scholarly journals The structure of priority in the school choice problem

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-381
Author(s):  
Conal Duddy
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Walking Distance ◽  
Extended Formulation ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
A Priority ◽  
Priority Ordering

AbstractIn a school choice problem, each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These orderings depend on criteria such as whether a student lives within walking distance or has a sibling at the school. A priority ordering provides a ranking of students but nothing more. I argue that this information is sufficient when priority is based on merit but not when priority is based on criteria such as walking distance. I propose an extended formulation of the problem wherein a ‘priority matrix’, indicating which criteria are satisfied by each student-school pair, replaces the usual priority orderings.

scholarly journals Coalitions and cliques in the school choice problem

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 801-823
Author(s):  
Sinan Aksoy ◽  
Adam Azzam ◽  
Chaya Coppersmith ◽  
Julie Glass ◽  
Gizem Karaali ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Choice Problem

scholarly journals School choice under partial fairness

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1309-1346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umut Dur ◽  
A. Arda Gitmez ◽  
Özgür Yilmaz
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Characterization Result ◽  
Partial Stability ◽  
Incentive Property ◽  
Student Exchange ◽  
Efficient Matching ◽  
Weak Axiom

We generalize the school choice problem by defining a notion of allowable priority violations. In this setting, a weak axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority violations. We introduce a class of algorithms called the student exchange under partial fairness (SEPF). Each member of this class gives a partially stable matching that is not Pareto dominated by another partially stable matching (i.e., constrained efficient in the class of partially stable matchings). Moreover, any constrained efficient matching that Pareto improves upon a partially stable matching can be obtained via an algorithm within the SEPF class. We characterize the unique algorithm in the SEPF class that satisfies a desirable incentive property. The extension of the model to an environment with weak priorities enables us to provide a characterization result that proves the counterpart of the main result in Erdil and Ergin (2008).

The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 362-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kennes ◽  
Daniel Monte ◽  
Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Day Care ◽  
Student Mobility ◽  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Matching Problem ◽  
Day Care Centers ◽  
Dynamic Matching ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Pareto Efficient

We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public day care centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents over time; for example, the school choice problem once student mobility is taken into account. We show that there does not exist any mechanism that is both stable and strategy-proof. We also show that the well-known Top Trading Cycles mechanism is neither Pareto efficient nor strategy-proof. Finally, a mechanism in which parents sequentially choose menus of schools is both strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. (JEL C73, D82, I21)

scholarly journals Mechanism Design for School Choice with Soft Diversity Constraints

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haris Aziz ◽  
Serge Gaspers ◽  
Zhaohong Sun
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
New Class ◽  
Soft Target

We study the controlled school choice problem where students may belong to overlapping types and schools have soft target quotas for each type. We formalize fairness concepts for the setting that extend fairness concepts considered for restricted settings without overlapping types. Our central contribution is presenting a new class of algorithms that takes into account the representations of combinations of student types. The algorithms return matchings that are non-wasteful and satisfy fairness for same types. We further prove that the algorithms are strategyproof for the students and yield a fair outcome with respect to the induced quotas for type combinations. We experimentally compare our algorithms with two existing approaches in terms of achieving diversity goals and satisfying fairness.

scholarly journals Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kennes ◽  
Daniel Monte ◽  
Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Computer Algorithm ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Strategic Performance ◽  
Matching Problems ◽  
Dynamic Matching ◽  
Deferred Acceptance

In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools’ priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce. (JEL C78, I21, I28)

scholarly journals School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

2003 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Design Approach ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Practical Solution ◽  
Student Assignment ◽  
Education Literature

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.

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