Limited Force and the Return of Reprisals in the Law of Armed Conflict

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-188
Author(s):  
Eric A. Heinze ◽  
Rhiannon Neilsen

AbstractArmed reprisals are the limited use of military force in response to unlawful actions perpetrated against states. Historically, reprisals provided a military remedy for states that had been wronged (often violently) by another state without having to resort to all-out war in order to counter or deter such wrongful actions. While reprisals are broadly believed to have been outlawed by the UN Charter, states continue to routinely undertake such self-help measures. As part of the roundtable, “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” this essay examines the doctrine of armed reprisals in light of recent instances of states using force “short of war” in this manner. We argue that the ban on reprisals has been largely ignored by states, and that recent attempts to apply the laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain (such as the Tallinn Manual) are further weakening this prohibition. We conclude that this is a potentially dangerous development that lowers the bar for resorting to military force, risking escalation and thereby further destabilizing the international system.

Author(s):  
Yishai Beer

This chapter revisits the in bello necessity principle. It challenges the current dichotomy between the two pillars—mistakenly assumed to be polar opposites—of the law of armed conflict: necessity and humanity. It embraces the idea that a well-trained military has an inherent interest in enhancing its operational effectiveness and constraining unnecessary brutality. The exercise of brute force by militaries, though common, reflects professional incompetency. The prevailing law of armed conflict, generally ignores the constraining effect of the necessity principle, which was originally intended to allow only the minimally necessary use of force on the battlefield. Consequently, the prevailing law places the burden of restricting the exercise of brute military force upon humanitarian considerations. Humanitarianism alone, however, cannot deliver the goods and substantially reduce war’s hazards. This chapter therefore calls for the transformation of the military’s actual or potential self-imposed professional constraining standards into a revised legal standard of necessity.


Emerging technologies have always played an important role in armed conflict. From the crossbow to cyber capabilities, technology that could be weaponized to create an advantage over an adversary has inevitably found its way into military arsenals for use in armed conflict. The weaponization of emerging technologies, however, raises challenging legal issues with respect to the law of armed conflict. As States continue to develop and exploit new technologies, how will the law of armed conflict address the use of these technologies on the battlefield? Is existing law sufficient to regulate new technologies, such as cyber capabilities, autonomous weapons systems, and artificial intelligence? Have emerging technologies fundamentally altered the way we should understand concepts such as law-of-war precautions and the principle of distinction? How can we ensure compliance and accountability in light of technological advancement? This book explores these critical questions while highlighting the legal challenges—and opportunities—presented by the use of emerging technologies on the battlefield.


Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


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