“We Act as Their Agents” and the Prohibition of Judgment by Laymen: A Discussion of Babylonian Talmud Gittin 88b

AJS Review ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-283
Author(s):  
Amihai Radzyner
Keyword(s):  

A sugya just a few lines long in the Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 88b, had enormous influence on the development of Jewish law in the area of the authority to pass judgment given to rabbinical courts in our day. According to the simple, commonly accepted understanding of this sugya, the Tannaim ruled that the Torah forbade men who had not received ordination to act as judges, and as a result, the judges in Babylonia were permitted to adjudicate, of necessity, only as agents of the judges of Palestine (שליחותייהו קא עבדינן, we act as their agents). The article reexamines these positions. The first part suggests two new ways to understand the essence of the agency of which R. Joseph spoke in the sugya. The second part of the article reexamines the source of the prohibition, to the extent that it exists, against adjudication by laymen.

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avishalom Westreich

Jewish law is normally characterized by a pluralist discourse and, even when controversies are acrimonious, the merits of competitive arguments are recognized and receive some legitimacy. By contrast, Jewish family law, especially in the case of marriage annulment, is characterized quite differently, patently diverging from the pluralist hermeneutic discourse normally characterizing Jewish law. This divergence is the subject of this article.From the work of early classic commentators to modern Jewish Law scholars, the character of marriage annulment in Jewish law has been much debated. Questions about both the authority of the Sages to annul a marriage and the meaning of annulment have arisen. Commentators have probed famous passages in the Babylonian Talmud mentioning the concept of marriage annulment (Heb. hafka'at kiddushin), often simply with the words “the Sages annulled the betrothal.” Similarly, discussing a case where a Jewish writ of divorce (get) was formally void but validated by the Sages, the Palestinian Talmud states “their [i.e., the Sages'] words uproot the words of the Torah,” which implies that the Sages have the authority according to Jewish law to annul a marriage in certain circumstances.


Author(s):  
Leib Moscovitz

The Palestinian Talmud (“Talmud Yerushalmi” in Hebrew; henceforth PT), is a rabbinic compendium of Palestinian provenance from Late Antiquity on the Mishnah. PT is far more than a commentary since it contains independent discussions of Jewish law and thought, stories about rabbis and other types of narrative, and biblical exegesis of various sorts. PT serves as an important tool for scholarly analysis of the more familiar and widely studied Babylonian Talmud (BT); the traditions preserved in PT are often less subject to various types of editorial reworking than their BT counterparts and, as such, can be very helpful for studying the development of their BT parallels. Likewise, PT serves as an important source of information about the Palestinian rabbinic world in Late Antiquity. In traditional settings, PT played a certain role in the interpretation of BT and in the development of Jewish law during the medieval period, in addition to serving as an object of study in its own right, although its study was largely neglected due to textual and interpretative difficulties, which problematized its study both for academic scholars and traditional students. This article accordingly begins by surveying the principal tools for the study of PT and continues with a survey of text-critical and exegetical issues, followed by a survey of various redactional aspects of PT. (Most of this material is in Hebrew, and much of it is highly technical, so it may prove unsuitable for beginners.) The focus here is of course on PT per se, although responsible scholarship on PT necessitates analysis of the work in a number of broader contexts, such as the study of Jewish history in Late Antiquity and rabbinic literature in general; hence, the student of PT is advised to consult surveys of these topics as well.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-63
Author(s):  
Ruth Roded

Beginning in the early 1970s, Jewish and Muslim feminists, tackled “oral law”—Mishna and Talmud, in Judaism, and the parallel Hadith and Fiqh in Islam, and several analogous methodologies were devised. A parallel case study of maintenance and rebellion of wives —mezonoteha, moredet al ba?ala; nafaqa al-mar?a and nush?z—in classical Jewish and Islamic oral law demonstrates similarities in content and discourse. Differences between the two, however, were found in the application of oral law to daily life, as reflected in “responsa”—piskei halacha and fatwas. In modern times, as the state became more involved in regulating maintenance and disobedience, and Jewish law was backed for the first time in history by a state, state policy and implementation were influenced by the political system and socioeconomic circumstances of the country. Despite their similar origin in oral law, maintenance and rebellion have divergent relevance to modern Jews and Muslims.


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