The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution*

1969 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 65-102 ◽  

As other analysts have suggested in different ways, the Cultural Revolution involves differences of emphasis among Chinese leaders over basic directional choices for the society at large: whether Maoist-style politics (or ideology) can continue to “take command” or must yield at least equal place to the practical problems and limitations involved in fixing priorities and setting goals; whether radical Maoism befits a China in transition or must be modified if China is to realize its historically based claim to great power status; or whether China must inevitably “change colour” or can remain ideologically “pure red” even in the throes of modernization.

2004 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 1097-1098
Author(s):  
Michael Schoenhals

This superb history of the Cultural Revolution inside China's foreign ministry is a carefully documented account by a participant whose overriding concern is with the factual record and with setting it straight. Ma Jisen, who worked in the West European Department between 1952 and 1969, asserts that on a number of crucial points popular understanding of Mao's assault on revisionism remains shaped by what are really little more than “dramatically oversimplified… [and] brazenly distorted…cartoonized rumour accounts" (pp. 403–404). In support of this assertion, she adduces much new and powerful evidence, especially from the first years of the Cultural Revolution. The end result is a book that may well prompt many readers to seriously reconsider much of our accepted knowledge about what happened – and why – in those tumultuous years when the British Mission in Beijing was set ablaze, Chinese students waving the Little Red Book were roughed up by the KGB in Red Square, and Mao turned from obsessing about American imperialist paper tigers to describing (in conversation with Edgar Snow in December 1970) that country's Republican president, Richard M. Nixon, as “a good person (haoren), the number one good person in the world!” The author is not out to replace old myths with new ones. She finds no simple answers and, in fact, does not even seem to seek them. Much of the value of her work lies in the subtle way it brings to the fore the absurdity of the Cultural Revolution. On occasion, her raw data, her carefully selected illustrations from contemporary texts, speak only too well for themselves: “If you want peace, the revisionists will not let you have peace,” she quotes Foreign Minister Chen Yi as saying in June 1966 – then, a few lines later, she has him denouncing, in the very same speech, the revisionist fallacy of seeking peaceful co-existence (pp. 13–14).


1980 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 281-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Y. Chang

During the first decade of the People's Republic of China from 1949, overseas Chinese affairs were considered important to the national interest of China, and a special department called the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But during the period from 1967–69, when the Cultural Revolution was caught in the wild wind, overseas Chinese and their institutions, particularly the ones at home, were considered ideologically suspect and undesirable because of their allegedly bourgeois background and foreign connexions. The privileges previously given to them as a cushion to adjust themselves gradually to the socialist system were repudiated and removed. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was disbanded.


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