scholarly journals Religious Liberty Sacralized: The Persistence of Christian Dissenting Tradition and the Cincinnati Bible War

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Linda Przybyszewski

In 1869, the Cincinnati school board ended a forty-year tradition of Bible reading in the schools in an attempt to encourage Catholics to use them, thus provoking national controversy and a lawsuit brought by pro-Bible advocates. Scholars regularly cite the Ohio Supreme Court decision in favor of the school board as a landmark in the legal separation of church and state. This article interrogates the meaning of the secularization of law by examining expressions of juristic, pedagogic, and popular consciousness in the multiple levels and spaces where individuals raised and resolved constitutional questions on education. Dissenting Christian tradition shaped the legal brief of Stanley Matthews, the school board's lead attorney. Matthews' sacralized the religious liberty guarantee found in the Ohio Constitution within a post-millennialist framework. Ohio Chief Justice John Welch hybridized Christian dissenting tradition with deistic rationalism in <u>Board of Education v. Minor, et al</u>, thus appealing to as broad a constituency as had the right to elect justices to the Ohio Supreme Court. The limited, technical ruling allowed for a metropole/periphery divide in educational practice, so that Bible reading and prayer in Ohio public schools continued well into the 20th century. Far from a landmark in secularization of the law, the Bible War case demonstrates the persistent power of religion to frame law, including the law of religious liberty.

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 690-713
Author(s):  
Ana Čović

In the light of the announced adoption of the Law on Same-Sex Unions, the question arises whether the draft law is in accordance with the Constitution, especially after the announcements that the law will not be signed. Although the Constitution specifies that marriage is a union of a man and a woman, experts point out that in this case it is not a law on marriage and family, nor does it provide for the possibility of adoption of children by same-sex couples, but that it regulates property, health, pension and other legal relationships of same-sex partners living in the union. At the same time, many public figures have invited traditional religious communities to react in order to defend the "right to freedom and future of the people", emphasizing that contentious issues related to the regulation of mutual rights and obligations of same-sex couples could be resolved by amending the existing laws in those areas. In the countries where similar laws exist, case law has played a significant role, just as various medical and psychological associations. The European case law is not uniform, and cases often end before the European Court of Human Rights, while in the United States at the federal level, all anti-homosexual laws are repealed by a Supreme Court decision (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 [2003]). Nevertheless, there is no single law in this area and the rights of same-sex couples vary from country to country. The paper will provide an overview of significant court decisions in this area in European countries, as well as the decisions of the US Supreme Court, which may lead us to think about the possible legal consequences of (non)adoption of the disputed Law on Same-Sex Unions, about procedures that could be initiated if partners decided to request judicial protection for the purpose of recognizing their guaranteed human rights, as well as the content and significance of such court judgments.


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.


The Conversazione held in the Society’s Apartments, and by the courtesy of the Geological Society in a portion of theirs, on 29 May 1947, was attended by many guests who included the Ambassadors or Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Mexico, Norway, Peru and Switzerland, while the Dominions were represented by their High Commissioners. The Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Clement R. Attlee, the Home Secretary and other Cabinet Ministers were also present. The Church was represented by the Bishops of Coventry and Portsmouth and the Dean of Westminster, while the Services were represented by senior officers of each arm. Other guests included distinguished representatives of the Law, the Universities and Public Schools, Research Organizations and Industry.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.


1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Carroll

The Supreme Court of the United States, whose decisions not only define constitutional law but vitally affect national policy, has long held both an honored and a controversial place in American life. In no area do its decisions bring it more honor or more controversy than in the field of religion; for, as a member of the First Congress under the Constitution said, “the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand. … Thus, the same decision of the Court may be hailed by some as a great landmark in the struggle for religious liberty, and denounced by others as a serious invasion of liberty of conscience. For although it may be pleasant to dream of religion insulated from governmental touch, the dual membership of citizens in the state and in religious bodies insures that conscience and government will touch at some points with inevitable friction, and, to the conscience so touched, it makes little difference whether the governmental hand is that of a local school board, the Congress, or the Supreme Court of the United States.The Court has recently been attacked as antireligious, or at least as callous to our religious heritage, because of its decisions invalidating a state-prescribed prayer and state-prescribed Bible reading in public schools. The first of these decisions prompted the more excited outcry, but the two, at first singly and then together, have precipitated a renewed debate about the proper constitutional relationship between the state and religion.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

AbstractThe right to freedom to practice one’s religion is protected under the Ugandan constitution and in the international human rights instruments to which Uganda is party. There are also different pieces of legislation governing the marriages and divorces of different religious groups in Uganda. The Supreme Court of Uganda in the judgement of Dimanche Sharon and Others v. Makerere University has dealt with the constitutional limitations on the right to freedom of religion. This article discusses the constitutional history leading to the inclusion of the right to freedom of religion in the Constitution of Uganda and the Supreme Court decision interpreting the limitations on the right to freedom of religion.


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