The Relationship between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed Conflict

2011 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Corn

AbstractOne of the most complex contemporary debates related to the regulation of armed conflict is the relationship between international humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflict) and international human rights law. Since human rights experts first began advocating for the complementary application of these two bodies of law, there has been a steady march of human rights application into an area formerly subject to the exclusive regulation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). While the legal aspects of this debate are both complex and fascinating, like all areas of conflict regulation the outcome must ultimately produce guidelines that can be translated into an effective operational framework for war-fighters. In an era of an already complex and often confused battle space, there can be little tolerance for adding complexity and confusion to the rules that war-fighters must apply in the execution of their missions. Instead, clarity is essential to aid them in navigating this complexity. This article will explore this debate from a military operational perspective. It asserts the invalidity of extreme views in this complementarity debate, and that the inevitable invocation of human rights obligations in the context of armed conflict necessitates a careful assessment of where symmetry between these two sources of law is operationally logical and where that logic dissipates.


2007 ◽  
Vol 89 (866) ◽  
pp. 373-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Milanovic

AbstractThe article examines and compares two recent judgments which provide some of the most valuable examples of the difficulties surrounding the application of international humanitarian law to the phenomenon of terrorism: the Hamdan judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Targeted Killings judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel. Both judgments deal with the thresholds of applicability of the law of armed conflict, as well as with the concept of unlawful combatancy and the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law. Both judgments are at times inconsistent and lacking in analysis, with the Hamdan judgment in particular misinterpreting the relevant international authorities, including the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions. Despite these flaws, or because of them, both of these judgments remain instructive. The purpose of this article is to present the lessons for the future that these two decisions might bring to ongoing debates on the impact of global terrorism on the law of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Geoffrey S. Corn

Proportionality is one of the most important civilian protection rules in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). In an era when combat almost always occurs in areas with substantial civilian populations, the proportionality rule is critical to protecting civilians and civilian property from the incidental and collateral consequences of attacks directed at otherwise lawful targets. The proportionality rule, however, prohibits attacks against otherwise lawful military objectives only when the attacker anticipates that civilian casualties or destruction to civilian property will be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. Application of the proportionality rule has triggered ongoing debates over the meaning of its constituent terms: What is a military advantage? How is military advantage to be valued? What qualifies as a concrete and direct advantage? When does the knowing infliction of civilian harm qualify as excessive? Considering criminal accountability adds another layer of complexity: What is the proper standard of assessing criminal responsibility based on a violation of this obligation? This chapter explores the relationship between the duty of obedience and the implementation of the proportionality obligation at the tactical level. Given that deliberate attack planning and dynamic targeting arise in different operational contexts, each requires a different implementation focus.


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