Rationality, uncertainty, and unanimity: an epistemic critique of contractarianism

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Alexander Schaefer
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Scientific Uncertainty ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Decisive Objection

Abstract This paper considers contractarianism as a method of justification. The analysis accepts the key tenets of contractarianism: expected utility maximization, unanimity as the criteria of acceptance, and social-scientific uncertainty of modelled agents. In addition to these three features, however, the analysis introduces a fourth feature: a criteria of rational belief formation, viz. Bayesian belief updating. Using a formal model, this paper identifies a decisive objection to contractarian justification. Insofar as contractarian projects approximate the Agreement Model, therefore, they fail to justify their conclusions. Insofar as they fail to approximate the Agreement Model, they must explain which modelling assumption they reject.

scholarly journals Reasoning about social preferences with uncertain beliefs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
isaac davis ◽  
Ryan W. Carlson ◽  
Yarrow Dunham ◽  
Julian Jara-Ettinger
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Judgments ◽  
Social Agents ◽  
Preference Reasoning ◽  
The Face ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization ◽  
Social Uncertainty

We propose a computational model of social preference judgments that accounts for the degree of an agents’ uncertainty about the preferences of others. Underlying this model is the principle that, in the face of social uncertainty, people interpret social agents’ behavior under an assumption of expected utility maximization. We evaluate our model in two experiments which each test a different kind of social preference reasoning: predicting social choices given information about social preferences, and inferring social preferences after observing social choices. The results support our model and highlight how un- certainty influences our social judgments.

Specialist versus Generalist Decision Making

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin W. Schulz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Vast Array ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization

A number of scholars argue that human and animal decision making, at least to the extent that it is driven by representational mental states, should be seen to be the result of the application of a vast array of highly specialized decision rules. By contrast, other scholars argue that we should see human and animal representational decision making as the result of the application of a handful general principles—such as expected utility maximization—to a number of specific instances. This chapter shows that, using the results of chapters 5 and 6, it becomes possible to move this dispute forwards: the account of the evolution of conative representational decision making defended in chapter 6 together with the account of the evolution of cognitive representational decision making defended in chapter 5, makes clear that both sides of this dispute contain important insights, and that it is possible to put this entire dispute on a clearer and more precise foundation. Specifically, I show that differentially general decision rules are differentially adaptive in different circumstances: certain particular circumstances favor specialized decision making, and certain other circumstances favor more generalist decision making.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 248-250
Author(s):  
Paul Weirich
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Risk Principle ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Mean Risk

Recognizing that an act’s risk is a consequence of the act yields a version of expected-utility maximization that does not need adjustments for risk in addition to the probabilities and utilities of possible outcomes. This treatment of an act’s risk justifies the expected-utility principle, and the mean-risk principle, for evaluation of an act. Rational attitudes to risks explain the rationality of acting in accord with the principles. They ground the separability relations that support the principles. The expected-utility principle justifies a substantive, and not just a representational, version of the decision principle of expected-utility maximization. Consequently, the principle governs a single choice and not just sets of choices. It demands more than consistency of the choices in a set. It demands that each choice follow the agent’s preferences, and these preferences explain the rationality of a choice that complies with the principle.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document