses critical historical cases in detail, including intervention into Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, and failed attempts at intervention into Guatemala, Macedonia, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe.

Introduction

The introduction outlines the puzzle and research question for the book: what explains China’s response to intervention at the UN Security Council? China is increasingly forthright about the specter of regime change, viewing the UN Security Council as directly or indirectly executing regime change—the forcible or coerced removal of the political leadership of a state by outside actors—via non-consensual intervention. Broad changes in the international system, like the norms of protection of civilians, accountability, and the responsibility to protect are invoked to secure populations under threat of mass abuse by their governments. However, China’s response to UN Security Council intervention in the trinity of post-9/11 cases where heads of state were marked for dispatch by public discourse is varied: China condoned, acquiesced or prevented action. China’s record cannot be robustly explained by existing theory. This book argues that status is an overlooked determinant in understanding China’s varying position regarding intervention at the UN Security Council. Under certain conditions, China’s status peer groups can modify China’s intervention-resistant preferences in these most difficult cases. China’s pursuit of status is partly driven by consequentialist calculation, but it is also inherently social, to conform to an intersubjective standard of good behavior as a member of the peer group guided by a logic of appropriateness. China faces a status dilemma in that China seeks status from two sometimes competing peer groups: the great powers and the Global South.

Theory and Empirical Strategy

Chapter 3 focuses on theory and empirical strategy. The chapter defines status and situates it against oft-interchanged concepts like honor, prestige, and reputation, and identifies gaps in the status literature. The chapter then explains when China is most status sensitive—i.e. that status drivers can trump other concerns regarding intervention—when there are two components. First, when China’s peer groups are able to exact social costs or social benefits on China by way of social influence. China’s peer groups are most able to do so when they are cohesive with no significant defectors from the peer group, unified around a single policy position, and willing to exact social costs on China for not executing their policy prescription. With these conditions met, peer groups have narrowed and defined policy options for China, so China can clearly understand what the peer group expectations are. A second component is the presence of a status trigger. Status triggers heighten or accentuate China’s pre-existing status concerns by emphasizing China’s isolation from its peer groups, making China more susceptible to status pressures. Status triggers are either speech acts that draw a contemporary parallel to a low status time in China’s foreign policy or attacks on China’s high-profile status-rewarding events. The chapter specifies why the great powers and the Global South are China’s peer groups for intervention, and debunks the popular assumption that Russia stands as China’s peer in the context of intervention.